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Abstract
Applications are integral to our daily lives to help us processing sensitive I/O data,
such as individual passwords and camera streams, and private application data, such
as financial information and medical reports. However, applications and sensitive
data all surfer from the attacks from kernel rootkits in the traditional architecture,
where the commodity OS that is supposed to be the secure foothold of the system
is routinely compromised due to the large code base and the broad attack surface.
Fortunately, the virtualization technology has significantly reshaped the landscape
of the modern computer system, and provides a variety of new opportunities for us
to protect application and sensitive data.
In this dissertation, we first design and implement a lightweight and reliable
hypervisor Guardian as the system secure foothold, which leverages virtualization
technology and a secure boot and shutdown mechanism to protect itself in its whole
life cycle. Guardian is the first bare-metal hypervisor with integrity and availability
guarantees. Moreover, we extend Guardian to be a framework of secure foothold,
which consists of summarized common security primitives for facilitating our pro-
posed systems and other security services. Based on the reliable secure foothold
(Guardian), we propose AppShield, which protects critical applications through
putting them into isolated execution environments (IEEs). In an IEE, AppShield is
able to reliably and efficiently protect data secrecy and integrity of a critical appli-
cation, as well as the execution integrity, against kernel rootkit attacks. Moreover, it
is able to defend against newly identified threats, which are evidence that protecting
applications against the malicious OS is more difficult than previously realized.
The inputs and outputs of protected application are not protected by AppShield
such that they could be tampered by kernel rootkits. To fix this gap, we propose
a trusted path (TP) scheme, named as Driverguard, to protect I/O flows between
hardware input/output devices and protected applications. DriverGuard is the first
generic approach that protects all kinds of I/O flows with a combination of crypto-
graphic and virtualization techniques. The combination of IEE and TP could protect
almost all applications and sensitive data. But for certain user data, we could do it
better. In this dissertation, we purpose a dedicated system KGuard to protect user
passwords in the increasingly popular online services without needing any IEE and
trusted path. In particular, KGuard does not trust any software components in the
guest kernel and user space (without IEE requirement), and also not leverage any
special hardware to assist the protection.
We implement the prototypes of all the above systems, and evaluate their perfor-
mance overheads. The experiment results show that the performance costs on CPU
computation and device I/O are insignificant.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Overview
Commodity operating systems are ubiquitous in home, commercial, government,
and military settings. The OSes are supposed to be the secure footholds of sys-
tems since they manage the entire resources, so compromising an OS compromises
every program and all security services upon it. In fact, unfortunately, the OSes
are routinely compromised due to the large code base, the broad attack surface and
the buggy loaded modules (drivers). Specifically, modern OSes usually have large
code base. According to the statistics from kernel developers [103], the Linux ker-
nel version 3.5 contains 39096 files with 15.6M SLOC, and its next version (i.e.,
version 3.6) adds 637 files with around 300, 000 SLOC in less than 3 months (i.e.,
71 days). For such large code base, it is impossible for current formal verification
techniques to formally remove all bugs [39]. The broad attack surface is also a
threat for OS security. The statistical results show that the Linux kernel version 3.6
has up to 337 system calls besides many implicit interfaces (e.g., /proc and /sys
virtual file systems) for applications to communicate with the OS. The dynamically
loaded modules and drivers are usually buggy (not fully tested) and they inevitably
increase the complexity of the OS and the number of attack interfaces. All these
factors cause the OS is not a good candidate of secure foothold of a system.
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Once a part of the monolithic commodity OS is compromised, the whole OS
is compromised and consequently all applications are compromised. Applications
are used in our daily life to process sensitive information, from sensitive I/O data,
such as individual passwords, biometric finger prints and camera streams, to private
application data, such as online banking information, medical reports and email
content. When the OS (secure foothold) is compromised, all data within application
address space are freely accessed by the adversary, and all security protections that
are built upon the OS to intentionally protect the application data are consequently
broken. Thus, a new application protection scheme that should be able to protect
the whole applications address space against the potentially compromised OS is
desired.
Another main threat from the compromised OS is the secrecy of the I/O data,
which are transmitted between the hardware input/output devices and user applica-
tions via the compromised OS. The I/O data usually contains sensitive information,
such as the data rendered from applications, e.g., sound data and printer data, or
generated for applications, e.g., keyboard passwords and fingerprints. In such I/O
data, all network traffics and disk files could be well protected through encryption,
such as the SSL technique can protect network I/O data. However, for the raw I/O
data, such as keyboard inputs, camera streams and fingerprints cannot be protected
through encryption techniques, because they are structured data. The encryption
may break constrains or change the meaning of certain fields, and consequently
cause unpredictable errors. For example, a camera stream consists of header and
data sections that are encoded by the camera device. If we simply encrypt the w-
hole stream, the header information will be lost or wrongly translated, which will
lead to video errors and even crash the camera driver or the corresponding user ap-
plication. In addition, the commodity hardware devices are not encryption-capable.
Thus, the generated data or the received data should be in plain text, such as the
keyboard scan code and the document content receiving by the printer. Once kernel
rootkits know the locations of the buffers caching the plain text, they can reveal and
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tamper with the data by directly accessing them.
To address the above problems, we need to answer a series of critical research
questions: which component/layer of the system could be the secure foothold?
What security mechanisms can be applied to it to make it reliable while still com-
patible with existing OS and applications? How to protect the whole application
against untrusted OS while still keeping it usable, e.g., allowing it to exchange data
with outside and use the memory as a fashion in the normal setting? How to effi-
ciently protect the secrecy of the I/O data transmitting between hardware input/out-
put devices and applications via the potentially compromised OS? Is the encryption-
capable device necessary? Can we do it better if we only focus on the protection
on one specific I/O data? Furthermore, Based on the secure foothold, what secure
primitives it can provide, and what security services can be built, besides the appli-
cation protection and the I/O data protection?
1.2 Research Objectives
In this dissertation, we aim to answer the above questions. Moreover, we aim to
design and implement several secure virtualization systems to demonstrate and e-
valuate our solutions on today’s hardware and software architecture.
1.2.1 Reliable Secure Foothold
The hypervisor is a promising secure foothold candidate. As a small piece of soft-
ware between the OS and the hardware, the hypervisor has the unique advantages,
in terms of the balance between security and versatility. However, to be a reliable
secure foothold, the hypervisor should meet two critical requirements. Firstly, it
should be secure against attacks from rootkits which can subvert the operating sys-
tem. Secondly, it should be always available throughout the life cycle even when
the OS is corrupted. By virtue of the virtualization, a hypervisor is widely deemed
as software which can resist attacks from an untrusted guest OS. However, no hy-
pervisor can simultaneously satisfy all the above requirements, especially for the
3
Application 
Operating  
System 
I/O Flows 
Hypervisor 
. . .  
Application 
Protection 
I/O Data 
Protection 
Reliable 
Foothold 
Figure 1.1: Research Objectives. In this dissertation, we focus on the application
protection and I/O data protection based on a reliable secure foothold.
availability requirement. It is challenging to achieve the reliability property, be-
cause 1) the kernel rootkits can directly modify or even delete the TCB (including
the hypervisor) images from the disk to make them unavailable. If the hypervisor
chooses to do runtime checking through intercepting disk I/O, it will lead to numer-
ous context switches, reducing the performance of the disk I/O as well as the CPU
utilization; and 2) the rebooting and shutdown mechanism of commodity systems
are complex. The hypervisor should efficiently and completely handle all of them
to ensure the availability before the system really rebooting/shutdown.
In this dissertation, we aim to build a reliable and lightweight secure foothold
with integrity and availability guarantees. Moreover, we aim to extend our secure
foothold to be a framework, which consists of common security primitives that are
potentially needed by our proposed systems and many other security systems. In
this way, people can quickly adopt it to support new security services with no or
minimum customizations.
1.2.2 Application Protection
The application protection is challenging due to the complex memory manage-
ment and the intensive data exchange between the protected applications with
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outside (e.g., the OS). The approaches like Flicker [57], TrustVisor [56] and
Fides [89] simplify the problem setting by assuming that the protected code is
self-contained with pre-defined inputs and outputs (e.g., inputs are the initial pa-
rameters and outputs are the final returns); and that the protected execution does
not involve dynamic memory allocation or deallocation. Some other system-
s [57, 56, 89, 13, 17, 106, 92, 16, 90] aim to protect the whole application in the
real settings. However, they have various drawbacks, such as high performance
overhead, large Trusted Computing Base (TCB), hardware modifications, or with
a restriction imposed on the protected code. Moreover, several newly identified
threats in Chapter 4 are evidence that protecting applications from malicious OS
is more challenging than previously realized. For example, the malicious OS may
swap two address translation mappings to break the data integrity without directly
accessing the data pages (i.e., mapping reorder attack). It may also illicitly return
an allocated memory region with its virtual addresses occupied by the application
stack (i.e., Iago attack [15]). By doing so, the application may happen to modi-
fy the control data (e.g., return address) in the stack, and thereby compromise the
execution of the victim application.
Thus, in this dissertation, we aim to propose a system to protect an application
with small TCB and low performance loss, as well as no modifications on system
hardware. Moreover, the new scheme should be able to defend against newly iden-
tified attacks.
1.2.3 I/O Data Protection
Application protection can only protect the data within application address space.
For the I/O data out of the protected application (transmitting in the kernel space)
are not protected. Thus, a I/O data protected scheme is desired. In fact, protect-
ing I/O data is to build trusted paths, which are secure channels that assure the
secrecy and/or authenticity of data transfers between a hardware devices and an iso-
lated execution environment. Without a trusted path, an adversary could illicitly
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obtain sensitive user inputs and the outputs of an application. Traditional trusted
paths are built upon commodity OS, which is not a reliable secure foothold. Thus,
some researchers propose new trusted path schemes to defend against untrusted OS.
However, they all have several drawbacks, such as needing encryption-capable de-
vices [59, 97], and incompatible with legacy applications [109].
Thus, in this dissertation, we aim to propose a generic, secure (against untrusted
OS) and practical (without needing special hardware and compatible with legacy
applications) trusted path scheme for protecting I/O flows on the commodity plat-
forms. It is challenging since it needs to handle all kinds of device I/O, and has no
extra assistance from special hardware.
Password Protection
The combination of IEE and TP could protect almost all applications and sensitive
data. But for certain user data, we could do it better, even in terms of security. In
this dissertation, we aim to propose a dedicated system to protect user passwords
in the increasingly popular online services. To make the new system secure and
practical, it should satisfy several requirements. Firstly, the new system should not
need any trusted information from isolated/trusted components in the guest space.
Secondly, it should not need special hardware to build trusted path. Thirdly, the new
system should be compatible with existing OS and all applications, especially for
legacy web browsers. Fourthly, the new system should be user-friendly, meaning
the interaction interface for web authentication should keep the same. Last but not
the least, the performance overhead and the latency in the whole process of the web
authentication should be insignificant. In this dissertation, we aim to let the new
proposed system support all these five requirements.
1.3 Threat Model
We assume the end-users themselves are security conscious, meaning that they are
aware of the potential dangers/attacks that arise from adversaries. The security-
6
conscious users are willing to enable some protection mechanisms and are wary of
authentication of the availability of the protection, e.g., the user will verify if he/she
gets a secret feedback (a secret message or a flashing signal) when the correspond-
ing protection mechanism is enabled.
We assume that a remote adversary completely controls the guest operating sys-
tems, meaning that the remote adversary is able to launch arbitrary code or appli-
cations to access any system resources, such as I/O ports, Memory-Mapped I/O
(MMIO) and main memory. Specifically, the adversary may 1) get the data stored
in the device memory or I/O ports by manipulating the configuration space of the
target or other devices, 2) intercept the I/O flows that goes through the kernel space
via device drivers, and 3) read user sensitive data from the user space by directly
accessing a particular memory region or following the links in some data structures.
The purposes of the adversary are to break the system foothold (the hypervisor),
and/or get the secrecy of the I/O data.
We assume that the adversary can not compromise the hardware devices whose
behaviors always exactly follow their specifications. We also assume the system
firmware is trusted. In fact, the modern BIOS has a built-in hardware lock mechanis-
m [91] to set itself as read-only so that the OS cannot tamper with it. Furthermore,
the modern BIOS only accepts signed updates [45, 97]. Due to the complexity of the
x86 platform (e.g., optional ROM), this assumption may not always true. Nonethe-
less, it is still possible to validate the system firmware by the proposed attestation
approach [52] or by a trusted system integrator.
The hypervisor is trusted. The load-time integrity of the hypervisor is achieved
through secure boot mechanism [96], and the runtime security is guaranteed by the
virtualization technology. Specifically, the hypervisor isolates its memory region by
configuring Extended/Nested Page Table (EPT/NPT) and IOMMU to stop software
and DMA access driven by hardware. The hypervisor is not as secure as the TPM
chip since several attacks have been discovered to compromise some versions of
hypervisors [94, 27, 49, 69]. However, the security of the hypervisor can be verified
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by those schemes [99, 98, 5, 69].
1.4 Metrics
We identify several key metrics to evaluate the security, efficiency and practicality
of a protection mechanism.
• Size of Code Base (e.g., SLOC). The size of the TCB should be as small
as possible. The smaller TCB will export less attack surface which may be
used by adversaries to compromise the system, and its security may be proven
through the rigorous formal verification mechanism [39].
• Performance Overhead. The security protection system should only intro-
duce reasonable performance overhead for the protected target (e.g., an ap-
plication) and other components in that system. The poor performance may
dramatically reduce the value of the protection system.
• Compatibility. The compatibility issue should be considered during the de-
sign of a protection system. It is better to be transparent to either the legacy
applications or the operating systems if it is not simultaneously compatible
with both of them.
• Practicality. The whole protection mechanism should be user-friendly for
normal end-users who do not possess or lack security domain knowledge.
Furthermore, the mechanism should be able to be widely deployed without
requiring special hardware (e.g., encryption-capable keyboard).
1.5 Terminology
This section establishes the terminology that is used throughout this dissertation.
• Secure Foothold. A secure foothold is a piece of code with highest privilege
in a system. The secure foothold is trusted and always behaves as expected.
It can bolster various security systems by growing the trust chains.
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• Isolated Execution Environment (IEE). The execution environment is de-
fined by code S executing on a specific platform. The isolated execution
environment protects the execution of S from any other code.
• Trusted Path (TP). A Trusted Path (TP) is a secure channel that assures the
secrecy and/or authenticity of data transfers between a hardware devices and
an isolated execution environment. Without a trusted path, an adversary could
illicitly obtain sensitive user inputs and the outputs of an application.
• Trusted Computing Base (TCB). The trusted computing base of a computer
system is the set of all hardware, firmware, and software components that
are critical to its security. Once they are compromised by the adversary, the
security properties will be broken.
• Virtualization. Virtualization is a technology that creates, manages, intro-
spects and destroys guest domains (virtual machines). The software that im-
plements virtualization is usually called virtual machine monitor (VMM) or
hypervisor.
1.6 Dissertation Overview
In this dissertation, we leverage virtualization technology to harden system-
s [19, 18, 20, 21]. Specifically, we build a lightweight and reliable hypervisor
(Guardian) as a system secure foothold, which is able to boost computer security and
provide reliable assistance for the end user to cope with various threats. Guardian
as the system secure foothold has two prominent features. The first is a secure boot-
up and shutdown mechanism, which enhances the existing hardware-based secure
bootup by offering integrity and availability protection of the TCB images and crit-
ical information. Another feature is a user-hypervisor interface which allows the
end-user to issue commands to and receive responses from Guardian at runtime.
The interface is secure in the sense that the channel between the end-user and the
hypervisor is authentic and the exchanged information is not exposed to the guest.
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Figure 1.2: AppShield protects an application through an isolated execution envi-
ronments built upon Guardian (the reliable secure foothold). The I/O flows between
the protected application and hardware I/O devices are protected by DriverGuard
through trusted paths. For user passwords, they are specifically protected by K-
Guard.
Based on Guardian, we propose AppShield, which protects critical applications
by putting them into isolated execution environments (IEE). AppShield is able to
reliably and efficiently protect data secrecy and integrity of a critical application,
as well as its execution integrity, against kernel rootkit attacks. Specifically, App-
Shield leverages the hardware-assisted virtualization techniques [46] to isolate the
application’s address space such that all accesses from the untrusted OS are blocked
except those explicitly authorized by the application through system calls. The pro-
tected application is allowed to utilize the main memory in the same fashion as in
a normal (unprotected) setting, and to access the memory with native speed, i.e.
without encryption/decryption or being intercepted. AppShield localizes the perfor-
mance overhead to the protected application and keeps the performances of those
unprotected applications unaffected.
The inputs and outputs of protected application are not protected by AppShield
so that they could be tampered by the untrusted OS. To fix this gap, we propose
DriverGuard to support trusted paths between the protected application and hard-
ware input/output devices. DriverGuard is a holistic and compact I/O protection
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system making use of a combination of cryptographic and virtualization techniques.
In particular, the trusted path built by DriverGuard focuses on those devices that ren-
der raw data, e.g., sound cards and printers, or generate raw data for applications,
e.g., seismic sensors and fingerprint scanners. Disk and network I/O are less con-
cerned, because such data could be simply protected through encryption.
The combination of IEE and TP could protect almost all applications and sensi-
tive data. But for certain user data, we could do it better, even in terms of security. In
this dissertation, we purpose a dedicated system KGuard to protect user password-
s in the increasingly popular online services without needing any IEE and trusted
path. In particular, KGuard does not trust any software component in the guest k-
ernel and user space (without IEE requirement), and also not leverage any special
hardware to assist the protection. Note that KGuard is able to protect user pass-
words against all kernel- and application-level key-loggers as well as all kinds of
network eavesdroppers.
Based on the above proposed systems, and many other existing virtualization-
based security systems, we summarize the common security primitives into our
secure foothold (Guardian), upgrading it to be a framework/template of secure
foothold so that it could be easily customized by end users according to their de-
mands to harden their systems. To demonstrate the value of the framework, we
create four security utilities, i.e., hypervisor-based firewall, device monitoring, soft-
ware runtime attestation and user present attestation for password authentication.
The experiment results show that we only need adding a few lines of code to achieve
all these security services, and the performance overheads are insignificant.
1.6.1 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation includes the following chapters. Chapter 2 sum-
marizes the related work, and Chapter 3 presents Guardian as a lightweight and
reliable system foothold. Based on Guardian, Chapter 4 describes AppShield that
creates isolated execution environments to protect critical applications. Chapter 5
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presents a trusted path scheme that is a generic solution to protect all kinds of I/O
data, and Chapter 6 presents KGuard to protect user passwords in the web authenti-
cation services. Chapter 7 summarizes a framework of secure foothold that could be
directly used or customized by end users to harden their systems. Finally, Chapter 8
concludes the dissertation and discusses a few directions for the future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
We first describe isolated execution environment (IEE) approaches, and then we
present the trusted path schemes which aims to protect I/O data. The IEE scheme
are complementary with trusted path mechanism to protect the whole lifecycle of
application and I/O data. Finally we describe the hypervisor security and the root
of trust to illustrate the reasonability of choosing the hypervisor as system secure
foothold.
2.1 Application Protection
There are several approaches proposed to protect application through creating iso-
lated execution environments, and all of them attempted to remove the OS out of
TCB.
2.1.1 Self-contained Code Protection
Flicker [57] system built on the TPM-based Dynamic Root Of Trust (DROT) tech-
nology can build an isolation environment to protect a piece of code and data. Due
to the limitation of the TPM, the latency of the Flicker system is significantly high.
To minimize the latency, TrustVisor [56] scheme are proposed. By leveraging vir-
tualization technology, TrustVisor virtualizes the physical TPM into Virtual TPM
(VTPMs) and migrate them into hypervisor space. Note that both of them simplify
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the problem setting by assuming that the protected code is self-contained with pre-
defined inputs and outputs (e.g., inputs are the initial parameters and outputs are
the final returns); and that the protected execution does not involve dynamic mem-
ory allocation or deallocation. Protecting complex environment such as the whole
application or device drivers may lead both schemes to failure.
2.1.2 Whole Application Protection
Secure-Processor-Based Protection. AEGIS [90] and XOM OS [53] are secure-
processor based approaches that provide compartments to isolate one application
from others. Both of them incur poor computability since they require substantial
modifications on the OSes and applications. AEGIS [90] also provide an alternative
implementation, which requires to build security into the OS.
Bastion [12] and SecureME [22] aim to deal with untrusted OS and untrusted
hardware attacks simultaneously with the assistance of a secure processor. Bastion
focuses on the protection of a security module, while SecureME attempts to pro-
vide privacy and integrity for data and code of the application. SecureME requires
modifications on both OSes and applications.
In addition, a Processor-Measured Application Protection Service P-MAPS [72]
is announced by Intel, which is built upon Intel TXT [24] and Intel VT [46] hard-
ware capabilities. P-MAPS provides runtime isolation to protect standard appli-
cations with small TCB. P-MAPS is quite similar to our scheme at a high level.
However, the details of P-MAPS are unavailable for public to conduct an in-depth
comparison.
Microkernel-Based Protection. EROS[81], Perseus[68], Microsoft’s
NGSCB [29] and Nizza [37] are microkernel(or small kernel) based solutions. They
attempt to run commodity OS and untrusted applications in the low-assurance par-
titions, and run the applications with higher security requirements in the high-
assurance partitions, which are isolated and protected by the microkernel itself.
However, all of them incur compatibility issue since they may require splitting or
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even redesigning on the applications.
Virtualization-Based Protection. The approaches like TERRA [34] and Prox-
os [92] are hypervisor-based trust partitioning systems. They protect applications
by isolating them into trusted domains with application-specific OSes. These sys-
tems incurs large TCB since they include all secure domains inside. In addition,
they are still vulnerable once the application-specific OSes are compromised.
OverShadow [17], CHAOS [16] and SP3 [106] aim to protect the whole ap-
plication execution against malicious application and OSes. However, all of them
need complex encryption and decryption operations on the application data. Obvi-
ously, these additional costly cryptographic operations may reduce the performance
and increase the latency of the whole system, especially for the protected applica-
tion. In addition, none of them claims that they protect applications from the MS
attack. Thus, the data and code integrity may still be broken by potentially compro-
mised OS. InkTag [41] is a new proposed approach, which also protects the whole
application and verifies the OS behaviors through paraverfication technique. The
paraverfication technique needs to modify the source code of the kernel, which is
not always available. Thus, it may lead to the failure of the protection on the close-
source OSes, e.g., Windows. In addition, it is unclear if InkTag can defend against
the new attacks identified in our dissertation 4.
BIOS-Based Protection. Lockdown [97] system relies on a BIOS-assisted
lightweight hypervisor and an ACPI-based mechanism to provide two switchable
worlds - green world for trusted applications and red world for untrusted applica-
tions. Lockdown uses a trusted path built upon LEDs to provide a verifiable pro-
tection. The main drawback of the Lockdown system is the switch latency is too
high. The switch requires 31 seconds on Windows and 13 − 28 seconds on Linux.
SecureSwitch [91] system that is quite similar to Lockdown also leverages a BIOS-
assisted mechanism for secure instantiation and management of trusted execution
environments. The switch latency is relatively smaller. The switch requires 6 sec-
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onds by using the ACPI standard. Both approaches needs to shut down one world
to run another one, meaning they can not simultaneously execute two worlds.
2.2 I/O Data Protection
We attempt to categorize these relevant trusted path schemes according to the dif-
ferences of their secure foothold.
2.2.1 Virtualization-based Protection
The trusted path [109] proposed by Zhou et al. aims to assure the secrecy and au-
thenticity of I/O data transferred between a periphery device and an application. To
build an exclusive trusted path between the device and the expected application,
the hypervisor fixes the device configuration space which is achieved using Virtu-
al Machine Control Structure/Block, Nested/Extended Page tables and IOMMU to
prevent unauthorized software and DMA access, and interrupt delivery path which
is achieved using Interrupt Remapping features and LAPIC x2APIC mode to make
sure that the interrupt is delivered to expected handler. The expected applications
are extended to support user-level drivers, which directly issue command to devices
through the built trusted path. Obviously, it suffers compatibility issues since appli-
cations are numerous and any new application will need to be modified to satisfy
the trusted path requirements. In comparison, DriverGuard requires modifications
on driver code only. Moreover, DriverGuard does not need to defend against inter-
rupt spoofing attack since it focuses on the secrecy of the I/O data between devices
and applications, and only authorized PCB is able to access the decrypted I/O data.
Even if the unauthorized codes are involved by unintended interrupt, they still can
not access the protected I/O data.
The virtualization-based trusted path schemes are closely related to our work.
BitVisor [84] is a dedicated hypervisor to I/O management. It uses a parapass-
through mechanism whereby access operations on the monitored devices are inter-
cepted and the operations on the other devices pass through without any checking.
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The interception allows the hypervisor to protect itself and to perform security func-
tions on the device I/O. However this approach does not protect the I/O data in the
kernel space. BitVisor does not claim that they protect the MMIO mapping attacks.
Hypervisors with privileged root domains (e.g., the Dom0 in Xen) are able to
assign different device drivers to separate virtual machines (e.g., driver domains
in Xen) and securely associate them with application virtual machines (e.g., guest
domains in Xen) [23, 8, 6, 75, 104]. These hypervisors isolate the device resources
(i.e., I/O ports and the memory address-space, including MMIO regions) belonging
to a device driver domain from other domains. Note that all these schemes do not
consider the MMIO mapping attacks. Moreover, their TCBs enclose the whole
operating system, which dramatically increases their trusted code bases.
2.2.2 Hardware-based Protection
The Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC) [50] is a dedicated hardware,
which provides a trusted path for users to confirm online transactions. The ZTIC-
based trusted path completely bypasses the legacy channel in the users’ computers.
Bumpy [59] system proposes to protect user keyboard inputs by building a trust
environment. It requires an encryption-capable keyboard and therefore is not appli-
cable to generic devices.
The special-device-based schemes usually combine with cryptographic technol-
ogy to protect the secrets in user and kernel space, such as Bumpy, which usually
requires many mediations on the system. Such medications not only consiquently
affect the compatibility of the scheme, but also often significantly reduce the usabil-
ity, and even make the scheme impractical sometimes.
The UTP system [30] proposes an isolated kernel module to temporally manage
user-centric I/O devices (e.g., keyboard and display) and enables a remote server to
verify that a transaction summary is confirmed by a local keyboard input. BIND
[83] binds data and code and uses cryptographic techniques to guarantee the in-
tegrity of data. However BIND is limited to derived data and can not help on the
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confidentiality of the I/O data. Both of them require a hardware supported secure
execution environment (e.g., secure kernel based on the AMD’s Secure Execution
Mode chip), which often occurs high latency and significant performance overhead.
2.2.3 OS-based Protection
Langweg et al. [51] propose a COTS-based scheme to solve the confidentiality, in-
tegrity and authenticity of input and output data1. Authors focus on the windows
platform, where the Windows message mechanism is able to be exploited by a ma-
licious program to access the input and output messages (data) which are originally
intended for other applications. By leveraging the advantages of the the DirextX, au-
thors build a secure user interface to directly fetch input data and access the display
hardware in exclusive mode. Trusted paths for browsers [107] focus on providing
a trusted GUI to user, protecting user inputs to the intended browser. These two
schemes only address security issues at the driver-applications interface, whereas
the battlefield of DriverGuard is the entire I/O path. BitE [58] is an approach for
preventing user-space malicious applications from accessing sensitive user input via
a dedicated trusted path between input devices and the target application, and pro-
viding visual verification feedback to the user to prove that the input is really caught
by the expected application.
All of them suffer from a large TCB since they are built atop large operating
systems, and some of them even contains the Window Manager [58].
2.3 Hypervisor Security
Comparing with legacy monolithic Operating Systems, the hypervisor is more se-
cure since its size is relatively smaller and the exported attack surfaces for guest
domains are considerably less. Although there have been several attacks discovered
to compromise some versions of hypervisors [94, 27, 49, 69], the security of the
hypervisor can be enhanced through some existing mechanisms. The TPM-based
1The confidentiality of the input data is not done.
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authenticated boot can verify the integrity of the hypervisor when being launched,
and the hardware-assisted virtualization technology, i.e., Intel VT-x and AMD V,
is able to significantly reduce the code size of the hypervisor, thereby the attack
surface is reduced. Furthermore, there are some sophisticated framework system-
s [99, 98, 5, 69] proposed to enhance the security of the hypervisor. HyperGuard
[69], HyperCheck [98] and HyperSentry [5] are three System Management Mode
(SMM)-based frameworks to measure and verify the integrity of hypervisors. The
code for the SMM mode are protected by hardware chipset. HyperSafe [99] is a
lightweight approach that protects existing bare-metal hypervisors with a unique
self-protection capability to provide lifetime control flow integrity. In order to e-
liminate the programming bugs in the hypervisor, the rigorous formal verification
mechanism [39] is able to be used to prove the correctness of the hypervisor.
Many hypervisor-based security systems have been designed and reported in the
literature. For instance, a hypervisor can be applied for I/O related protection [84,
19], for kernel integrity protection [78, 71, 100, 65, 4, 60, 105], and for user space
protection [34, 17, 106, 56]. By studying these systems, we identify interception
and manipulation as the hypervisor’s major security primitives which are adopted
in Guardian as well. Our work has remarkable differences with the aforementioned
systems. Guardian caters to the enduser’s security needs, instead of the security of
platform components such as the kernel or a user process. This demands Guardian
to be highly efficient, user friendly and compatible with the operating system and
applications, such that it is suitable for practical use. Most existing systems just
briefly mention the TPM based secure boot for loading the hypervisor. In contrast,
we devise a novel method to establish the hypervisor as the root of trust and show
how to build a variety of security services on top of it.
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2.4 Root of Trust
2.4.1 Software-based Root of Trust
Software-based ROTs have been proposed and used in [77, 3, 79]. The trust es-
tablishment is based on a challenge-response protocol. A speed-optimized function
(code block) is established as the ROT on a platform if, within an acceptable time
delay, it can compute a correct checksum of memory regions according to a given
challenge. It is based on the assumption that it incurs a noticeably longer delay for
any other implementation of this function. It also has a restriction on both the adver-
sary’s capability, for instance no collusion with a third party, as mentioned in [28])
and the capabilities of the target platforms. In addition, to stop the proxy attack,
it may even require to unplug the network and disable the wireless to physically
cut down the connection with outside. These limitations and requirements lead to
inconvenience or even to impracticability. Thus, software ROTs are unqualified to
be a security foothold for normal users’ computers.
2.4.2 Hardware-based Root of Trust
The hardware-based ROT can be categorized into static ROTs and dynamic ROT-
s. A static ROT is a built-in platform component. When the platform boots up, a
trust chain can be established from the ROT up to the operating system. The TPM
chip [96] is a typical example of static hardware ROT. As a chip on the mother-
board, it is secure against all software attacks. Secure (or authenticated) boot up,
remote attestation and sealed storage are the main security services provided by the
TPM framework. The main disadvantages of TPM are its low speed, inflexibility
and passiveness. Therefore, to support various security services, it usually requires
assistance from certain secure software routine (e.g., hypervisor). IBM’s secure co-
processor [2] is a strong hardware root of trust with such a high price tag that it is
not feasible for the mass market. SMART [28] is a hardware-software co-designed
scheme, where a piece of code works on a modified low-end microcontroller u-
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nits (MCU) to function as a dynamic ROT. The SwitchBlade architecture [11] can
prevent persistent rootkits from infecting security-critical files (e.g., kernel image)
with an ROT residing on the disk controller. These ROTs may be integrated with
Guardian though carefully design and implementation.
AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) [1] and Intel Trusted Execution Technol-
ogy (TXT) [24] are dynamic ROTs. These new processor features allow a piece of
code to be securely executed in an isolated environment enforced by the hardware.
Despite of their easiness of use, they incur high latency as showed in the Flicker
system [57]. Fortunately, the high latency may be tolerable for the end-users, s-
ince it only required once when the system as well as Guardian boots up. The boot
mechanism of Guardian is compatible with dynamic ROT techniques.
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Chapter 3
Reliable Secure Foothold
In this chapter, we harness the fast-growing hardware-assisted virtualization tech-
niques to build a tiny but reliable hypervisor as the security foothold for personal
computers. The hypervisor we propose is named as Guardian. Guardian has t-
wo prominent new features which are the enabling techniques for the hypervisor to
become a security foothold. The first is a new secure bootup and shutdown mech-
anism, which enhances the existing hardware-based security boot up by offering
integrity and availability protection of the TCB image and critical information. The
other feature is a secure user-hypervisor interface which allows the end-user to is-
sue commands to and receive responses from Guardian at runtime. The interface
is secure in the sense that the channel between the human end-user and the hyper-
visor is authentic and the exchanged information is not exposed to the guest. We
also propose two practical security utilities based on Guardian. The first is a device
monitor utility, whereby the user can instruct Guardian to monitor the state of pe-
ripheral devices, e.g., a camera. The second is a hyper-firewall whereby Guardian
inspects inbound/outbound network traffic and drops illegal packets. We have im-
plemented Guardian on a desktop with a Linux guest. Guardian consists of around
25K SLOC, and the utilities consist of around 2.1K SLOC. Our experiments show
that Guardian inflicts an insignificant workload to the whole system.
The growing hardware support for virtualization will continue to empower the
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hypervisor with more effective and stronger security control over commodity plat-
forms with smaller code size and better performance. We envisage that using a
hypervisor as a generic security foothold is a promising direction to greatly boost
up the security for commodity platforms. Our work presented in this chapter is
an important step towards this ultimate goal. We summarize our contributions as
follows:
1. We design and implement Guardian which is the first system to provide both
integrity and availability guarantees. Note that all existing hypervisors do not
achieve the availability guarantee.
2. We design and build a device monitor and a hyper-firewall as two security
utilities on top of Guardian.
In the next section, we present our research objectives and threat model. Then
we present the design of Guardian in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we describe the
implementation and the evaluation. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 3.4.
3.1 Problem Definition
We aim to provide a tiny and reliable hypervisor as a security foothold for personal
computers. Namely, we undertake to furnish the end-user with a reliable security
basis when the conventional one (typically the operating system) fails. Though the
security foothold, the human user can configure security policies and manage re-
sources in the platform. It not only boosts up the system security, but also facilitates
the end-user to determine the trustworthiness of her system. Note that we do not
attempt to detect and remove malicious software from the platform, nor is to protect
the operating system or a user application.
3.1.1 Threat Model
Since our goal is to assist the end-user, we assume that they are security- conscious
users, who are happy and intended to use our system to protect their systems. We do
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not consider any human adversary who may have physical access to the system. For
instance, the adversary can issue malicious DMA accesses by inserting extra physi-
cal devices (e.g., a firewire device). A malicious human user can always remove the
hypervisor from the platform.
The adversary in our threat model is malware residing in the operating system
which can subvert the operating system and launch arbitrary attacks. However,
we assume that they can not compromise the hypervisor. Note that the hypervisor
makes use of hardware-assisted virtualization techniques to defend against mali-
cious software accesses and illicit DMA accesses. This assumption can be more
reasonably held if the hypervisor has a tiny code size and simple logic so that only a
small attack interface is exposed to the adversary. Existing techniques [99, 98, 5, 69]
can also be applied to enhance hypervisor security.
We assume that the adversary can not compromise the hardware devices whose
behavior always exactly follow their specifications. We also assume the system
firmware is trusted. In fact, the modern BIOS has a built-in hardware lock mech-
anism [45, 91] to set itself as read-only so that the OS cannot tamper with it. Fur-
thermore, the modern BIOS only accepts signed updates [93, 97]. Due to the com-
plexity of the x86 platform (e.g., optional ROM), this assumption may not always
true. Nonetheless, it is still possible to validate the system firmware by the proposed
attestation approach [52] or by a trusted system integrator.
3.2 Design of Guardian
In this section, we introduce the techniques for establishing Guardian as a security
foothold, and describe the functionalities of the two secure user interfaces.
3.2.1 Establishing Guardian as a Security Foothold
To establish Guardian as a security foothold, it is necessary but not sufficient to
ensure a secure boot. The secure boot alone can only validate the integrity of the
system’s TCB image during booting up, while a reliable security foothold needs
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both integrity and availability guarantee, so that the system still boots up into a
trusted state even if the TCB image on the hard drive are modified by attackers. We
do not elaborate the details of secure boot (e.g., TPM-based secure boot [96]) to
avoid verbosity as it has been widely used in the literature. Our focus is to explain
how to ensure that the intact TCB image is always available for the boot up. The
TCB of our system consists of the BIOS, the bootloader-core and the Guardian
image. Recall that the BIOS is protected by the hardware and is trusted in our threat
model. Therefore, we intend to protect the bootloader core and the Guardian image
against runtime attacks.
A straightforward approach is for Guardian to intercept and validate every disk
I/O, such that any access to the security critical image residing on the disk is
blocked. Obviously, this solution is costly due to the high overhead and complexity
of a disk I/O interception multiplied by the huge number of disk operations.
We devise a novel scheme without interposing on disk operations. The basic
idea (visualized in Figure 3.1) is that once Guardian is launched, it immediately
relocates its image and the bootloader core from the disk into a protected memory
region prior to launching the guest. Then, Guardian intercepts all power off events,
and writes the protected image back to the disk before cleaning up the memory. In
the following, we describe the details of secure boot up and secure shutdown, which
in tandem with runtime protection bolster the availability of Guardian throughout
its whole life cycle.
Secure Bootup
Figure 3.2 illustrates the disk layout for Guardian, where a special partition, referred
to as the hypervisor-partition, is created during installation to avoid being trespassed
by normal file systems. To allow for a secure boot without increasing the TCB size
and complexity, we make slight changes on the bootloader (e.g., Grub 2). The
BIOS passes the control to the bootloader core in the boot track. The bootloader
core includes the Master Boot Record (MBR), the diskboot image and the basic-
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Figure 3.1: Protection of the TCB (from power up to power down). The TCB
consists of the Guardian image and the bootloader core. The protected memory for
the TCB image is reserved by Guardian and inaccessible for the guest OS.
function image, which provides all basic functions and usually has to load other
modules and configuration files such as grub.cfg to launch an operating system due
to the limited size of the boot track (32KB in maximum).
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Figure 3.2: An illustration of the disk layout.
Our modification is on the basic-function image only, such that it always launch-
es Guardian before loading other components including the OS. In specific, once the
core is loaded to the CPU by the BIOS (illustrated by Step 1 in Figure 3.3), it check-
s a bit flag in main memory (referred to as VMM flag) which indicates Guardian’s
presence. If VMM flag is not set, i.e., the core immediately passes the control to
Guardian whose image is placed at a fixed disk address upon installation (Step 2 in
Figure 3.3). The address of Guardian is hard-coded into the core, such that it loads
Guardian directly using disk I/O without involving any file system.
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After occupying the CPU, Guardian loads the TCB image into a reserved mem-
ory region. It then configures the hypervisor page table, the EPT and IOMMU to
ensure that the reserved region is not in the hypervisor or the guest’s space and not
accessible by DMA devices either. Separating the reserved region from the hyper-
visor space ensures no accidental accesses to the region. (As shown later, Guardian
must map the region into its space by re-configuring the page table in order to access
it.)
Finally, Guardian sets VMM flag indicating its presence, and passes the control
back to the bootloader core (Step 3). After asserting the flag is set, the core loads
other modules and configuration files (Step 4) and proceeds to boot up the guest in
the normal way (Step 5).
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Figure 3.3: The sequence of secure bootup.
Device Configuration Space Protection. A rootkit may manipulate the device
configuration space (e.g., the space-overlapping attack [109]) to thwart Guardian
to intercept certain I/O events or access to I/O data. In order to defeat the con-
figuration space manipulations and conflicts/overlapping between different devices,
Guardian is poised to intercept and validate any update to the device configuration
registers after its boot up. Note that these registers are located in the northbridge
chipset [31]. The interception are realized via configuring Virtual-Machine Control
Structure (VMCS) for I/O ports and the EPT for MMIO regions.
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Secure Shutdown
The guest may modify the Guardian image on the disk. Therefore, when the system
is powered off, the TCB saved in the reserved memory must be written back to
their original locations in the disk for the next round of execution. There exist two
types of shutdown events. One type is the sleep events, where the system enters a
sleep state through the Advanced Configuration and Power-management Interface
(ACPI) [40]; the other is the reboot event, where the system restarts from the BIOS.
Guardian intercepts both types of shutdown events and responds accordingly.
ACPI Sleep. The ACPI sleep event is managed by the Operating System Pow-
er Management (OSPM) subsystem on the modern ACPI-compatible system. Re-
ceiving commands from software (e.g., system call) or external interrupts (e.g., the
System Control Interrupt triggered by pressing the power/sleep button or closing
the laptop lid), the OSPM subsystem sets the PM1a CNT register to force the sys-
tem entering the corresponding sleep state. Note that Guardian prohibits the ACPI
sleep event to be triggered by the optional sleep control and PM1b CNT registers.
Specifically, there is a 32-bit pointer in the Fixed ACPI Table (FADT) pointing to
the PM1b CNT block. Guardian clears this pointer and intercepts accesses to the
PM1b CNT register. The same method is used on the control sleep register.
Guardian intercepts the guest’s sleep command issued to the PM1a CNT reg-
ister. Note that the actual interception method depends on whether the register is
accessed by PIO or MMIO. The former involves VMCS configuration whereas the
latter requires the EPT.
Among the six Sleep states (S0 to S5) defined in the ACPI specification (in
Figure 3.4), the light-sleep (S0 to S3) states are not of concern, because the main
memory remains powered and Guardian remains alive. Therefore, Guardian per-
forms no action. For the soft-off state (S5) where the system will be powered off,
Guardian restores the TCB image back to the respective disk locations by using di-
rect disk I/O operations. Note that Guardian needs to re-activate the disk which has
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Figure 3.4: ACPI sleep states.
been closed (but remains powered) before the ACIP sleep command is issued. In
the end, Guardian clears VMM flag and resumes the intercepted ACPI command
which turns the platform off.
It is slightly more complicated to deal with the hibernation state S4 due to the
need for platform context saving. Guardian needs to save its context into the hy-
pervisor partition, in addition to the restoration work done for S5. For the guest
context, Guardian disables and prohibits the ACPI S4BIOS Transition 1, which by-
passes Guardian as the BIOS directly saves all memory content into the hard disk
including Guardian’s context. Therefore, only the OS-assisted hibernation method
is supported and the OS must write its own context into the disk before hibernation.
Note that after the PM1a CNT register is set, the platform passes the point of
no return, because the ACPI hardware will force the platform to enter S4 or S5
state and no software will be loaded to the CPU. In other words, Guardian is the last
piece of code executed before shutdown, which guarantees the security of the TCB
and critical data resting on the disk.
System Reboot. There are three possible ways to reboot a system. One is ACPI
reset, which is activated by the ACPI reset register. Note that the system will imme-
diately reboot once the reset register is set. The ACPI reset register can be accessed
by port I/O or memory-mapped I/O, which can be intercepted by Guardian through
1It clears the F bit in the Firmware ACPI Control Structure (FACS) and intercepts accesses to
the SMI CMD command register, which is S4BIOS service activation.
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configuring the VMCS or EPT, respectively. The second way is essentially trig-
gered by the CPU INIT signal. Guardian intercepts the event through configuring
the VMCS.
In the third way, an attacker can switch the CPU to the real mode and jump to the
BIOS entry to reboot the system. The tricky part is that it can bypass the INIT and
ACPI reset mechanisms, meaning that the previous two interception methods will
fail to intercept this one. To intercept it, a straightforward solution is to intercept the
CPU switch from protected mode to real mode. However, the cost will significantly
rise up when legitimate CPU-mode switches take place frequently, e.g., in Windows.
Our solution is to prevent jumping to the BIOS reboot-routine from the guest by
configuring the EPT. Any attempts from the guest OS to reboot the system will
be intercepted by Guardian whose response is to repeat Step 3-5 in secure bootup
without rebooting the whole platform.
Recovery
Guardian provides an alternative secure boot mechanism, where the system is able
to boot up from a trusted-storage, such as a live CD or a read-only USB token. The
bootup sequence is the same as the one described in Section 3.2.1. For convenience,
the end-user can configure the system always boot up from a trusted storage, such
that the system still can boot up into a trusted state.
The secure shutdown procedure may not be triggered due to some unexpected
and irresistible events, e.g., power failure or system crash. Given that such unex-
pected system failure events may lead to the untrustworthiness of the TCB image,
we need the TPM-based secure boot [96] to guarantee that only the trusted image
can be booted. In such cases, the system can not boot up, and the security-conscious
end-users need the recovery mechanism to restore Guardian image. Specifically,
the bootloader in the trusted storage is extended to restore TCB image into the hard
drive. Note that the bootloader originally has the capabilities to read/write the hard
drive, the trusted storage and the main memory. Therefore, we can easily combine
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these functions to do the recovery.
Guardian Update
The end user can upgrade or patch Guardian in a secure environment. Note that
the whole system is clean and secure before the guest boots up, because there is no
untrusted code executing in the system at that time. Thus, the end user can upgrade/-
patch Guardian at that phase (i.e., the secure boot phase). Specifically, during the
secure boot phase, the end user activates the BUSUI interface of Guardian (details
in Section 3.2.2), where an option is for upgrading or patching Guardian. Following
the guidelines, the end user asks Guardian to load a new or patched Guardian image
into the system and replace the original copy. After the upgrading/patching step, the
system reboots to let the updated Guardian re-control the system.
3.2.2 Secure User-Hypervisor Interface
The secure interface is a duplex channel between the end-user and Guardian without
involving the guest OS. Guardian shields the channel against any access from the
guest. With the interface, the end-user can configure Guardian during its boot-up,
and issue commands during runtime. For the sake of usability and simplicity, we do
not rely on any external device such as a USB token. The user inputs are through
the keyboard while the outputs are via the display in VGA mode.
Guardian provides two secure UIs. One is the Boot Up Secure User Interface
(BUSUI), which is used in the secure boot phase before the guest starts to run.
Since the platform then is in a trustworthy state, the implementation of BUSUI is
straightforward. Guardian utilizes the BIOS services (i.e. INT 0x16 and 0x10)
for input and output. The end-user activates it by holding a special key for a few
seconds. In our current design, a user can deposit a text message to Guardian as a
shared secret and can also input policies.
The other interface is the Run Time Secure User Interface (RTSUI), which is
used after the guest boots up. The RTSUI can be dynamically launched by the end-
user. RTSUI extends the secure user interface in KGuard [18]. Namely, Guardian
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securely receive inputs of a human user through a keyboard while it securely pro-
duces outputs through the display. Both the input and output paths are inaccessible
to the guest OS. Since the interface in KGuard is only for password input, we extend
it to a command-line interface such that the user can conveniently input commands
and read responses.
3.3 Implementation
We have built a prototype of Guardian on a Dell OptiPlex 990 MT desktop with
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 CPU @ 3.40GHz processor2 and 4GB main memo-
ry. Guardian consists of around 25K SLOC for its core functions, which is much
smaller than Xen (263K SLOC for Xen-4.1.2) and Linux (8,143k SLOC for Linux-
2.6.33.20). A comprehensive comparison between Guardian and other hypervisors
is listed in Figure 3.5. Specifically, TrustVisor itself is around 17K SLOC. NO-
VA [88] consists of the microhypervisor (9K SLOC), and several trusted compo-
nents, i.e., a thin user level environment (7K SLOC), and the VMM (20K SLOC).
BitVisor [84] and VMware ESXi are 194K and 200K SLOC, respectively. KVM is
around 200K SLOC, as well as a customized QEMU (140K SLOC). Xen is around
263K SLOC with Dom0 that can be customized to 200K SLOC [47]. Microsoft
Hyper-V uses a Xen-like architecture with a hypervisor (around 100K SLOC) and
Windows Server 2008 (larger than 400K SLOC).
The binary size of Guardian is around 223KB, which is much smaller than
Xen (around 1,264KB for Xen-4.1.2 ) and Linux (around 134,134KB for Linux-
2.6.33.20) image, and the bootloader core is around 30KB. Guardian reserves
512KB memory space for TCB images and other critical information. Guardian
also provides 11 hypercalls for security services, which is smaller than Xen ex-
ported hypercall surfaces (i.e., 46 hypercalls). Note that Guardian only focus on
the security services, while these systems (e.g., Xen) usually provide many more
2The Hyper-threading mode is disabled since our current hypervisor does not support the multi-
processor mechanism.
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Figure 3.5: TCB size. Larger TCB implies more bugs.
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Figure 3.6: The LmBench results on OS operations.
We first measure the overhead on the OS operations using the LmBench suite.
Figure 3.6 shows the results: socket (local connection), memory operations (i.e.,
read, write and bcopy) and some system calls (i.e., mmap, fork+exec and fork+exit).
However, fork+exec and fork+exit incur higher performance penalties of 39% and
38%, which are heavily dependent on the Intel EPT performance. We do believe that
this could be improved with the performance enhancing of memory virtualization.
We also measure computation performance with Guardian. The results gener-
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Figure 3.7: The system benchmark comparison results generated by SPEC CPU
2006.
ated by the benchmark tool SPEC CPU 2006 (see Figure 3.7) show that Guardian
usually only introduces 0.2% - 10.3% performance loss, and may lead to 38.2%
performance overhead in some extreme cases (i.e., memory intensive operations
with extreme low cache hit rate), which is also dependent on the page operations of
current Intel EPT. Again, we believe that it can be improved in the further.
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Figure 3.8: The I/O-bound benchmark results.
For I/O-bound benchmark test, we select a range of benchmark tools, includ-
ing Bonnie, Postmark, Netperf and Linux kernel. For Bonnie, we use a 1GB file
and perform sequential read/write (fread/fwrite) and random access (frandom). For
Postmark, we choose 20,000 files, 100,000 transactions and 100 subdirectories, as
well as all other default parameters. For Netperf, we use another local machine as
the Netperf server, and run both TCP STREAM and UDP STREAM benchmarks
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to measure basic network performance. For Linux kernel, we compile the Linux-
2.6.33.20 with default configuration. Figure 3.8 shows the results.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed Guardian as a security foothold on the end-user
systems to enhance their security. Specifically, we introduced Guardian whose in-
tegrity and availability were guaranteed by the novel bootup and shutdown tech-
nique. Guardian also provided a secure user interface, through which the end-user
could update the configurations of Guardian or dynamically activate/deactivate a
dedicated security service for the security needs. We have implemented Guardian
and the two utilities. The experiment results show that they are efficient and easy to
use. Our work demonstrates that computer security can be significantly boosted up
by using a tiny and reliable hypervisor.
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Chapter 4
Application Protection
In this chapter, we propose AppShield, a novel system which reliably and efficiently
protects data secrecy and integrity of a critical application, as well as its execution
integrity, against rootkit attacks. AppShield leverages the hardware-assisted vir-
tualization techniques [46] to isolate the application’s address space such that all
accesses from the kernel are blocked except those explicitly authorized by the ap-
plication through system calls. The protected application utilizes the main memory
in the same fashion as in a normal (unprotected) setting. It accesses the memory
with native speed, i.e. without encryption/decryption or being intercepted, and it
can request the kernel to (de)allocate memory buffers. AppShield achieves perfor-
mance isolation since those unprotected applications are not affected and do not
have performance loss. We have implemented a prototype of AppShield which con-
sists of a bare-metal hypervisor with roughly 29K SLOC and a tiny kernel module
of around 2K SLOC. We have experimented the prototype with several applica-
tions (e.g., Apache and VIM) and run a suite of benchmark tests. The experiment
results demonstrate that AppShield incurs insignificant performance costs in CPU
computation, disk I/O and network I/O.
ORGANIZATION. In the next section, we define the problem by specifying the
threat model, our objectives and the AppShield overview. In Section 4.2, we de-
scribe the dynamic address space isolation together with newly identified threats.
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The secure and efficient address space switch, and the support of legal data ex-
changes is described in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, respectively. The implementa-
tion and evaluation are shown in Section 4.5. Finally, we discuss several issues in
Section 4.6, and conclude this chapter in Section 4.7.
4.1 Synopsis
4.1.1 Threat Model
In this work, we consider an adversary who remotely controls the OS on the target
platform by a rootkit and attempts to attack a critical application by tampering with
its data and/or execution. The adversary can run arbitrary code and launch DMA
operations in the victim platform. Nonetheless the adversary can not physically
control it.
Our aim is to protect a critical application execution integrity and data security
against such an adversary. We do not consider protection of its availability. Neither
do we protect the application’s raw I/O inputs and final data outputs1. Side channel
attacks are also out of scope of our study.
We suppose that no malicious data input can subvert the control flow of the crit-
ical application. It is orthogonal to our objectives to enhance code security (e.g.,
fixing bugs) of the protected applications. The platform’s chipset and all periph-
eral devices are trusted in the sense that they operate exactly following their spec-
ifications and do not contain Trojan-Horse circuits or microcode that respond to
commands of the adversary.
In our model, a bare-metal hypervisor is trusted since it can be protected with
secure boot/DRTM (e.g., Intel TXT) and hardware virtualization technology. Fur-
thermore, the hypervisor can leverage some existing hypervisor protection schemes
(e.g., HyperSafe [99], HyperSentry [5], HyperCheck [98]) to further enhance its se-
curity. Note that the hypervisor can intercept and emulate the SMM operations so
1The critical application may encrypt its disk and network data. Existing secure I/O path schemes
like [19, 109] can protect the raw I/O inputs
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that SMM-based attacks cannot subvert it.
4.1.2 Desired Properties
It is desirable for a security solution for the stated problem to have the following
properties. Firstly, the application’s behavior should be preserved by the protection
mechanism. The application is not assumed to be a piece of self-contained code and
is entitled to issue system calls as in a normal setting. For instance, it can request
the OS to allocate a memory buffer even though the OS is not trusted.
Secondly, the security mechanism should have minimum performance impact on
the protected application and on the platform as a whole. The performance require-
ment has twofold implications. Ideally, the protected application should be able
to access the main memory with the native speed. Therefore, hypervisor-based in-
terposition and memory buffer encryption/decryption should be avoided since they
take a significant toll on memory access delays. Moreover, the mechanism should
only incur localized performance overhead, without affecting the performance of
unprotected applications and the OS.
Lastly, the TCB of the security mechanism should small and simple, which en-
sures that the risk of subverting the TCB is kept minimal. This property precludes
the approach of using a trusted virtual machine where the TCB encloses an operat-
ing system.
In this chapter, we present the design and implementation of AppShield which
is the first of its kind meeting the security requirement with all the aforementioned
properties. AppShield uses a tiny hypervisor on the bare-metal machine to protect
a critical application against the untrusted OS. Its overview is described in the next
section.
4.1.3 AppShield Overview
The fundamental idea of AppShield is to isolate the target application’s context
(registers) and address space from the kernel and other applications, while allowing
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it to issue system calls and utilize the memory in a dynamic fashion. The rootkit
cannot access its memory space, except those memory buffers explicitly exported
to the kernel by its system calls. In the rest of the chapter, we use CAP to denote
the critical application that is under AppShield’s protection.
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of AppShield. The data flows (dotted lines) between
the protected Critical APplication (CAP) always go through the shared buffer and
mediated by the shim code. The control flows (solid lines) between CAP and the
OS are mediated by the Transit Module (TraMod). The execution of transit module
are protected by the hypervisor.
Figure 7.1 depicts the architecture of AppShield. It consists of a bare-metal
hypervisor, a transit module in the guest kernel space and a shim code in the user
space. Both the transit module and the shim code are safeguarded by the hypervisor
to defend against attacks from the guest kernel. CAP runs in an address space
isolated from the rest of the guest domain, while the guest OS and those unprotected
applications on the platform run unaffected. The page table of CAP is managed
by the guest OS, but the updates are intercepted and verified by the hypervisor to
defend against various attacks (Section 4.2.2). CAP’s system calls are mediated
by the trusted shim code which is essentially a wrapper of libc libraries. The
main task of the shim is to marshal the system call parameters by exporting the data
needed by the system call routine into the shared buffer accessible to the kernel.
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Since events like interrupts and system calls causes context switches between CAP
and the guest kernel, the transit module responds to the event, facilitates the context
switches, and prevents the context switch from being manipulated by the rootkit.
4.2 Dynamic Address Space Isolation
Dynamic address space isolation is the bedrock of AppShield. In this section, we
first elaborate how the hypervisor isolates a pre-defined address space of CAP.
Then, we explain how the isolation is dynamically adapted to the changes of the
memory boundary at runtime. While our description follows Intel virtualization
technology, the approach is applicable with AMD’s as well.
4.2.1 Address Space Isolation
In a nutshell, the physical memory assigned to the guest is divided into two sepa-
rated regions by the hypervisor. One region is used for CAP while the other is for
the guest OS and other applications. The memory dichotomy as depicted in Fig-
ure 4.2 is realized by two suites of EPTs maintained by the hypervisor, respectively.
In this way, the virtual addresses of the guest OS and other applications are never
mapped to a physical address dedicated to the protected application, and vice versa.
The hardware enforced address space isolation ensures that the guest OS and the
protected application cannot directly access each other, provided that all EPTs are
properly set and applied. For the sake of clarification, we use AppShield EPT to
refer to the ones dedicated for CAP. In the following, we only focus on the EPT
configuration. The details of applying the proper EPT are described in Section 4.3
which elaborates the context switches between CAP and the guest OS.
The hypervisor exports two hypercalls for CAP to activate and deactivate the
protection. The activation hypercall is issued before CAP’s main function is en-
tered. In response, the hypervisor obtains the CR3 register value from the VMCS
and traverses the page table entries belonging to the application, so that it locates
all pages within the address space, including the shared libraries. (Note that the
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Figure 4.2: Address Space Isolation. With the trusted AppShield EPT, only the
memory regions of CAP and the shared buffer are accessible, while with the original
EPT, the memory regions except the shared buffer are inaccessible.
page fetching during the traversal forces the guest kernel to load share libraries into
the memory.) Both the traversed guest PTEs and the pages pointed by them con-
stitute the physical memory region that needs to be separated from the guest. The
hypervisor creates the AppShield EPT for this region and marks the corresponding
entires in the original EPT as inaccessible, so that the guest cannot visit the isolated
region. Once the application’s code and data are isolated, the hypervisor can vali-
date its launch-time integrity, supposing that it has been priorly authenticated by a
signature or an HMAC tag.
Through the deactivation hypercall, CAP notifies the hypervisor to disable the
protection. In response, the hypervisor destroys the AppShield EPT and restores the
entries in the original EPTs. Note that the deactivation hypercall can only be issued
by CAP. Any deactivation requests from malicious guest OS and other unprotected
applications will be rejected by the hypervisor.
4.2.2 Dynamic Isolation
One of the main challenges of isolating a full-fledge application is that its memory
region evolves over time, due to dynamic memory allocation and deallocation as
a result of relevant system calls (e.g., brk) which are in turn invoked by the corre-
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sponding memory usage functions (e.g., malloc and free) in the libc library.
The semantics of these system calls are preserved in AppShield as the guest
OS still manages the memory resources for CAP through the guest page table. Al-
though the hypervisor protects the guest page table used by CAP, the guest kernel
may manipulate the virtual and/or physical address of the new buffer to attack CAP
without direct access to the latter’s memory space. We identify several such attacks
below.
Address Manipulation
VA VB VC VD VE VF 
PB PC PA PF PD PE 
VA VB VC VD VE VF 
PB PC PA PF PD PE 
VA VB VC VD VE VF 
PB PC PA PF PD PE 
VA VB VC VD VE 
PB PC PA PF PD PE 
(a) Legal Mappings 
(d) Mapping Reorder (c) Double Mapping 
(b)  Mapping Overlap 
Old Mapping Current Mapping 
Existing Buffer Page New Buffer Page Overlapped Page 
Figure 4.3: Threats for address space isolation.
In general, address manipulation attacks can be launched by the kernel in re-
sponse to any system calls that result in page table updates. Without loss of gener-
ality, we use buffer allocation as an example to illustrate the attacks.
Suppose a CAP’s buffer contains three consecutive pages at virtual address
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VA, VB and VC respectively and CAP requests a new buffer. In a normal scenari-
o, the newly allocated buffer’s virtual address and physical addresses do not overlap
with any existing one, as illustrated in Figure 4.3-(a), where they are at virtual ad-
dress VD, VE and VF . In the following, we show four types of manipulation attacks.
Mapping Overlap Attack. The malicious kernel may overlap two memory re-
gions in the virtual address space. As illustrated in Figure 4.3-(b), the new buffer
is set to the pages located at VC to VE . The overlapping leads to undesired mod-
ifications of data in PC when the application attempts to update the first page of
the allocated buffer. Obviously this threat could break the data integrity, and it may
also subvert the control flow of the application, if the overlapping memory is in the
application stack and the modifications change the stored return address(es). In fact,
the mapping overlapping is a type of Iago attack [15].
Double Mapping Attack. The double-mapping attack maps two or more virtual
pages to one physical page in the user space. As shown in Figure 4.3-(c), a write
to VA affects the result of a read operation at VF . This attack is more stealthy than
the mapping-overlap attack, as the physical addresses are transparent to the code
running in the virtual space which is not tampered with at all.
Mapping Reorder Attack. The mapping-reorder attack is to reorder the existing
address mappings between the virtual addresses and the physical addresses. As
shown in Figure 4.3-(d), CAP retrieves wrong data when it reads from VF . As a
result, CAP’s data or control flow can be manipulated by the malicious kernel.
Mapping Release Attack. The mapping-release attack is to release one or more
existing mappings without any system call requests driven by the protected applica-
tion. The mapping-release could induce the hypervisor to give up the protection of
those pages since they are not in the protected addresses space any more. By doing
so, the guest OS can freely access the data on those released pages.
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Information Collection
Most applications and shared libraries trust OS by default, and they all miss the
verification of the OS behaviors in the memory allocation and deallocation. To fix
this loophole, AppShield has to verify if the memory updates follow the requests of
the application and are not manipulated.
To verify the OS behaviors in memory updates, we should know the existing
memory layout, determine the intent of the application relevant to memory updates
and interpret the page table updates operated by the untrusted OS. The existing
memory layout (the mapping relationship between guest virtual addresses to guest
physical addresses) can be collected from the guest page table of the CAP. The
collected information is reliable since it is collected by the hypervisor and the page
table has been protected to prevent any update.
To determine the intent of the application relevant to memory updates, one pos-
sible way is to allow the hypervisor to intercept all system calls that are potentially
used by the CAP to allocate or deallocate memory. In order to correctly interpret
the memory updates information (i.e., the based address and the size), the hyper-
visor has to know the exact semantic meaning of all parameters and return values.
It inevitably increases the complexity of the hypervisor and thereby dampens its
security. In this chapter, the trusted shim running in the user space closely works
with the CAP. Thus, it knows the system calls used by the CAP and their semantic
meanings, e.g., the parameter of the malloc is the memory size and the return value
is the based address of the new allocated buffer. Through several hypercalls, the
trusted shim is able to securely synchronize such information with the hypervisor.
To intercept and interpret page table updates, one possible solution is to allo-
cate a dedicated Guest Page Table (GPT) in the address space of the CAP, and the
hypervisor or transit module manages its updates. By doing so, the security of the
page table is guaranteed but the complexity of the hypervisor or transit module will
dramatically increase, which further takes a toll on the overall system security. An-
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other possible way is the paraverfication technique [41]. However it requires costly
modifications of OS code. To achieve good compatibility and make the hypervisor
and transit module small and simple, we choose the solution that is similar to the
management of the page table in paravirtualization, e.g., Xen [6]. Specifically, the
page table created by the untrusted OS for the CAP is set read-only, but the manage-
ment is still handled by the untrusted OS. The updates referring to the CAP memory
regions are intercepted and verified by the hypervisor. Note that during the valida-
tion procedure, the hypervisor gets the original and the new value of the page table
slot, together with the virtual address according to the slot position. Considering the
updated address and comparing the original value with the new one, the hypervisor
obtains the meaning of the current update, and thereby can validate the page table
update.
Verification Details
In page table update verification, the hypervisor and the shim code jointly enforce
the following policies for protecting the address space of a CAP.
1. The page table of CAP should be non-writable for the untrusted guest OS.
Any update should be intercepted by the hypervisor.
2. The newly added memory region should not conflict/overlap with any existing
memory regions, no matter the conflicts happen in virtual address space (no
mapping overlap) or physical address space (no double mapping).
3. Once the mappings between guest virtual addresses and guest physical ad-
dresses are fixed, they are not allowed to re-map (e.g., no mapping reorder).
4. The memory regions can be released only if the CAP requires to release them
(no malicious release), and the page data should be cleaned before allowing
the guest OS to manage/access it (no data leakage).
Essentially, the mapping overlap attack is the conflicts in the virtual address s-
pace. Thus, the verification algorithm can be put into the trusted shim, since it is
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protected and aware of virtual addresses. Specifically, the trusted shim is able to
know all memory regions used by the CAP by collecting such information in the
memory-related system calls. For example, the trusted shim can know the size of
the memory-mapped region through the second parameter of mmap and the base
address through the return value. Such information stored in an ordered list is inac-
cessible for the untrusted guest OS since the address space of the CAP is isolated
by the hypervisor. For each new allocated memory region, the trusted shim veri-
fies it with existing ones. If there is no overlap, it then updates the maintained list
and passes the execution flow to the CAP; otherwise it will issue a hypercall to the
hypervisor to inform the policy violation.
To defend against double mapping and mapping reorder attacks in the page table
updates, the hypervisor has to interpret the old mapping Mo and the new mapping
Mn, and analyze the intent of this update. If the guest OS is to build a new mapping
(i.e., Mo is empty and Mn points to a guest physical page), the hypervisor verifies
if the new pointed physical page is occupied before. If it is already occupied, it is
a double mapping attack; otherwise the update is approved. If the guest OS aims to
remap/reorder the mappings (i.e., both Mn and Mo point to guest physical pages),
the hypervisor directly rejects it.
If the guest OS aims to free an old mapping (i.e., Mo points to a guest physical
page while Mn is empty), the hypervisor verifies if CAP requires the guest OS to
release this memory page. The information about the released memory pages is pro-
vided by the trusted shim through hypercalls. Those potentially released memory
pages are stored in a list in the hypervisor space. By searching the list, the hyper-
visor decides if the current page is the one that CAP aims to release. If it is not,
the hypervisor rejects the update; otherwise it approves it and updates the list by
deleting the corresponding record. Note that the data on the releases memory page
is cleaned by the trusted shim once it gets the release requests from the CAP.
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4.3 Secure Context Switch
Events like system calls, interrupts and exceptions, lead to context switches be-
tween CAP and the kernel. Different from traditional user-kernel context switch,
the switch between CAP and the kernel involves address space switches, since they
run in two address spaces.
Entry Gates 
Commodity OS 
Exit Gates 
CAP 
Transit Module 
Address Space Boundary 
Figure 4.4: Control flow between the CAP and the guest kernel.
When CAP is in execution, the transit module in AppShield handles all inter-
rupts and prevents the kernel from exploiting the context switch to attack CAP. Its
main tasks are to facilitate the context switch and to safeguard CAP’s context infor-
mation. It also notifies the hypervisor to perform address space switch. As shown
in Figure 4.4, when an interrupt is raised, the control flow leaves from CAP to the
kernel. Once the event is processed by the kernel, the flow goes back to CAP. We
proceed to elaborate the details of context switch.
4.3.1 Transit Module
The transit module is a self-contained kernel module with its execution being pro-
tected by the hypervisor using the mechanism described in [82]. Specifically, the
memory regions occupied by the transit module is isolated by the hypervisor, such
that the untrusted commodity OS can not modify the data and the code. The control
flows of the transit module always start from the pre-defined addresses.
The transit module has two sections (Figure 4.5), which are page aligned for
facilitating memory protection. The first section is the public section which contains
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Section 
Private 
Section 
Page Aligned 
Entry Gates 
…
 
…
 
Exit Gates 
Figure 4.5: The format of transit module
information that is read-only for the transit module and the commodity OS. The
second section is the private section which contains private data. Accesses to the
private section are only allowed if they are from the transit module; other accesses
originated from outside of the transit module are blocked by the hypervisor.
Exit Gate 
Entry Gate 
Original 
Interrupt 
Handler 
Address Space Boundary 
AppShield 
Interrupt 
Handler 
Figure 4.6: The AppShield interrupt handler.
The transit module consists of a set of interrupt handlers called AppShield in-
terrupt handlers. An AppShield interrupt handler is composed of two code stubs
(Figure 4.6). One is called the entry gate which is located in the public section and
the other is called the exit gate which is in the private section. The control flow of
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the transit module always starts from one of the entry/exit gates. The exit gate han-
dles the context switch from CAP in protection to the guest kernel while the entry
gate handles the switch back to CAP. More details are presented in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Event Capture
We do not use the hypervisor to intercept the interrupt events as this method sig-
nificantly affects the platform performance. When AppShield is activated, the hy-
pervisor loads the AppShield Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) which is dedicated
to CAP under protection, and protects it from be modified by the guest kernel by
setting its region as read-only.
The AppShield IDT contains the pointers pointing to the AppShield interrupt
handlers. The hypervisor installs the AppShield IDT to the CPU occupied by CAP
by setting its IDTR register. Consequently, the AppShield interrupt handlers be-
come the first responders to interrupts on the CPU. When the guest OS is running,
it uses the original IDT and interrupt handlers. The switch of the two IDTs follows
the switch of the address space. As illustrated in Figure 4.7, the original IDT is
uninstalled and the secure IDT is installed for the CAP execution.
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Figure 4.7: Performance Overhead Localization. When the context switches to
CAP, the normal IDT is uninstalled and the secure IDT is installed.
By using two sets of interrupt handlers, our design achieves performance over-
head localization, because the transit module is only invoked when CAP is inter-
rupted. AppShield is not involved when other applications and the guest OS are
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running.
4.3.3 Context and Address Space Switch
Figure 4.8 depicts the control flow of event handling with two context switches at
the exit gate and the entry gate. When an interrupt is raised during CAP’s execu-
tion, the exit gate of the AppShield interrupt handler kicks off the context switch.
Under the protection of the hypervisor, the exit gate first prepares a buffer and saves
CAP’s context in the transit module’s private section. It then creates a dummy con-
text for the kernel to execute within. Note that the dummy context should not be
randomly generated since some context information is used by the kernel to serve
the application. For instance, the EIP should point to the corresponding interrupt
handler so that the original handler can serve the interrupt. Specifically, we only
need to hide the information in the general registers (i.e., EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX,
ESI, EDI, EBP) since they may contain sensitive CAP data. In the case of system
call context switch, we also need to keep the parameters in the corresponding regis-
ters. Moreover, to allow the execution flow to come back to the transit module, the
return address of the dummy context is set to point to the corresponding entry gate.
In the end, the exit gate then issues a hypercall to inform the hypervisor to restore
the original page tables so that the interrupt handler in the guest kernel can properly
execute.
Once the guest interrupt handler finishes its process, the control is returned to
the entry gate. The entry gate issues a hypercall to request the hypervisor to restore
the AppShield EPT. After ensuring that the request is indeed from the legitimate
entry gate, the hypervisor restores the AppShield EPT and installs the AppShield
IDT, so that the entry gate can properly restore the saved context and resume the
interrupted CAP execution.
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Figure 4.8: A typical address space switch always starts with an exit gate and ends
with an entry gate. The commodity OS handles the events that trigger the address
space switch.
4.3.4 Special Considerations
Fast-System-Call Cost Localization
The platforms equipped with new processor and chipset support fast system call
mechanisms (i.e., SYSENTER/SYSCALL, SYSEXIT/SYSRET), which are inde-
pendently proposed by Intel and AMD, respectively. The SYSENTRER/SYSCAL-
L traps the CPU to the kernel mode and the SYSEXIT/SYSRET transfers the CPU
back to the user mode. In this chapter we choose one pair (i.e., SYSENTER/SY-
SEXIT) to illustrate.
The SY SENTER instruction sets the registers (i.e., CS, EIP, SS and ESP)
according to values specified by the operating system in certain Model-Specific
Registers (MSR), and triggers the CPU to trap into the kernel mode. To localize
the performance overhead to CAP, the hypervisor also prepares two sets of MSR
registers. One set is used for CAP, where the EIP value in the corresponding MSR
(i.e., SYSENTER EIP MSR) is modified to point to the new system call handler
prepared by the transit module. By doing so, all fast system calls will be intercepted
by the transit module. Another set is used for the unprotected applications as usual.
The two sets of registers are switched following the switches of the address spaces.
Note that the context backup and restoration are still handled by the pairs of the exit
and entry gates.
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Multi-Thread Execution
AppShield supports multi-thread execution of CAP. The child threads could be user
threads, which are completely maintained by CAP in user space, or light weight
processes scheduled by the guest OS and sharing the same address space with their
parent.
The user threads do not have their own contexts since they do not have the kernel
structure for scheduling. Therefore, they are transparent to AppShield. In contrast,
light weight process threads may have multiple user contexts for CAP, since each of
them has its own corresponding structures (e.g., kernel stack) for scheduling. These
threads may run in parallel and trap into the guest OS simultaneously. Therefore, by
using the base addresses of their kernel stacks as the identifiers, the transit module
can distinguish each of them, and save/restore the respective contexts.
4.4 System Call Adaption
The system call from CAP to the guest kernel exposes some CAP data since they
are passed to the guest as parameters. AppShield provides a spatio-temporal pro-
tection [22] for the data involved in the system call. It ensures that the guest OS can
only access the authorized data (spatial protection) during the execution of the sys-
tem call (temporal protection). The previous sections have explained that temporal
protection is achieved by address space isolation and secure context switch. In this
section, we describe how AppShield enforces spatial protection through system call
adaption.
A majority of system calls do not need the OS to access the application address
space to get further information, since all needed information in the parameters
(e.g., close) or even without needing any parameters (e.g., getpid). These calls are
passed to the guest OS without any adaption.
Those system calls whose parameters contain pointers (e.g., a pointer pointing
to the file name in open), need adapting. To ensure spatial protection, researchers
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have proposed two possible solutions. The first approach [17] is to interact with the
hypervisor multiple rounds to safely move the decrypted data into a shared/public
buffer. The other approach [22] does not allocate a new buffer. Instead, it decrypts
the data in the original buffer and allows the OS to directly access the buffer. Both
solutions use expensive cryptographic technique, which dramatically reduces the
application performance if the application frequently issues system calls. In addi-
tion, the multiple round interaction (with the hypervisor) is another source of the
performance loss. We summarize the time cost of the parameter marshalling in a
system call in two typical schemes (i.e., Overshadow and SecureME) together with
our scheme in Table 7.1. Overshadow needs 8 context switches and costly cryp-
tographic operations, and SecureME also needs cryptographic operations together
with 2 context switches. For our scheme, we only need 2 context switches for one
system call.
Crypto. Operations Data Movement Context Switch (#)
OverShadow
√ √
8
SecureME
√ √
2
AppShield X
√
2
Table 4.1: The time cost of the parameter marshalling in a system call. Our scheme
is relatively efficient because we give up the costly cryptographic operations and
reduce the switch times.
In our scheme, the trusted shim creates a shared region (buffer) in its user space,
and issues a hypercall to inform the hypervisor that the shared region is accessible
for the guest OS. In this way, the guest OS can only access the data within the
shared region, but cannot access any other regions within the user space of the CAP,
achieving the spatial protection.
To adapt system calls, the shim developers should understand the semantic
meaning of each system call. Specifically, they should know the meaning of the
parameters and the return values. In addition, they should know the direction of the
data exchange, e.g., from application perspective, the buffer referred to by the pa-
rameter is for receiving data from the guest OS, or caching the data that will be sent
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out. Getting such semantic information, they are ready for the system call adaption.
Specifically, for the data that the CAP attempts to send out, the shim simply moves
the data into a buffer allocated in the shared region, and updates the corresponding
parameter to refer to the new buffer. To receive data from the guest OS, the shim
should reserve a buffer in the shared region. The shim then saves the base address
of the original buffer, and updates the corresponding parameter to refer to the re-
served one. When the system call returns, the shim copies the received data into the
original buffer and continues the execution.
4.4.1 System Call Emulation
There are several system calls whereby the system call adaption technique is not
applicable to resolve the conflicts between the system call purpose and our security
requirements. Specifically, such system calls are not designed for exchanging data.
Instead, they are for introspecting or manipulating the application by accessing or
modifying internal status.
The first is Futex (i.e., fast user mutex), which provides a method for an ap-
plication to wait for a value at a given address, and a method to wake up other
applications waiting on a particular address. The implementation of Futex not only
directly accesses the process memory, but also binds some information (e.g., a hash
bucket) with the address. Therefore, if we simply apply the system call adapting
technique to Futex, the semantic information may be bound to a wrong address,
which may lead to the failure of Futex.
The rest are the system calls used in the signal-handling, where the guest OS
needs to prepare a temporary execution context for the application and transfers the
execution control to a pre-registered handler to handle the corresponding signal. The
critical security issue here is that the guest OS needs to be authorized to manipulate
the application context. Such authorization may be exploited to reveal and tamper
with the application data, e.g., involve a function to send plain text outside. To
revoke the authorization from the guest OS, we have to emulate it.
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Configurations Descriptions
CPU Intel i7-2600 with 3.40GHZ
Memory 3GB DDR3 1333MHZ
Network Card Intel Device 1502 with 1Gbps
Disk ATA 7200RPM
OS Ubuntu 10.04 with Kernel 2.6.32.59
Table 4.2: The configurations of the experiment machine.
4.4.2 Ptrace
The ptrace system call is not allowed for CAP since its working mechanism requires
the guest OS to directly read the content of the user space, or to modify the data or
even code of the specific addresses, which is completely conflicts with our security
requirements. We should not emulate this system call since it opens the door for the
malicious guest OS to read/write the whole address space of the CAP.
4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of AppShield on a PC whose specification is
listed in Table 4.2. The prototype consists of a dedicated hypervisor running on the
bare-metal hardware, and a Linux loadable module as the transit module. The code
base of the hypervisor is around 29K SLOC with 218KB binary size. The transit
module consists of around 2K SLOC, and the trusted shim is around 1K SLOC.
Trusted Shim
We do not modify the source code of the application and the shared libraries, instead
we create the shim as a wrapper of libc, and allow it to intercept the function calls
that are supposed to call the libc functions. Specifically, on the Linux system, an
application usually needs shared libraries at runtime, and the dynamic linker load-
s those shared libraries in whatever order it needs them. However, when you set
LD PRELOAD to a shared library, that file will be loaded before any other li-
braries, including the libc library. Preloading a library means that its functions will
be used before others of the same name in later libraries, allowing a function to be
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System Calls
Files
open, close, read, write, chdir
writev, access, fstat64, uname, poll, fcntl
statfs64, fstatfs64, getdents64, getdents
stat64, lseek, llseek, getcwd, fchdir, ioctl
Network
bind, listen, accept,
sendto, recvfrom, accept4, select
connect, send, recv, getsockname
Memory mmap2, munmap, mremap, brk, mprotect
Process
getpid, gettid, getgroups32, set thread area
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid
exit groud, tgkill, getrlimit, exit
Time time, clock gettime, gettimeofday
Others futex, rt sigaction, rt sigprocmask, sigaltstack
Table 4.3: Supported system calls.
intercepted. We use this feature in our implementation, saving the cost of the source
code modification.
The trusted shim needs to do some initializations and preparations for the pro-
tection and the interception, such as allocating the shared buffer, and informing the
hypervisor to protected the application. However, those functions for intercepting
system calls are passively invoked, meaning those functions will not execute until
the application explicitly call them. To solve this problem, we resort to another fea-
ture - constructor function. A constructor function marked with .init will be called
by the dynamic linker when the library is loaded. The trusted shim supports 56
system calls (listed in Table 4.3) in the current implementation.
We evaluate the impacts of AppShield by running both macro- and micro-
benchmark kits.
4.5.1 Micro Benchmark
In the micro benchmark, we evaluate the cost of the address space switch (Ta-
ble 4.4). An address space switch event can be divided into three parts: protection
mode switch, context backup and restoration. The protection mode switch includes
a hypercall, IDTR and EPT switching. The context backup consists of saving 17
registers (including general, flag and control registers) and creating a dummy con-
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Operation Time (µs)
Out of Protected Address Space 1.72
Back to Protected Address Space 1.33
Context Backup 0.11
Context Restoration 0.08
Table 4.4: The micro-benchmark results for address space switch.
text. The context restoration is to load all the saved registers. The cost of domain
switch is relatively high, because it contains the costly memory access from hyper-
visor space to guest space, i.e., inserting the return address to the kernel stack. All
three costs constitute the latency for the system to handle a particular interrupt or
exception. The cost for a system call is for address-space switch cost and param-
eter marshalingt. The parameter marshaling cost varies for different system calls.
For instance, there is no such cost for getpid, while we need it to copy data from
user space to the shared region in write. Thus, we do not measure them individu-
ally, but choose to evaluate the whole application performance overhead in macro
benchmark.
4.5.2 Macro Benchmark
AppShield Impacts on Performance
SPEC CINT2006 [25] is an industry-standard benchmark intended for measuring
the performance of the CPU and memory. We executed SPEC CINT2006 in two se-
tups: system with virtualization, and the system with AppShield. Figure 4.9 shows
the results.
Comparing the impact of running the workload in a system with a bare-metal
hypervisor, we calculate the overhead added by the additional virtualization layer.
Based on the virtualization impacts, AppShield imposes an additional 0.01% slow-
down on average. The primary source of virtualization overhead is VM exits due to
interrupts and privileged instructions [35].
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Figure 4.9: SPECint 2006 Result. AppShield introduces insignificant slowdown
comparing with virtualization.
Computation Effects
We measure the AppShield protection on computation programs. In our experi-
ment, we measure three encryption algorithms (i.e., AES, RC4 and RSA), which is
adopted from OpenSSL 0.9.8k project. We run these algorithms to encrypt/decrypt
messages with different lengths, from 32bytes to 2048 bytes. The measurement re-
sults in Figure 4.10 show that the protection effects on the computation programs is
quite small.
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Figure 4.10: The effects of AppShield protection on computation.
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Disk I/O Benchmark
The disk I/O benchmark includes three sub-benchmarks to evaluate the overhead in
disk reading, writing and copying. Disk I/O benchmark reads/writes data from/to
files with different sizes. In our experiments, the file size is 64MB, and the read-
/write granularity is from 512B to 4MB. Experiments with a larger file and a smaller
buffer result in more system calls, and consequently introduce more context switch-
es. However, with the increasing of the buffer size, the performance is better, which
is also proved by the experiment results in Figure 4.11. Note that the overhead is
mainly introduced by data copy and context backup/restoration in parameter mar-
shaling.
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Figure 4.11: The disk I/O Benchmark.
Network I/O Benchmark
We measured the network performance with the Apache web server. The Apache
is configured as worker mode with one main process and 20 threads. We run the
standard ab matchmarking tool included in the Apache utility tools. We execute
10,000 web requests, at the concurrency level of 100 to fetch the default index page.
The web client and the Apache server are in the same LAN. The Apache web server
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Linux AppShield Overhead
Apache Throughput 320.65 req/s 316.84 req/s 1.01x
Connection Time (ms)
Processing 160 163 1.01x
Waiting 131 135 1.03x
Table 4.5: The benchmark results of Apache.
serves requests with 1.20% overhead in throughput, and about 3.05% overhead in
waiting time and 1.86% overhead in processing time. The overhead is reasonable
since Apache may cache the frequently requested pages, without issuing disk I/O
for each request.
4.6 Discussions
I/O Data Protection
To keep the hypervisor and the transit module small and simple, we do not integrate
the device drivers into them, while choose to reuse the legacy ones in the untrusted
OS. It means that the untrusted OS have the chance to reveal or tamper with the input
data of the CAP. For the file and network data, we can use cryptographic techniques
to protect them, e.g., all file and network data are encrypted with the CAP private
key. However, the data like keyboard input and mouse input are passed from the
devices in plain text, meaning that the untrusted OS is able to get the content or
even arbitrarily modify them. To protect such data, we can integrate the trusted
path [19, 109] with our AppShield technique.
Fine-Grained Protection
Currently, we focus on the whole application protection, while the AppShield tech-
nique can be adapted to protect self-contained high-assurance components. To
achieve this, we can split the application into low- and high-assurance partitions,
and only protect the high-assurance components. In addition, the high-assurance
components that are aware of the existence of the AppShield can explicitly commu-
nicate with the hypervisor to request more fine-grained protections or certain special
services, e.g., the online transaction service.
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Verifiable Protection
End users usually require a proof (verifiable protection) to indicate the state of the
protection. There are several approaches proposed to provide a secure feedback
channel. Bumpy [59], ZTIC [50], Lockdown [97] and Trusted Path [109] attempt to
use a dedicated (extra) hardware device (e.g., USB token and mobile) as the trusted
monitor, while KGuard [18] and Guardian [21] build a visual verification on the
display. We can integrate the the visual verification into our hypervisor since it does
not need dedicated devices. Note that the visual verification is only involved when
the first time the CAP is isolated.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the designed and implementation of AppShield,
which reliably and flexibly protects critical applications with complete isolation,
rich functionalities and high efficiency. We have implemented the prototype of
AppShield with a small bare-metal hypervisor. We have evaluated the performance
impacts on CPU computation, disk I/O and network I/O using micro and macro
benchmarks. The experiments show thatAppShield is lightweight and efficient.
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Chapter 5
Generic Protection On I/O Flows
In this chapter, we aim to protect data flows between applications and devices a-
gainst an untrusted kernel throughout the entire I/O lifecycle. In particular, we fo-
cus on those devices that render raw data, e.g., sound cards and printers, or generate
raw data for applications, e.g., seismic sensors and fingerprint scanners. We are less
concerned with disks and network adaptors, because these devices deal with derived
data from applications. Therefore, a straightforward solution to protect the disk I/O
and the network I/O is to encrypt the data before and after I/O operations.
In this work, we present DriverGuard, a holistic and compact I/O protection sys-
tem making use of a combination of cryptographic and virtualization techniques.
We implement DriverGuard with slight changes on the device drivers and the Xen
hypervisor. Our experiments with several I/O devices demonstrate that DriverGuard
imposes little overhead to the system and causes unnoticeable delays to user appli-
cations. DriverGuard is complementary to many user space protection schemes
such as Overshadow [17], and SP3 [106]. A composition of DriverGuard and a
user-space protection scheme can protect the whole lifecycle of data processing.
Our work is also remarkably different from secure I/O [84] and driver code
security [78]. Secure I/O copes with those attacks misusing the I/O mechanism (es-
pecially DMA operations) for illegal memory accesses. Driver code security tackles
software attacks, such as return-address attacks [14] and code injection attacks [55],
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which gain the root privilege by subverting drivers. Although these attacks do not
necessarily target at the I/O data, they are one of the threats considered in our study.
Our work is similar to the trusted path proposed by Zhou et al. [109]. Their trusted
path aims to assure the secrecy and authenticity of data transfers through a trusted
path from the new inserted user-level driver to the device, while our work focuses
on the protection of the secrecy of the I/O data through a trusted path built upon the
legacy drivers.
ORGANIZATION The next section describes the problem as well as the threat
model, security requirements and main challenges in Section 5.1, and explain the
design rationale in Section 5.2. We describe the design overview, privileged code
block and design details of DriverGuard in Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.
Section 5.6 discusses the automatical PCB identification and the full path I/O pro-
tection, and Section 5.7 shows the evaluation of DriverGuard through experiments
and performance measurements. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 5.8.
5.1 Problem Definition
In this section we state our goals together with the threat model, and present the
possible attacks and the main challenges we are facing.
5.1.1 Our Goals
There are several approaches [17, 106] proposed to protect the data in the user space.
Therefore, in this chapter we focus on the I/O flow protection in the kernel space.
Specifically, we attempt to propose an approach to defend against attacks that get
the value of the I/O data from device interfaces and kernel-space buffers. More
specifically, we focus on the protection of the raw I/O data that is generated from or
send to devices. Disk I/O and network I/O are not in the scope of our study, because
neither disks nor network adaptors produce or render raw data. In fact, data stored
in disks or transmitted across networks are actually generated by user applications.
Therefore, they can be protected using user-level encryption techniques (e.g., using
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SSL to protect the network data). Note that the devices mentioned in the chapter are
hardware/physical devices rather than virtual devices.
The second goal is to propose a generic solution to protect all kinds of I/O flows
on different machines and different devices. We attempt to make our system to be
compatible with commodity operating systems and legacy applications.
5.1.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
In our threat model, we consider the malicious software residing in the guest as
the adversary. The malware may compromise the kernel through attacks like ROP
[80, 9, 14] and code injection [55]. As a result, the adversary can take full control
of the guest, e.g., launching arbitrary code and issuing any DMA requests.
We assume that malware can not subvert the hypervisor. This assumption is
reasonable since the TPM-based secure boot scheme can guarantee the load time
integrity of the hypervisor, and the virtualization technology can prevent malicious
software and illicit DMA accesses driven by the guest OSes in runtime. In addi-
tion, some proposed hypervisor-protection schemes [99, 98, 5, 69] can be applied
to ensure the hypervisor’s security.
We trust the end user, and assume that the adversary can not physically control
the system. We assume that the hardware devices always behave according to their
specifications. We also assume the system firmware is trusted as in [45, 91, 93, 97].
The modern BIOS has a built-in hardware lock mechanism to set itself as read-
only and only accepts signed updates, so that the OS cannot tamper with it. Due to
the complexity of the x86 platform (e.g., optional ROM), this assumption may not
always be true. Nonetheless, it is still possible to validate the system firmware by the
proposed attestation approach [52] or by a trusted system integrator. Furthermore,
for the computers in an organization, the security-savvy system administrator can
simplify the system boot settings, such as disabling unnecessary option ROMs.
In this work, we only focus on uniprocessor platforms. Attacks from multi-
core or multi-processor are out of scope of our discussion. Note that it is not our
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interest in this chapter to study how to check the trustworthiness of a device driver.
We assume that a trusted authority1 signs every device driver to be installed. The
hypervisor can validate the integrity of device drivers by verifying the signatures.
Neither the denial-of-service attacks nor the side channel attacks (e.g., [85]) are in
the scope of our work.
Although the security and functionality of DriverGuard are independent of user
space protection, the benefits are maximized if DriverGuard joins schemes such as
Overshadow [17] and SP3 [106] to safeguard the entire I/O data life cycle covering
both kernel and user spaces. We will discuss this issue in Section 5.6.2.
5.1.3 Attacks
According to the characteristics of driver operations, we spell out attacks targeting
at the I/O data. From the above typical I/O flow, we can find out many possible
attack targets to get the value of the I/O data. We summarize all attack targets into
three categories: device I/O interface, the kernel space data buffer, and the user-
space data buffer.
• Attacks on device I/O interfaces. The device I/O interfaces include PIO,
MMIO and DMA descriptors. For PIO and MMIO, a rootkit may launch the
I/O-port or MMIO mapping attack [109] to intercept or manipulate the device
I/O, or directly access the interface to get the I/O data. It may also attempt to
modify the DMA descriptor to induce the device sending or fetching the I/O
data to or from the memory regions controlled by the rootkit.
• Attacks on kernel space data regions. This type of regions include all driver
allocated memory regions. A rootkit can keep probing and reading the target
I/O data, or be triggered by some special event (e.g., external interrupt) to
access the I/O data directly from these regions. It is hard for the kernel to
defend against such attacks because the rootkit has the same privilege as the
1To avoid increasing the TCB size, we suppose that the platform administrator signs every driver
to be installed in the platform. The hypervisor is pre-configured with the administrator’s public key.
65
kernel. Another attack is that the rootkit calls the driver’s legitimate routine
to access the data.
• Attacks on user space data regions. The user space regions are wildly open
for a kernel rootkit. Once the I/O data is in the user space, the rootkit is able
to bypass kernel- and user-level protections to directly access it. Such attacks
can be defended by serval user-space protection approaches [17, 106].
5.1.4 Security Requirements
Given that the locations of the I/O data can be categorized into two types: device
interface (including PIO, MMIO and DMA) and main memory, we summarize all
required security properties of the I/O flow protection on each of them.
For the data in the device interface, we require that malicious code can not access
or manipulate the data. The security properties are stated as:
• SP0: The physical addresses and I/O ports of all device interfaces can not be
updated once they are fixed by the BIOS during the system boots up.
• SP1: Any access on the data or to update data transfer parameters through
the device interface should be intercepted and verified.
• SP2: Only accesses from trusted code blocks are granted.
For the data in the main memory, we require that only the trusted code blocks
are able to read the protected I/O data, and the executions of the trusted code blocks
are protected. The security properties are summarized as follows:
• SP3: If the I/O data in a memory buffer is readable (plain text), access control
must be enforced and only granted the trusted code blocks can access it.
• SP4: If the I/O data in a memory buffer is unreadable (cipher text), any code
blocks are able to access it without triggering any verification mechanism.
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• SP5: If a trusted code block is interrupted to give up CPU during its execu-
tion, its execution context must be saved and restored when it occupies CPU
again.
5.1.5 Challenges
We now discuss the challenges in designing a system that provides the guarantee of
confidentiality of the I/O data over the lifetime of the system. The first challenge is
the complexity of the I/O sub-system. Different devices have different interfaces to
communicate with the system. For instance, cameras use USB interface while the
PS/2 keyboard is attached to the system with the PS/2 interface. Furthermore, for
the same device with the same version, different platforms (e.g., Linux or Microsoft
Windows) have different driver implementations. The diversity and complexity dra-
matically increase the difficulties to build a generic solution to protect all I/O flows.
The second challenge is the complex and intensive interactions between drivers
and the kernel. Most driver functions are dependent on the kernel exported func-
tionalities. For instance, the driver memory allocation and deallocation are heavily
dependent on the kernel memory management component. The heavy dependence
and intensive interactions make it extremely hard to distinguish if an access on the
protected I/O data is driven by the benign driver or by the compromised kernel.
The third challenge comes from the power of attackers. Once attackers compro-
mise the kernel, they are able to gain the kernel (highest) privilege, which allows
attackers’ code to freely access any memory regions and I/O ports. On the other
hand, it is hard for the buggy monolithic kernel to completely defend against soft-
ware attacks due to the large size and numerous attack surfaces.
5.2 Design Rationale
A straightforward approach is that the hypervisor arbitrates whether a control flow
can access the I/O data. It requires the hypervisor to introspect driver operations,
which is difficult to implement due to the semantic gap (e.g., lack of details of driver
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operations) between the hypervisor and the driver. Considering the complexity of
I/O operations, the workload on the hypervisor will inevitably expand its code size,
and may significantly downgrade the whole system performance.
Isolation is a widely used method to protect program executions. To apply iso-
lation on I/O data protection, one may propose location isolation or execution iso-
lation. Location isolation is to place device drivers and the kernel’s I/O subsystem
into a separated domain, e.g., a driver domain or Dom0 in Xen, or the hypervisor’s
space, e.g., VMware, so that malware in the guest kernel can not attack them direct-
ly. These approaches are efficient in terms of I/O performance. Nonetheless, the
resulting protection is weak because the TCB size is increased significantly due to
the drivers and the I/O subsystem.
In the execution isolation, the device drivers still reside in the untrusted guest
kernel while their executions are escorted in a secure environment established by
the hypervisor, similar to TrustVisor [56] and Overshadow [17]. The generic exe-
cution isolation is not applicable for I/O data protection, because I/O operations are
featured with frequent hardware interrupts and intensive driver-kernel interactions.
Note that if the I/O subsystem is also enclosed in the execution isolation, it suffers
from the same drawback as in the location isolation approach.
We adopt the idea of execution isolation, however, at a micro-level. It is well-
known that most of the driver code is for housekeeping purposes, such as error
handling, resource allocation and cleaning up [33], with only a small portion deal-
ing with I/O data transferring. We further observe that among the code for data
transferring, only a few code blocks, e.g., an encoding function, need to process the
I/O data, while the majority of them just move the data from one memory location
to another without necessarily knowing the content. Based on these observations,
we design DriverGuard as a fine-grained I/O protection mechanism, which enforces
access control on the device interfaces and encrypts the I/O data once it is moved
into memory. To let the device driver work properly, DriverGuard distinguishes
those security-sensitive driver code (around 1% of the driver code according to our
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experiments) from the rest. Only these identified code blocks are granted to access
device interface, and access decrypted I/O data. Other code blocks is only able to
access encrypted I/O data. In the meantime, DriverGuard protects the execution of
security-sensitive code block to prevent malicious code from accessing the I/O data.
Different from the hypervisor introspection technology, those access controls do not
impose comprehensive semantic logics on DriverGuard. Hence, its performance is
on par with the location isolation solution, however, the security strength is much
stronger.
5.3 Design Overview
By and large, DriverGuard is constructed using three lightweight protection tech-
niques as the building blocks: cryptography, access control and runtime protection.
We use cryptographic techniques to protect all I/O data without interfering with
most of the driver and the kernel executions. For regions holding data which cannot
be protected by encryption, we resort to DriverGuard to enforce access control. The
plaintext data can only be accessed by a few designated driver code blocks, which
are trusted and whose executions are safeguarded by our runtime protection mecha-
nism. We refer to these code blocks as privileged code blocks (PCBs) in the rest of
the chapter. By protecting the execution of PCBs, we successfully ensure the whole
I/O data security with minimal overhead since PCBs only constitute a tiny fraction
of the driver code.
5.3.1 Protection Mechanism
A high level view of DriverGuard’s protection mechanism is as follows. Once the
hypervisor boots up, it fixes all physical addresses and I/O ports of all device in-
terfaces by setting read-only on the configuration space registers, and rejects any
update requests from the guest OS [109] (achieve SP0). All device interfaces re-
lated to protected I/O flow are enforced access control by the hypervisor, so that
any access from the guest must be trapped into the hypervisor (achieve SP1). If
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the access is from a PCB (i.e., command-PCB or computation-PCB), the hypervi-
sor grants the access, otherwise rejects it (achieve SP2). Receiving the I/O data
from device interface, a PCB may attempt to read the content of data to do some
computations, such as encoding or decoding operations. Before the PCB is off the
CPU, the PCB is designed to either require the hypervisor set access control back
on the data if it is readable2 (achieve SP3) or encrypt the data into cipher text with
the key (achieve SP4, and see more in Section 5.3.4), which is generated by the
key-PCB and only accessible by PCBs. Non-PCBs are free to move the ciphertext
to anywhere without any constrains from the hypervisor. Figure 5.1(a) and Figure
5.1(b) illustrate the difference between a PCB’s and a non-PCB’s I/O data accesses.
Since the PCBs never actively give up the CPU until its execution flow ends, the
off-CPU event must be triggered by external interrupts or exceptions. Based on this
observation, the hypervisor enables interception mechanisms on all interrupts and
exceptions during the PCB execution. If the interception mechanism is triggered,
the hypervisor restores protection on the I/O data. Furthermore, the hypervisor also
protects the PCB execution context to avoid indirect data leakage (achieve SP5).
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cpy function, accesses the encrypt-
ed I/O data.
Figure 5.1: The concept of privileged code block (PCB).
In Section 5.1.2, we assume that every driver is signed by a trusted entity such
as the platform’s administrator. To ensure the initial integrity of the PCBs in a
2The PCB is able to get enough semantic information to know if the I/O data is readable or not.
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driver, we further assume that they have been explicitly labeled in the driver code
before being signed and installed. Therefore, the signature on the driver code also
ensures the integrity of PCBs. (We will discuss PCB identification methods in Sec-
tion 5.4.1.) Next, we explain the design details of three building blocks and leave
the discussion of their integration in Section 5.5, since it involves the details of I/O
operations.
5.3.2 Access Control Over Critical Regions
Since we do not rely on encryption-capable devices, encryption is not applicable
for data used by the hardware. To cordon off illicit accesses to the data, we utilize
the hypervisor’s access control mechanism. In general, the data regions are classi-
fied into memory regions and I/O ports, for which we apply different access control
methods by leveraging the hardware features and the virtualization techniques avail-
able in the platform.
To intercept accesses to a protected memory region, DriverGuard sets the at-
tribute bits in the corresponding Page Table Entries (PTEs), clears the correspond-
ing IOPL bits, and sets up the I/O bitmap to intercept accesses to an I/O port. Note
that the protected memory addresses are machine addresses not guest physical ad-
dresses (or named pseudo physical addresses). We use checkpoints3 in the rest of
the chapter to refer to both the IOPL bits and the PTEs marked by the hypervisor for
the purpose of access interception. Although the aforementioned protection tech-
niques are used in many existing schemes, e.g., [17, 67], we are confronted with two
new problems. First, given a memory buffer, the hypervisor must make sure that the
kernel can not bypass the checkpoint to access the region, which is challenging for
memory regions allocated by the kernel. Secondly, the hypervisor must ensure that
the sensitive I/O data is indeed placed in the region with a checkpoint. The first
problem demands a careful page table walk checking while the second demands the
I/O control integrity checking.
3Our definition of checkpoint has no relation with the checkpoint for rollback in distributed sys-
tems.
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5.3.3 Cryptographic Components
We introduce to the device driver a symmetric-key encryption function and a de-
cryption function, both of which can be called by any code. However, any write
access to the function code is denied by the hypervisor. We also add a key gen-
eration function to the driver as a PCB. The security of the I/O data relies on the
secrecy of the driver’s key, rather than the secrecy of the decryption function, which
complies with the famous Kerckhoff’s principle. The driver’s secret key is securely
generated based on a secret random seed supplied by the hypervisor. The secret
key is securely stored in a kernel space buffer priorly appointed by the driver and
can only be accessed by the driver’s PCBs. This prevents any unauthorized code
from decrypting the driver’s data, even though the decryption function can be called
arbitrarily.
5.3.4 PCB Execution Escorting
The third building block in DriverGuard is the runtime protection mechanism that
prevents a PCB’s execution from deviating its expected behaviors. The protection
is requested at the PCB’s entry and is relinquished at the exit via hypercalls. The
hypervisor agrees to admit a control flow into the escorting only when the request
is issued from the driver’s PCB, and agrees to discharge a flow from escorting only
when the request is issued from the PCB presently under escorting. The PCB is
registered to DriverGuard during the kernel boot up process (details in Section 5.5).
0x1234
flow routine
checkpoint 
lifted
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off CPU on CPU
Figure 5.2: An illustration of runtime protection, where 0x1234 is an exemplary
memory address with a PTE checkpoint.
The PCB under the escorting is granted by the hypervisor to access the critical
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data such as the driver’s secret key and the I/O data, or to issue I/O commands.
In our design, the hypervisor temporarily restores the access on those regions for
the PCB, and withdraws the access right at the exit of escorting. Therefore, no
duplicated exceptions or page faults will be raised despite that the PCB may access
the same region multiple times within one escorted execution. An escorted PCB
can be scheduled off from the CPU for various reasons. In that case, the hypervisor
intercepts these events and restores all checkpoints. Meanwhile, it also securely
saves the driver’s runtime stack and sets up a breakpoint for the PCB’s upcoming
CPU occupation. As a result, other code’s accesses to the protected regions are
denied. Figure 5.2 depicts a scenario of escorting.
5.4 Privileged Code Block
We consider three types of PCBs in a driver. One is computation-PCBs which refers
to the driver code blocks making computation on the I/O data, e.g., an encoding
function. The second is command-PCBs which refers to the driver code blocks
issuing data transfer parameters to the device. This type of code is security sensitive
because their executions determine the locations of plaintext I/O data. The third is
key-PCBs which refers to the driver code blocks initializing the driver’s encryption
key. Each driver generates its own key in the driver initialization step, such as in
module init.
There are several properties of PCB summarized as follows: 1) It is self-
contained in the sense that there is no extra function calls to kernel functions; 2)
It does not contain indirect call or indirect jump (e.g., no call using function point-
er), meaning that the control flow is static; and 3) It does not have any dynamic data
dependence except for the parameters. These properties call for driver developers’
prudence in driver coding such that the driver code is friendly to PCB identification.
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5.4.1 Identifying PCB
Given that the key-PCB is added by the DriverGuard scheme, we only illustrate
how to identify the other two types of PCB from the driver code. Following the I/O
data flow, the sophisticated driver developers are able to identify all functions that
operate on the I/O data, and thereby label all PCB candidates in these functions.
If some PCB candidates are not naturally satisfy the above listed PCB properties,
there are some guidelines for the driver developers to modify them into PCBs.
Obviously, it is easy to achieve the second property by carefully programming.
To achieve the first property, the developer can replace external function calls with
its own code if they are simple (like inline functions). If they are hard to be replaced,
the developer may either move these function calls out of the PCB candidate if they
do not effect the behavior of the driver, or divide the PCB candidate into two PCBs
with the function call as the separator. In order to achieve the third property, the
developer could assign the dynamic dependence data to the static or global data
variables. To facilitate the protection on these variables, developers are able to put
them in a particular region (e.g., a pre-reserved page) with compiling flags. Note
that the labeled driver can be distributed after the PCB-labeling work is done.
5.4.2 PCB Format
A PCB is always capsulated by a pair of hypercalls for escorting. The entry hy-
percall is a start escort hypercall that requires DriverGuard to start to protect the
execution of the PCB, and the exit hypercall is an end escort hypercall that informs
DriverGuard to end the PCB execution protection. There are two possible formats
for a PCB. One format of the PCB is ended with encryption on the protection data.
Such PCBs are usually in the intermediate parts of a driver, where the driver does
some process operations on the I/O data whose output is ready for the later stage.
The other is ended with protection requirement which is to request DriverGuard
to block all accesses on the protected regions. Such PCBs usually directly work
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with device (e.g., updating I/O buffer for DMA transferring) or user-level applica-
tions (e.g., copying data into user space). We illustrate their different formats in
Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: The two types of PCB format. (a) A PCB ending with encryption.
Thus, the hypervisor does not need to enforce access control on the data; (b) A PCB
ending with protection requirement. Therefore, the hypervisor must enforce access
control on the data to restrict the access.
We assume that the PCB interface is trusted and well-designed/implemented,
without malicious intention to leak I/O data to outside. In fact, it is true in almost
all cases especially for the ones in the driver interfaces since they are usually well
defined in the specification.
5.5 Design Details
We build DriverGuard on top of the Xen hypervisor to protect the drivers running
in a Linux guest domain. We systematically examine every step in I/O operations,
from the device discovery to the application’s (or device’s) data fetching. In order to
adaptively protect the driver operations, the hypervisor needs to store certain context
information about the driver. We start with driver context initialization since it is
performed by the hypervisor during the guest domain bootstrapping.
5.5.1 Driver Context Initialization
The context information of drivers are securely stored in three types of tables in the
hypervisor space. A device table specifies the management relation between a driver
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and a device by paring their identifiers. For every protected driver, the hypervisor
maintains a PCB table and a region table. The former stores the entry and exit
addresses of all PCBs of the driver while the latter specifies the memory regions and
the I/O ports to protect. There are five types of regions in the region table: 1) the
application buffer; 2) the memory buffer allocated by the driver for data processes;
3) the I/O data buffer such as DMA buffers ; 4) the device interface, including the
I/O ports or MMIO regions and DMA descriptor queues; and 5) the buffer holding
the driver’s secret key. Figure 5.4 depicts their locations in the system.
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Figure 5.4: An illustration of five types of regions with same numbering in the
description.
Device Table Initialization When a guest kernel image is uncompressed, the
hypervisor inserts a hook function to the kernel to inform the hypervisor about the
device-driver association via a hypercall. The hypervisor then initializes the device
table accordingly. The hypervisor also sets the checkpoints for the kernel structure
maintaining the device-driver association. Whenever a driver takes the ownership of
a device, the hypervisor intercepts the event and updates the device table properly.
PCB Table Initialization We assume that all PCBs in a driver have been man-
ually identified and delimited by a pair of hypercalls, i.e., an escorting-entry hyper-
call and an escorting-relinquish hypercall. The hypervisor scans the driver code to
record the addresses of escorting-entry hypercalls and of the respective escorting-
relinquish hypercalls. It puts these pairs into the PCB table. In Section 5.6.1, we
will discuss how to automatically identify PCBs.
Region Table Initialization The regions used by a driver can either be the
default ones chosen by the manufacturer/the kernel or set by the driver. In the
first case, the hypervisor updates them when the driver is loaded as in the device
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discovery step. In the latter case, the driver informs the hypervisor via a hypercall
about the protected regions or I/O ports.
Driver Key Initialization Each driver has a dedicated key-PCB to initialize
its own encryption key. In the key-PCB, key initialization algorithm first issues a
hypercall to get a random seed from hypervisor, and then saves the generated key
into its key buffer. The key generation process is only run once, and escorted by
hypervisor (see escorting details in section 5.5.3).
5.5.2 Checkpoint Deployment
Given a memory region or an I/O port, the hypervisor sets up the corresponding
checkpoint to intercept and verify potentially malicious accesses. The detailed de-
ployment method is dependent on the virtualization environment.
Memory Region Checkpoint
For a memory page A, the hypervisor walks through the page tables through the
CR3 register to locate the corresponding PTE pointing to it. The hypervisor sets the
attribute bits on the PTE to specify different access rights. To set a page read-only,
the PAGE RW bit is cleared; and to set a page non-access, the PAGE PRESENT
bit is cleared. Note that all protected regions are in kernel space and all processes
share one kernel space mapping. In the paravirtualization setting, only the hyper-
visor is able to update page tables. In the hardware-assisted virtualization setting,
a Shadow Page Table (SPT) or Extended/Nested Page Table (EPT/NPT) is used to
translate virtual addresses into machine addresses, and the SPT/EPT/NPT is only
updated by the hypervisor. Although the mechanism of the SPT is a little bit d-
ifferent from the one of EPT/NPT, i.e., the SPT requires the hypervisor to control
over the guest page table while the EPT/NPT do not need, the page-access-checking
mechanisms are essentially the same, since the final access right to a page is deter-
minate by the page table, i.e., SPT/EPT/NPT, handled by the hypervisor. Therefore,
those checkpoints can not be removed by the malicious kernel. Note that in the
hardware-assisted virtualization environment, the hypervisor enforces access on the
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machine address, not the pseudo physical address or virtual address.
Given that the granularity of the memory protection is in the page-level, we
should carefully deal with the I/O data buffers that are not page-aligned or mixed
with other data in a single page. There are two options to solve the problem. One is
to request I/O buffer at the length of pages. In fact, to accelerate the performance,
many device drivers have such allocation feature. For example, the USB camera
driver allocates a large memory pool in page level for data caching. The other op-
tion is to let the hypervisor emulate the operations that access other data. In Driver-
Guard, we choose the second option to avoid changes on driver code. Although
emulation incurs performance loss, the likelihood of its occurrence is low. This is
because the checkpoints are only deployed on device interfaces used immediately
after or before I/O, and other data are protected by encryption.
Legitimacy of Memory Region When the hypervisor attempts to set up a
checkpoint, it checks whether the machine memory page can be reached by an-
other unauthorized PTE. In other words, the kernel is not allowed to bypass the
checkpoint to visit a machine memory page. Therefore, the hypervisor must ensure
that there exists no unchecked virtual-to-machine address translation for memory
pages with checkpoints.
We leverage the hypervisor’s memory management mechanism to tackle this
issue. The Xen hypervisor maintains a page info structure for every ma-
chine memory page. The count info field in this structure records the num-
ber of usages of a machine memory pages. For a page allocated to a guest, its
count info is actually 2, because the hypervisor itself is holding it4. There-
fore, on setting up a PTE checkpoint, the hypervisor checks if the correspond-
ing counter is 2. In addition, we modify the hypervisor’s do mmu update and
do update va mapping to prevent the kernel from crafting a trapdoor path for
existing checkpoints. These functions are used by the guest kernel to update page
4Before a machine memory page is allocated to a guest OS, the hypervisor holds it first and sets
the PGC allocated bit. Therefore, the page’s count info is already 1 before being allocated
to the guest.
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tables. In this way, for any page table update, the hypervisor checks whether the
requested update increases the usage counter of any machine memory page with a
checkpoint.
In the hardware-assisted virtualization environment, the hypervisor does not set
two PTEs pointing to the same machine address. To enforce this property, the SP-
T/EPT/NPT update algorithm can be extended to verify it. Note that the legacy
hypervisors, such as Xen, do not export any interface for the guest to manage the
SPT/EPT/NPT.
I/O Port Checkpoint
I/O ports is separated from the memory address space, and the accesses to such
I/O ports need a set of special instructions, e.g., inb and outb. A successful access
must go through the IOPL checking and I/O bitmap checking. Any access will be
blocked once its priority is lower than the priority specified in the IOPL. Even if
the access pass the IOPL checking, it is still blocked if the corresponding bit is
set in the I/O bitmap. To prevent the malicious guest kernel from accessing the
protected I/O ports, the hypervisor clears the IOPL bits of EFLAGS of the guest’s
CPU. Namely, it sets the I/O privilege level to 0, such that the hardware always
checks the I/O bitmap for PIO instructions because the paravirtualized kernel runs
in Ring 1. Then, the hypervisor sets the bits corresponding to the protected I/O ports
such that a PIO instruction will cause a general protection exception.
It is relatively easier to set up I/O checkpoint in hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion. More specifically, the hardware-assisted virtualization technique supports that
the hypervisor itself can intercept all instructions that access a particular I/O port
through a dedicated I/O bitmap in the hypervisor space. Therefore, the hypervisor
simply activates the I/O bitmap mechanism by setting the 25th bit of the processor-
based VM-Execution control vector and then sets the bits in the bitmap correspond-
ing to all protected I/O ports.
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5.5.3 PCB Execution Escorting
PCB Admission
A driver’s PCB starts with the hypercall which takes as the parameter the buffer
address it requests to access. To admit a PCB, the hypervisor checks whether the
hypercall is issued from the instruction whose address is registered in the PCB table.
If not, the hypervisor rejects the request.
For an admitted PCB, the hypervisor protects its stack as follows. The hyper-
visor allocates a dummy stack for the PCB. Therefore, an admitted PCB has two
runtime stacks. A genuine stack is used for the PCB’s execution while the dummy
stack is used for untrusted code sharing the same execution flow due to interrupts.
The usage of dummy stacks will be explained in the next subsection. Figure 5.5
below describes the details of the PCB admission algorithm, where InEscorting is
a flag bit indicating the current execution state.
Admission Algorithm:
1) Fetch the EIP value stored at the top of the current guest kernel stack, which is the return address
of the hypercall.
2) If EIP does not match any entry in the PCB table, return error.
3) If the address of requested buffer is legitimate, then
a) set InEscorting to 1;
b) If the guest’s kernel stack segment is not a dummy stack, then
(i) allocate a dummy stack at the reserved space.
(ii) save the machine addresses of the dummy stack and the present stack as
(MA′ss,MAss). Return 0.
c) else, switch to the corresponding genuine stack. Return 0.
6) Return -1 as an error message for admission failure.
Figure 5.5: Algorithm for PCB admission.
Escorting
Once a PCB is admitted by the hypervisor, its execution is escorted and the check-
points for the buffers are temporarily lifted. The essence of escorting is that the hy-
pervisor intercedes whenever the PCB is scheduled off from the CPU, which occurs
due to the hardware interrupts. This situation opens the door to the kernel attacks,
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because the kernel may occupy the CPU and could access the PCB’s runtime stack
and data. To defend against such attacks, the hypervisor should be able to enforce
access control on the data and stack before the potentially malicious kernel occupy
the CPU. In the virtualization environment, the hypervisor is able to configure the
system to give priority to itself to occupy the CPU. Specifically, all hardware inter-
rupts are sent to the hypervisor prior to sending to the guest domain. Therefore, the
hypervisor is able to 1) restore the checkpoints and 2) replace the runtime stack with
the dummy stack allocated in PCB admission. The hypervisor also sets a breakpoint
to intercept the events that the PCB is re-scheduled to the CPU.
We explain below how the hypervisor handles an interrupt through interrup-
t handler do IRQ and a debug exception through the debug exception handler
do debug in addition to its normal process.
Interrupt To switch to a dummy stack, the hypervisor only replaces the content of
the PTE for the present stack with the machine page number of the dummy stack
allocated during admission. This change is transparent to any guest process, since
the address in the ESP register remains the same. Hence, the guest kernel is not
able to access the true stack while the subsequent execution can use the dummy
stack without being affected. The algorithm for stack switching and checkpoint
restore is shown in Figure 5.6.
IRQ-handler Algorithm:
(1) If InEscorting = 0, return.
(2) Restore the checkpoints that are removed during escorting.
(3) Switch to the dummy stack, by setting the PTE for the guest’s stack base to point to MA′ss.
(4) Set InEscorting = 0.
(5) Set a local breakpoint at the instruction pointed by EIP . Save the address pair in EIP and
ESP .
(6) Return and pass the control to the default interrupt handler.
Figure 5.6: Interrupt handler for escorting. When there is an interrupt interrupting
the execution of the execution of a PCB, the interrupt handler restores the protection
on the escorted data, and saves the context of current escorting PCB.
Debug Exception When a debug exception occurs, the hypervisor’s do debug func-
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tion is called before the event is forwarded to the guest kernel. All breakpoints used
by the hypervisor are local breakpoints. Therefore, they are triggered only for the
present process. There are two types of local breakpoints used in DriverGuard.
Setting a breakpoint at the EIP is to intercept the event of PCB resuming. For
this type of breakpoint, the hypervisor enters into escorting only when both EIP
and ESP values match the previously saved pair. The details are shown in the
following algorithm in Figure 5.7.
Debug-handler Algorithm: Breakpoint address stored in EIP, the stack address stored in ESP
/* Enter into Escorting */
(1) If there exists a saved (EIP′,ESP′) pair, s.t. ESP′ = ESP and EIP′ = EIP, then
(a) remove the breakpoint at EIP;
(b) Restore to the genuine stack by replacing the stack PTE with MAss.
(c) Set InEscorting = 1, and return 0.
(2) Return -1 as an error message.
Figure 5.7: Exception handler for escorting. When a previous interrupted PCB
resumes, the exception handler restores the PCB execution context.
PCB Exit
To exit from the hypervisor escorting, the PCB issues another hypercall. The hyper-
visor checks if InEscorting is set. If not, it returns an error message; otherwise, it
clears InEscorting flag. The PCB should also issue a hypercall to protect its data if
the data are left in plaintext. The hypervisor sets no more breakpoints and processes
interrupts and exceptions in the normal way.
5.5.4 Data Region Access Control
A potentially malicious access to a memory region with a checkpoint caus-
es a page fault and an access to an I/O port with a checkpoint throws out
a general protection exception. Therefore, we modify the hypervisor’s page
fault routine do page fault and the general protection exception handler
do general protection. In the former, the hypervisor gets the address of
the trapped instruction from EIP and the address being checked from CR2, while in
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the latter, the I/O port number is enclosed in the instruction.
If the access is granted by the hypervisor, the event will not be forwarded to the
guest kernel. In that case, The legitimate flow continues to execute the intercepted
instruction without being re-scheduled due to the page fault as the guest kernel does
not observe this exception. For unauthorized accesses, the page fault or exception
is passed to the guest kernel. DriverGuard is compatible with memory mapping for
page sharing because the checkpoints are deployed at the PTEs. A buffer mapped to
two addresses has two PTE checkpoints. In the following, we elaborate the details
of region access control according to all types of regions except the control region.
I/O Buffer The addresses of I/O buffers are obtained within an escorted
command-PCB. Since the I/O buffer contains the data to/from the device, they are
not protected by encryption. The hypervisor blocks all accesses not from an escort-
ed PCB. For an input buffer containing the data from the device, the driver always
encrypts the data before moving them to other locations, whereas for an output
buffer the driver must decrypt the data after copying them to the output buffer.
Driver Buffer Driver buffers temporarily hold data for processing. When the
data in those buffers are encrypted, the hypervisor does not set up checkpoints for
them. Only when the escorted PCB is temporarily scheduled off from the CPU, the
hypervisor sets up the checkpoints against all accesses as the data are in plaintext.
In this case, the PCB notifies the hypervisor about the buffer address.
Key Buffer The key buffer holds the secret encryption key used by the driver.
The hypervisor allows the key to be read only from the instructions from the en-
cryption/decryption functions and is currently in escorting mode. Thus, a non-PCB
can not access the encryption key.
5.5.5 Device Control Protection
As explained in Section 5.5.1, the control region’s addresses can be obtained in the
initialization phase for certain devices. The hypervisor denies all write accesses to
the region not from an escorted PCB. Furthermore, it is also crucial to maintain the
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consistency between the I/O buffer address specified in an I/O command which is
sent to the control region and the buffer addresses requested by the device driver.
This is because the kernel may manipulate the I/O command such that the device
uses an unprotected I/O buffer for transferring. To defend against such attacks,
the driver’s command-PCB informs the hypervisor the locations of the I/O buffers
in use, such as the DMA buffer and the DMA descriptor queue. The hypervisor
inserts them in the region table and sets up the checkpoints accordingly. Therefore,
it ensures that the I/O buffer in use is always protected.
5.5.6 Device Configuration Space Restriction
The physical addresses and the I/O ports of all devices are decided by the device
configuration registers. All these configuration registers are located in the north-
bridge chipset [31]. There are two possible methods to access them. One is through
I/O ports. The I/O port CONFIG ADDRESS (i.e., 0xCF8) is used to selec-
t a dedicated device whose configuration space is updated through the I/O port
CONFIG DATA (i.e., 0xCFC). The other method is through MMIO. Typically
there is a continuous 256MB memory region reserved by the system for all devices.
Any access to this region will trigger the chipset to propagate the configuration
throughout the whole system. In order to avoid the configuration space conflicts
(e.g., MMIO mapping attack) between different devices, the privileged code (e.g.,
the hypervisor) is able to verify the update requests by setting access control on the
above I/O ports and the reserved memory mapped region.
In order to defend against I/O-port and MMIO mapping attacks, DriverGuard
restricts the updates on the physical addresses and I/O ports of device interfaces.
According to the above descriptions, DriverGuard sets checkpoints on the I/O ports
0xCF8 and 0xCFC, or the reserved memory region. The details of the checkpoint
refers to Section 5.5.2. Any update (write) operations will be rejected. This restric-
tion does not lower the runtime performance of the system since the configuration
operation is normally done once at the bootup phase of the system.
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5.5.7 User-Space Device Driver Support
When a device is managed by a user-space driver, the I/O data is directly transferred
between a user space buffer and the device interface without any intermediary ker-
nel space buffers. According to our threat model in Section 5.1.2, the user space
memory regions are well protected by schemes like Overshadow. However, those
schemes are not sufficient for I/O protection because they do not protect the device
interface. Thus, we need to instrument the driver code with hypercalls to fix the pro-
tection gap. The inserted hypercalls update the information of the device interface
to DriverGuard and request it to enforce access control on the device interface. Re-
call that all the user space driver code is protected. Thus, we do not need to identify
PCBs for user-space drivers.
5.6 Discussions
In this section, we discuss the automatic PCB identification process, and the whole
life cycle of protection on the I/O flows with the cooperations of DriverGuard and
other user space approaches.
5.6.1 Automatically Identifying PCB
Ideally, a fully automated PCB identification algorithm can discover PCBs in a de-
vice driver with no false positives and no misses. False positives lead to unneeded
overhead while misses result in loopholes for the adversary to attack. However,
it remains as an open problem how to design such a PCB identification algorithm
for a driver’s source code or binary code. In this chapter, we make analysis of the
challenges and propose a best-effort solution.
Recall that we defined three types of PCBs in Section 5.4. We only need to
discover computation-PCBs and command-PCBs, as the key-PCBs are new function
inserted to the driver. Labeling command-PCBs is straightforward, since they are
featured with special instructions (e.g., inb and outb) involving the device interface
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(e.g., I/O ports) or special memory region (e.g., MMIO). Many existing techniques
can be used to identify the related statements, e.g., interprocedural points-to analysis
technique [38] and the slicing techniques [86, 101, 62]. For instance, in the slicing
techniques, we select the device interface (e.g., the I/O ports) as the seed, and the
slicing tool can find out all statements that directly access the seed.
The computation-PCBs are the code blocks computing on the I/O data (e.g.,
mapping the scan code into key code in the keyboard driver). Identifying the
computation-PCBs is a challenging task since it involves code and data semantics.
To the best of our knowledge, existing code analysis techniques (e.g., forward and
backward slicing, and thin slicing) are not sufficiently intelligent to distinguish code
semantics. Another challenge is the abundant usage of function pointers in drivers,
which makes it infeasible to determine execution flows through a static code analy-
sis. This issue is aggravated by the fact that most drivers are essentially a collection
of disjointed functions, instead of a single executable. The executions of driver
functions are usually integrated with kernel execution. It is therefore difficult to
map out all possible execution flow given existing code analysis techniques.
We propose a semi-automatic method for computation-PCB identification, with
automated tools for coarse-grained scope defining on a large scale of code and hu-
man efforts for fine-grained refinement on small scale code fragments. Given a
driver’s source code which is a set of functions, the basic idea is to firstly pick up
functions related to I/O data, then identify PCBs within each chosen function. In
a nutshell, the procedure is divided into three steps: 1) to select functions which
potentially contain PCBs; 2) to identify PCB statements in each function selected
in previous step; and 3) to form all PCB blocks from the statements discovered in
Step 2.
Step 1: Function Candidate Selection Drivers are highly structured code to con-
form to hardware interface specifications, such as providing file operation interfaces
like open, read and close. According to hardware specifications, I/O flows
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must originate at those designated interfaces. Therefore, those interface functions
which do not process I/O data, as well as functions solely called by them, are exclud-
ed from our search scope. For instance, the interface function poll corresponding to
the select system call usually does not access the I/O data, while allows a program
to monitor and wait until one or more of driver/device states become ready for some
class of I/O operations. The interface functions like read and write usually handle
I/O data for the requests of the applications. For ease of presentation, we use F to
denote the set of interface functions with I/O flows.
We then map out the execution flows (and therefore I/O data flows) starting from
functions in F , so that all dependent functions are examined. For this purpose, we
first manually identify the I/O data used in F , because the exact locations of I/O
data in those functions are implementation specific, e.g., in the function parame-
ters or predetermined buffers. Then, we use the I/O data as the seed to perform
dynamic taint analysis [64, 48] to identify functions involved in I/O flow5. Since
the dynamic taint analysis does not guarantee covering all execution paths, manual
efforts are needed to check missed functions. Lastly, we extend F to enclose al-
l functions picked up either manually or by the tool. For each function in F , we
identify computation-PCB in the next step.
Step 2: PCB Statement Identification In each selected function, we attempt to
identify from the function body the PCB-candidate statements where I/O data are
involved. Using the I/O data in Step 1 as the seed, we apply the slicing tools [86, 62]
to label all seed-related statements in the function body. Note that the resulting state-
ment set contains non-PCB statements for two reasons. Firstly, according to [74],
slicing techniques may introduce false positive in statement discovering. Secondly,
it is likely that some statements correctly identified by the slicing tools are not for
I/O data computation, since the slicing technique does not take code semantics into
consideration. For instance, statements that copy I/O data between memory buffers
5Although the method for dynamic taint analysis is applicable to drivers in principle, we have not
found any existing tool suitable for this task.
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do not satisfy the definition of computation-PCB. We suggest to manually examine
the slicing results to filter out non-PCB statements.
Step 3: PCB Formation The last step is to organize the PCB statements in Step
2 into PCBs and instrument them with hypercalls. If each PCB statement is treated
as a PCB block, its performance toll will significantly rise up. For each function
in F , our algorithm scans the statements identified in Step 2 with several rounds of
iterations. In the first iteration, adjacent PCB statements are grouped into one PCB
block. In the second iteration, the algorithm attempts to merge separated PCBs in
order to reduce the total number of PCBs. If two PCBs are in the same basic block
(i.e. a straight-line sequence of code with one entry point and one exit) and the
number of non-PCB statements between the PCBs are less than a predetermined
parameter κ, then these two PCBs are merged together with the non-PCB statement
in between into a new PCB. Note that κ is used to tune the balance between the
size of PCB and the number of PCBs. This iteration continues until no new PCB is
generated. In the end, two hypercalls are inserted for each formed PCB as described
in Section 5.4.
It is better for the driver developers to do the PCB identification since 1) they
know best, and 2) it may increase the market share due to the extra security services.
In addition, the identification process is only done once, and the results can be de-
livered anywhere. For a particular system, the hypervisor does not need to maintain
a universal list (including all PCBs), while it manages the PCB list only for the
drivers loaded in the system. Maintaining the PCB list that are never used will lead
to unnecessary cost and may increase the TCB size, especially for the hypervisor.
5.6.2 Full I/O Path Protection
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, a full I/O path in general consists of the user-space
buffers allocated by the application, the kernel-space buffers allocated by the driver
and/or kernel, and the I/O interface buffer such as a DMA buffer. DriverGuard
ensures the security of the latter two while a user-space protection scheme (e.g.,
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Overshadow [17], SP3 [106] or SecureME [22]) secures the first type of buffers. To
have a seamless integration, the key issue is to ensure that the kernel segment of the
I/O path correctly joins the intended application’s user space segment, as a device
is shared among multiple applications.
This issue has twofold implications. One is that the location of the user space
buffer allocated by the target application must be securely passed to the driver, such
that the driver can deliver (fetch) I/O data to (from) the right place. The other is that
the data during the user-kernel space transition must be securely handled. When the
I/O data is transferred between the application’s buffer and a kernel buffer, it should
be ensured that no security gap exists during the transition. In other words, both
buffers should be protected either by encryption or hypervisor-based access control
while allowing data flow between them.
We propose below a design integrating DriverGuard with Overshadow as illus-
trated in Figure 5.8. Note that Overshadow makes use of a cloaked shim which is
introduced as a trusted component in user space. The shim code in Overshadow
plays the role of protecting data exchange between the application and the kernel
using system calls. We propose to add a new function named as shimguard in the
cloaked shim. Shimguard in the cloaked shim handles inbound and outbound da-
ta before and after system calls and correctly locates the application buffer for I/O
data.
Before an application issues a system call to activate an I/O operation, the shim-
guard is involved by the cloaked shim. The shimguard first updates the identity
of the application, the identity of the buffer and the identity of the target driver to
the hypervisor. The identity of the application is the unique address space identi-
fier (ASID) maintained by the hypervisor as proposed in Overshadow. If current
ASID is the trusted application, the hypervisor accepts the hypercall, otherwise it
will reject the hypercall. The identity of the buffer is its memory region represented
in machine address. The start and end virtual addresses of the buffer are provided
by the shimguard using the hypercall, and the corresponding machine addresses are
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Figure 5.8: The shimguard helps Overshadow and DriverGuard to protect the whole
life cycle of the I/O data. Note that the I/O data denoted as D in the shaded regions
are encrypted either by driver PCBs or by shimguard.
collected by the hypervisor. Note that the virtual addresses alone can not used as the
identity of the buffer since they may represent a different buffer in another virtual
pace. The identity of the device driver can be got by using the name of the device
provided through the hypercall since the device and driver mapping relationship is
maintained by the hypervisor. The hypervisor generates a unique AES encryption
key for the received 3-tuple of identities. Both the 3-tuple and the corresponding
key are inserted into a table in the hypervisor space. For clarity purpose, we use
shim-key to denote the AES key save in couple with the 3-tuple identifiers.
We use a read operation as an example to illustrate how to protect the I/O path
starting from the device interface to the application buffer. The protection over the
kernel space segment is the same as described in previous sections. When the PCB
of the driver moves the I/O data into a user space buffer denoted asAddr, it requests
the shim-key for Addr from the hypervisor. The hypervisor releases the shim-key
on the condition that there exists an entry in the previous table containing both the
requesting driver’s identity and the machine address of Addr. If successful, the
driver PCB encrypts the I/O data and transfer the cipher text to Addr. When the
cloaked shim is triggered to fetch the data from Addr, the shimguard function re-
quests the shim-key from the hypervisor. The hypervisor releases it on the condition
that there exists an entry in the previous table containing both the requesting appli-
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cation’s ASID and the machine address of Addr. If successful, the shim deciphers
the encrypted I/O data and passes it to the application.
The operations for outbound data flow is similar to the description above. Note
that the shim-key in different from the the encryption key used by the driver de-
scribed in previous sections. The shim-key is application specific and is the same
as that used in Overshadow, whereas the driver has its own encryption key. The key
generation and management are trusted as it is generated by the hypervisor in the
hypervisor space and protected in the guest space.
5.7 Evaluation
We implement DriverGuard and run experiments on six peripheral devices to eval-
uate its security and performance. The devices are a USB keyboard, a web camera,
a fingerprint reader, a sound card, a printer and a graphic card.
5.7.1 Security Analysis
Driver Security
As we know drivers are usually buggy. Attackers are able to compromise the driver
through these vulnerabilities to hijack the control flow or data flow of the driver to
attempt to get the I/O data. Fortunately, attackers can not get the I/O data as long
as the integrity of driver’s PCBs are kept under the protection of the DriverGuard.
Even if attackers completely control other parts of the driver, they are only able to
access encrypted I/O data or are directly rejected since all these accesses are not
from PCBs. Smart attackers may attempt to call a PCB to get I/O data. However,
this attempt would fail because 1) the control flow of the PCB is static, and 2) I/O
data is either encrypted or set protection by the hypervisor according to the design
of the PCB (Section 5.3.4) when the control flow is out of PCB . The confidentiality
of the I/O data is dependent on the trustworthiness of PCBs, not other parts of the
driver or kernel. Therefore, attackers can not get any benefits from buggy device
drivers.
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ROP Attack
The Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attack is a very powerful attack since it
does not need to inject malicious code but drives legitimate code to do malicious be-
haviors. However, the ROP attack can not get the protected I/O data in our system
due to the design of the PCB and the DriverGuard protection. More specifically, in
our design, the executions of PCBs are protected by the hypervisor and the control
flows of PCBs are static. Therefore, attackers can not hijack any PCB control flows.
Furthermore, only the execution flows that start from recorded start escort hyper-
calls are able to access decrypted I/O data. Any other execution flows that have no
escorting request or with unrecorded requests are rejected.
DMA Attack
Our scheme relies on IOMMU to defend against DMA-based attacks, whereby a
rootkit instructs a DMA device to read/write a memory region. IOMMU can defend
against this type of attacks if the checkpoints are set on I/O page tables as well. If
IOMMU is not available, an alternative approach is to intercept DMA request with
shadow DMA descriptor mentioned in BitVisor [84]. Nonetheless due to its high
runtime cost, the shadow DMA descriptor is more amiable to slow devices with
infrequent usage, e.g. a fingerprint reader.
Interrupt Spoofing Attack
The interrupt spoofing attack are proposed in [109], which attempts to induce the
device driver operating on incomplete or inconsistent data by processing spoofed
interrupts. Obviously, the interrupt spoofing attack may lead to the device driver’s
misbehavior. However, it can not help attackers to access the I/O data, since it is
only readable for trusted PCBs.
Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks (e.g., [102, 85]) can be used by the adversary to infer secret
data. Since the adversary in our model refers to malwares residing in the guest
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OS, the hardware-based side-channels such as power consumption are not feasible
for the adversary. The adversary can launch other attacks by observing the timing
difference between two I/O events (e.g., keystrokes) or the contents in a CPU cache,
which is weak than the adversary considered in chip-card security. In addition,
existing side channel attacks mainly target cryptographic data, such as a decryption
key or a password. It is unknown whether generic I/O data is subject to these attacks
as well.
Our current design does not take side-channel attacks into consideration. To
counter these attacks, DriverGuard should deploy a special AES implementation
resisting side-channel attacks. The hypervisor should clean up the CPU caches
whenever a PCB is scheduled off from the CPU. It can also generate random I/O
events to defeat timing analysis. The main challenge is how to deal with side-
channel attacks without increasing the hypervisor’s complexity and incurring more
overhead.
Attacks on Multi-core Platform
On a multi-core platform, it is possible that while a PCB runs in one core accessing
the I/O data, the subverted guest kernel on another core can also access them using
the same page table used by the PCB. This attack can be countered using hardware-
assisted virtualization supporting EPT or NPT.
The hypervisor prepares a dedicated EPTs for PCBs so that they have access
permissions to those protected checkpoints. The non-PCB code such as the un-
trusted guest kernel use the normal EPT/NPT, in which the checkpoint regions are
set as inaccessible. Whenever a PCB starts to occupy a CPU core, the hypervi-
sor installs the dedicated EPTs (e.g., triggered by the start escort hypercall) for the
corresponding core. When it gives up the CPU core, the normal EPTs are restored
(e.g., triggered by the end escort hypercall). Since instructions on other cores do
not have the dedicated EPTs, they cannot access the protected region when the PCB
is in execution. Note that the EPTs are solely managed by the hypervisor. The guest
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kernel does not the privilege to manipulate the EPTs.
5.7.2 Security Evaluation
To validate the design of DriverGuard, we evaluate its effectiveness in several ex-
periments.
Known Attacks
To the best of our knowledge, the only publicly known kernel-level attacks on I/O
devices are keyloggers. We have downloaded and tested three kernel-level keylog-
gers and none of them can successfully acquire the keystrokes. The first keylogger6
directly reads the keyboard I/O ports 0x0060 and 0x0064 using a fake interrupt
handler. It fails because the fake interrupt handler does not belong to the authorized
keyboard driver PCBs. Thus, it cannot access the I/O port or get the decryption key.
The second keylogger7 modifies the keyboard driver’s data structure and installs a
malicious function handler. Since the malicious function handler is not admitted
by the hypervisor as a PCB, it can only access encrypted keystrokes without being
allowed to use the secret key. The third keylogger8 modifies the system call table to
replace read function with a malicious one. The malicious read function first calls
the original read, and then steals data from the user space buffer that is passed as
parameter. This rootkit fails because the read function only copies the encrypted
keystroke. After the driver places the ciphertext in the application buffer and opens
it for the application, the hypervisor denies all kernel level accesses.
Synthetic Experiments
We introduce three synthetic attacks to read protected I/O data, and the results show
that the DriverGuard successfully prevents all of them. More specifically, in the first
experiment, we attempt to modify one byte in the protected MMIO region. Driver-
Guard catches the write operation through a page-fault exception. DriverGuard
6http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=59&id=14
7http://goo.gl/DpOBc
8http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/view/25677/kernel.
keylogger.txt
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rejects the operation once it verifies the caught operation is not from an identified
PCB. In the second experiment, we try to read the protected I/O data in a driver
buffer, where the data is encrypted. We are only able to get the cipher text since the
newly introduced code is not able to get the encryption key to decrypt it. In the third
attack, we introduce a piece of code to call a PCB to get the protected I/O data. The
attack fails as the data is encrypted when the execution flow is out of the PCB.
5.7.3 Usage of PCB
In our experiments, we manually identify all PCBs on the source code of device
drivers and the drivers in the kernel’s I/O subsystems, e.g., a host controller driver.
It is straightforward to identify command-PCBs and key-PCBs, because key-PCBs
are introduced by DriverGuard while command-PCBs are the code accessing port
I/O, MMIO or structures used by devices (e.g., frame list of UHCI). Identifying
computation-PCB requires the semantic knowledge of the code. We trace the I/O
data to spot code segments computing on the I/O data. Note that code segments for
copying or moving data are not PCBs.
Table 5.1 lists all the involved drivers (except for the graphic driver since it
uses user-level driver) used in our experiments and the number of PCBs in each of
them. We find that a driver typically has only around ten PCBs and each PCB has
approximately 15 lines of code without making function calls (except the encryption
and decryption functions). The total PCB code only account for 1v3% of the driver
code. The tiny size of PCB and its simple logic allow for high security assurance,
as compared to protecting the execution of thousands of lines of driver code.
5.7.4 Performance Evaluation
We experiment with DriverGaurd on a PC with Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU
E7200 @2.53GHz, 4GB main memory, running Xen 4.0.0 and a PV guest domain
with Linux kernel 2.6.31.13. DriverGuard adds around 1.7K SLOC to the Xen
hypervisor. Our performance evaluation includes a cost measurement of Driver-
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Driver Size (LOC) # of PCBs Avg. PCBSize (LOC) Device
keyboard 4964 11 17 keyboard
HID∗ 12771 13 10 keyboard
UVC driver 7838 7 11 camera
EHCI∗ 10011 6 15 camera
HDA-Intel 47825 8 6 sound card
Sound-core∗ 18722 5 4 sound card
devio 1628 7 12
printer, finger-
print reader
UHCI∗ 7600 5 14
printer, finger-
print reader
Table 5.1: The number of PCBs and the average size for each driver used in our
experiments. The drivers labeled with stars are those within the kernel’s I/O sub-
system. The PCB size includes the hypercalls and the calls to the encryption and
decryption functions.
Guard’s component functions and a set of application tests with six devices. We
remark that the I/O characteristic is favorable to our scheme as peripheral devices
are usually much slower than the CPU. Therefore, DriverGuard does not affect the
driver performance since the device speed is the performance bottleneck.
We choose 128-bit RC4 as the encryption cipher in our implementation rather
than AES encryption, because RC4’s compact code is easier to protect and does not
significantly expand the PCB size,
Component Cost Evaluation
We instrument the DriverGuard code to measure the CPU cycles consumed by its
main components including the escort hypercalls, the interrupt handler do IRQ, the
debug handler do debug, the page fault handler do page fault and the general
protection exception handler do general protection The results are shown
in Table 5.2. Note that the encryption cost within a PCB comprises the overhead of
the secret key access which incurs one page fault and the hypervisor’s checkpoint
removal.
We also test the time cost induced by DriverGuard to data movements in the
guest domain, including I/O port data and memory buffer transferring. The cost is
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Components CPU cycles
do IRQ 844
do debug 739
do page fault 961
do general protection 1813
Encryption 1KB within a PCB 23355
Table 5.2: Cost of DriverGuard components
due to the interceptions triggered by the checkpoints. We choose two commonly
used functions: inb and memcpy. inb reads one byte from a serial port while we run
memcpy to copy 12K bytes from one buffer to another. Both the port and the mem-
ory buffer are protected by DriverGuard checkpoints and the functions are allowed
to access. The test results are shown in Table 5.3.
memcpy inb
Normal (in CPU cycles) 1884 2738
DriverGuard (in CPU cycles) 3026 2939
overhead (%) 1142 (60.62%) 201 (7.3%)
Table 5.3: Time cost induced on the guest domain data access
As shown in Table 5.3, the overhead for protecting memory data flow is rather
high (about 60%). Therefore, a severe performance drop will be seen in I/O flows
involving frequent memory data movement. In fact, most device drivers are opti-
mized to reduce the number of memory copying. A widely used practice is for the
driver to maintain a large cache buffer and memory copying is invoked only when
the cache is full.
Driver Performance Measurement
We test three input devices (keyboard, camera and fingerprint reader) and three out-
put devices (printer, sound card, and the graphic card). For each device, we evaluate
the performance overhead and latency for the device drivers and user applications.
Keyboard When a user presses a key on the keyboard, an interrupt is generated
by the hardware. The interrupt handler of the HID driver is invoked to get the key
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code and to send it into a tty buffer through the keyboard driver. Following that,
an event is raised to trigger sys read, which has been sleeping on the event. When
being waked up, sys read transfers the key value from the keyboard driver’s buffer
to a user space memory address. In our experiment, we measure the time cost of
the interrupt handler which moves the data from the keyboard to the tty buffer. The
results are shown in Table 5.4. Although the protected keyboard I/O is slower than
the unprotected one, it does not affect the application because the overhead (i.e.,
0.085ms) is still negligible as compared the speed of human keystrokes.
key code transfer
Normal 0.053ms
DriverGuard 0.138ms
overhead (%) 0.085ms (160.40%)
Table 5.4: overhead of a protected keyboard I/O
Camera The web camera in our experiment is managed by the default Linux UVC
driver. When the camera is opened by an application, it continuously collects video
data and sends them to the application. The UVC driver’s interrupt handler moves
and decodes the captured data from the camera into a video frame, which resides in
the driver’s buffer mapped to the user space. The user application can directly use
the frame data like normal user-space data without any kernel-to-user-space data
movement.
We run a command line program called capture-example9 which reads the cam-
era data continuously. We measure the time overhead of the UVC interrupt handler
and the application’s waiting time for getting new data, which is a key factor to the
quality of the generated video stream. The results are shown in Table 5.5.
The interrupt handler’s cost grows 10 times when under the protection of Driver-
Guard. The main overhead is due to the encryption on the camera data, which are
4 pages long. Nonetheless, the drivers spends much more time in waiting for the
9It can be downloaded from http://v4l2spec.bytesex.org/spec/
capture-example.html.
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camera’s data generation. Thus the cost of the interrupt handler does not cause
the overall performance degradation. We test video chatting using Empathy 2.30.2,
which is an graphic instant messenger. The experiment results do not show notice-
able delays to the human users.
interrupt handler waiting time
Normal 0.023ms 33.24ms
DriverGuard 0.259ms 33.38ms
overhead (%) 0.236ms (1026.09%) 0.14ms (0.42%)
Table 5.5: The performance of a USB camera
Fingerprint-Reader Our fingerprint reader is the Upek Touchchip fingerprint sen-
sor. In our evaluation experiment, we choose Fingerprint GUI 10 as the application
which uses the default Linux driver devio to communicate with the fingerprint read-
er. When the fingerprint reader is active, the driver’s interrupt handler continuously
loads the collected fingerprint data into its buffers, which are then fetched by Fin-
gerprint GUI by calling the ioctl function. In our experiments, we measure the
whole I/O session of fingerprint collection. The results are shown in Table 5.6.
Printer The printer in our experiments is HP Officejet 7210 and the device driver
fingerprint collection
Normal 2.61s
DriverGuard 2.63s
overhead (%) 0.02s(0.77%)
Table 5.6: The turnaround time of fingerprint collection.
in use is devio. We use OpenOffice to print documents via a print-process running in
the background. The print process opens the printer and issues ioctl to send data to
the printer. After sending out the data, the print-process waits for a signal sent back
by the printer to close the printer. In our experiments, we measure the turnaround
time between the printer open and the printer close. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 5.7.
10http://www.n-view.net/Appliance/fingerprint/index.php
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1 page 2 pages 4 pages 8 pages
Normal 15.74s 27.36s 56.65s 120.75s
DriverGuard 16.19s 27.73s 58.15s 122.40s
overhead (%) 0.45s (2.86%) 0.37s (1.35%) 1.50s (2.65%) 1.65s (1.37%)
Table 5.7: The turnaround time of file printing
Sound Card The sound card in our test is Intel Corporation 82801I (ICH9 Fam-
ily) HD Audio and the driver in use is HDA Intel. We run the application Totem
which plays MP3 files. Totem places its sound data into a user space buffer, which
is mapped into the DMA buffer specified by the driver. When the music is in play-
ing, Totem directly sends data into mapped DMA region in user space, and issues
ioctl to synchronize and update information. The hardware fetches the data from
the DMA buffer directly without the driver’s involvement. Hence, DriverGuard is
only involved in protecting the control region so that the kernel can not change the
location of the DMA buffer in use.
Specifically, DriverGuard sets the sound card MMIO, the status and control re-
gion read-only after the probing stage. It rejects any update on the DMA descriptor
base address. DriverGuard also denies any access to the DMA buffer from the ker-
nel. Therefore, there is no cost for DriverGuard during music playing, though the
cost in opening the sound card is high, which is shown in Table 5.8.
sound card open
Normal 7.8µs
DriverGuard 12.3µs
overhead (%) 4.5µs (57.7%)
Table 5.8: overhead of the protected sound-card opening
Graphic Card We test DriverGuard with the graphic card. Since Xen 4.0.0 in our
testing platform does not support Direct Rendering Manager (DRM), we have to
run a guest Linux without DRM where the X Window sever directly manages all
display outputs. The X Window server runs in the user space and does not use any
kernel-level drivers. In a nutshell, it simply copies the display data to a designated
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memory buffer reserved by BIOS for the graphic card.
According to the design, we implement a loadable kernel module as the Trust-
ed Loadable Module, which collects the reserved physical region, the user-space
mapping region and the page table base address of the X Window server during the
system booting. To defend the kernel’s data stealing, DriverGuard grants the X Win-
dow server to access these protected regions and denies all accesses from the kernel
or other user processes. We test the display performance with x11perf, which is a
10subs 100subs
Normal 45.6 µs 55.5 µs
DriverGuard 45.8 µs 55.5 µs
overhead (%) 0.2 µs (0.44%) 0
Table 5.9: Graphic card performance evaluation with x11pref.
graphic card performance measurement tool. We run the command x11perf -repeat
100 -reps 10 -subs 10 100 -circulate to measure the graphic card performance with
and without DriverGuard protection. The results in Table 5.9 show the performance
overhead is rather small. The reason is that when the X Window server accesses the
protection region, there is only one page fault exception which is for the first access.
After lifting the checkpoints, further access will not trigger any exception until it is
switched off.
5.8 Summary
We have proposed DriverGuard which is a hypervisor-based system protecting I/O
flows between devices and applications, especially for devices generating data or
rendering data. DriverGuard protects I/O device control, I/O data transfer and a
driver’s data processing, against attacks from the untrusted guest kernel. It is fea-
tured with fine granularity protection, strong security assurance and low overhead.
It only adds around 1.7K SLOC to the Xen hypervisor and a few lines to the driv-
er code. DriverGuard can work jointly with user-space data protection schemes to
safeguard the entire data lifecycle.
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Chapter 6
Dedicated Protection on User
Passwords
Password based authentication is the primary method for a remote server to check
a user’s identity. In a typical web authentication, a user password is transferred
from the keyboard to the kernel, then to the browser before being sent out over the
network to the web server through an SSL channel. One of the main threats to
password authentication is kernel/application keyloggers which steal the password
from its transferring path.
Any countermeasure to keyloggers must cope with both the attacks on the appli-
cation which forwards the password to a remote server, and the attacks on the I/O
path, namely from the keyboard to the application. Virtualization based isolation is
the main approach as used in [26, 36, 32, 10], where either the browser or the entire
OS is isolated as a protected environment. This approach usually incurs significant
cost due to the large code to isolate and the security assurance is not strong, though
it addresses other related security problems, e.g., phishing attacks. Another ap-
proach, as suggested in Bumpy [59] and BitE [58], is to use an encryption-capable
keyboard to protect the I/O path and rely on the latest processor features to isolate
the application. However, most commodity platforms at present are not equipped
with the needed keyboard.
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In this chapter, we propose a novel system to protect passwords against keylog-
gers in remote authentication without using a special keyboard or isolation protec-
tion like [26, 36, 32, 10]. Note that in the typical remote authentication setting, it is
unnecessary for the user’s platform (including the OS and the application) to know
the actual user password as long as it can forward the authentication information to
the server properly. Therefore, the high level idea of our work is that a hypervisor
intercepts the user’s password input; and whenever the application needs to submit
the password to the server through an SSL channel, it traps to the hypervisor which
performs the desired encryption. In other words, the normal SSL connection be-
tween the application and the server is split into non-cryptographic operations and
cryptographic operations, such that the latter are accomplished by the hypervisor
holding the password.
In our system, the cleartext password is never exposed to the operating system
or the application. As a result, a keylogger can only get a ciphertext version. The
system is highly efficient because no extra computation or communication cost is
incurred as compared to normal password authentication, except the keyboard inter-
ception and the trapping. It is entirely transparent to the operating system, though
the application needs to have a plug-in in order to split the SSL operations. Further-
more, the system is user friendly as it results in little user experience change. (Note
that anti-phishing is not in the scope of our work.)
In the rest of the chapter, we present the design and implementation details of
our password protection system named as KGuard. It is for password based web
authentication using Firefox. We also report its performance in experiments with
commercial websites such as Gmail. A novel building block of our system is a
secure user-hypervisor interaction channel that allows a user to authenticate a hy-
pervisor, which in itself is of research value as it addresses one of the challenges
recently identified in [108]. KGuard can be extended for other password authen-
tication systems (e.g., SSH) by replacing the browser plugin with the one for the
application.
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In the next section, we present an overview in Section 6.1 with the emphasis
on the methodology used in our design. In Section 6.2, we describe the details
of our design. The implementation details and performance results are shown in
Section 6.3 and Section 6.4, respectively. We discuss several important issues in
Section 6.5 and conclude this chapter in Section 6.6.
6.1 Overview
This section presents an overview of our work. We explain the design criteria and
the rationale we follow, including the trust model and a high level explanation of
our approach. We also show the architecture of the proposed system.
6.1.1 Design Criteria
Ideally, a password protection system should meet the following criteria. Firstly,
the protection should offer the strongest security assurance. It should be able to
defeat attacks from rootkits which subvert the operating system, as kernel rootkit
keyloggers are not uncommon in the cyberspace.
From the practicability perspective, the protection should induce little or no
modification on the operating system and is fully compatible with existing browser-
s. This is due to the fact that proprietary operating systems such as Windows and
Mac OS are more widely used than open-source operating systems.
Furthermore, the password security should not be attained at the price of the
easy-of-use of password authentication. On the user side, the protection scheme
should be as simple as possible and does not require user possession of extra de-
vices, such as a USB token and a mobile phone. On the server side, no changes
should be needed. Last but not the least, the protection system should incur low
cost. The cost is measured in terms of both the time delay during the password au-
thentication session and the overall computation load on the platform. It is crucial
that the user should not experience noticeable delay in an authentication session.
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6.1.2 Design Rationale
In order to meet the criteria, we carefully assess a variety of design options. The
foremost issue to consider is the trust model, i.e. which component in the platform
can be considered as trustworthy.
Trust Model
We do not trust the operating system and applications running on top of it, in the
sense that they can be compromised and attempt to steal user passwords. Therefore,
safeguarding user password necessitates a root of trust which should not be sub-
verted by rootkits. One candidate for the root of trust is the TPM chip [96], which
is expected to resist all software attacks. Nonetheless, despite of its high security
assurance, the TPM chip offers rather primitive and inflexible functionalities and is
slow in computation. These drawbacks make it ill-suited for password protection.
In this work, we choose the hypervisor (a.k.a. virtual machine monitor or VM-
M) as the root of trust, as in [78, 84, 17]. The main benefit is that it allows us
to develop desirable protection functions within the hypervisor, and therefore facili-
tates the design and the implementation. The hypervisor is not as secure as the TPM
chip since several attacks have been discovered to compromise some versions of hy-
pervisors [94, 27, 49, 69]. However, the security of the hypervisor can be ensured
by three measures. Our design is based on hardware-assisted virtualization, such as
Intel VT-x and AMD V, which significantly reduces the virtualization code of the
hypervisor. In addition, TPM-based authenticated bootup can verify the integrity of
the hypervisor when being launched. Thirdly, the hypervisor in our system is only
for protection in a normal personal desktop setting, rather than a cloud server with
a full-fledged virtualization for multiple VMs. Therefore, those unneeded services
from the hypervisor are turned off so that only a minimal attack surface is exposed
to the guest OS.
A secure hypervisor is capable to dynamically protect memory regions and I/O
ports against direct malware accesses. In addition to that, the hypervisor also uses
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IOMMU to enforce the similar policies against malicious DMA operations launched
by malware.
Protection Method
There exist several candidate methods to protect user passwords against rootkits.
One is to follow the isolation approach as shown in [56]. The execution of rou-
tines processing the password is isolated from the rest of the platform to cordon
off attacks. This method is not compatible with our design criteria because of its
low performance. The frequent interrupt caused by user keystrokes for password in-
putting induces the expensive system thrashing between the protection mode and the
regular mode. In addition, the isolation approach faces the difficulty of extracting
appropriate Pieces of Application Logic (PAL) due to the complexity of the kernel’s
keyboard input processing and the browser’s web page processing. Another possi-
ble method could be to escort the password data flow as shown in DriverGuard [19].
Nonetheless, this approach requires code modifications on the drivers, which does
not satisfy our compatibility requirement. Moreover, DriverGuard by itself does not
guarantee the security of password in the application level.
In this work, our method is based on the characteristics of password authentica-
tion. Firstly, passwords are typically sent to a remote server through SSL/TLS. It is
not necessary for the local host to know the password in use. Secondly, passwords
are fed to the system through keystrokes which can be intercepted by the hypervisor.
Based on these two observations, the basic idea of our protection method is to in-
tercept the password keystrokes and then securely inject them back to the SSL/TLS
connection established by the browser, however, with its cryptographic operations
performed by the hypervisor. Therefore, the password is encapsulated using the
web server’s public key following the SSL/TLS specification without any exposure
to the operating system or the browser.
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Security Properties
The main challenge of realizing the proposed protection method is the gap between
the hypervisor and the security-conscious user. In existing platforms, a user only
interfaces with the operating system through the application, e.g., a browser.
This gap entails three problems to solve. The first is about the timing for protec-
tion. It is undesirable for the hypervisor to intervene in all keyboard inputs. Ideally,
the protection is only activated by the user whenever needed. The on-demand pro-
tection brings up the second challenge: how the user is assured that the hypervisor
is protecting the password input. Note that the operating system may cheat the us-
er by simulating the hypervisor’s behavior. Last but not the least, the hypervisor’s
SSL traffic assembling must use a proper public key certificate for encapsulation.
Ideally, the hypervisor is capable of verifying whether the certificate belongs to the
intended web server.
In this work, we design a dynamic secure channel for user-hypervisor interaction
which bypasses the operating system. While the hypervisor’s protection mechanism
is dormant, the channel allows a security-conscious user to activate it through a key
combination. In addition, the channel allows the user to verify whether it is indeed
active. Note that it is not necessary for the hypervisor to authenticate the origin of
the keystrokes, because a faked activation key combination, e.g., from the malware
instead of the user, does not lead to password leakage1.
For the aforementioned third problem, our design achieves the same level of
security as the standard browser’s dealing with SSL certificates, because a certificate
misuse is essentially the traditional man-in-the-middle attack on SSL. Similar to
the browser’s certificate verification, the hypervisor ensures that the certificate is
genuine and matches the SSL connection.
1The faked activation key combination can be considered as a denial of service attack. It will
be quickly spotted by a user because as shown later, the hypervisor will respond to the user with a
secret message pre-shared with the user.
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6.1.3 Architecture
We consider a platform with an operating system running on top of a hypervisor.
A user uses a web browser to login to a remote server by supplying the password.
KGuard is designed to protect the user password from being stolen by kernel/appli-
cation rootkits. The architecture of KGuard consists of three components:
1. A secure user-hypervisor interaction channel allows the user to activate or
deactivate the password protection and authenticate the hypervisor. A user
toggles the protection by pressing a prescribed key combination. In response,
the hypervisor securely displays (on the screen) a secret message pre-shared
with the user.
2. A routine in the hypervisor intercepts user keystrokes after the protection is
activated. It also validates the authentication server’s public key certificate
supplied by the browser and encapsulates the password using encryption.
3. A browser plugin splits the SSL connection for password submission. Specif-
ically, it requests the hypervisor to perform the needed cryptographic opera-
tions in an SSL connection and handles other non-cryptographic operations
by itself.
Note that the hypervisor only performs cryptographic operations. It does not
establish any SSL connection with the server. In a web authentication, the browser
may establish multiple SSL connections. Only the one submitting the password is
split by the plugin to get the needed cryptograms from the hypervisor. The benefit
of this design is that it does not entail extra computation and communication cost
and it can keep the hypervisor small without including the support for SSL.
The following diagram illustrates the architecture of our password protection
system.
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Figure 6.1: The Architecture of The Password Protection System.
6.2 Design Details
In this section, we provide the details of our design for each of the components
mentioned above. Note that we use the terms “KGuard” and “hypervisor” inter-
changeably in the rest of the chapter since KGuard is a part of the hypervisor.
6.2.1 User-Hypervisor Interaction
The user-hypervisor interaction channel is a duplex channel. In one direction, a user
sends an activation command to the hypervisor by requesting the operating system
to issue a hypercall. In the other direction, the hypervisor (on receiving the user’s
command) securely displays a secret message on the screen. Therefore, the user can
verify whether the hypervisor receives the command or not.
Hypervisor Protection Activation
There exist several approaches for activation. One alternative design is for the hy-
pervisor to listen to a prescribed hardware event, such as keystrokes, plugging a
USB device etc. These methods can bypass the operating system. Nevertheless, it
requires extra work from the hypervisor which has to keep listening to all events
and filter them properly. In our system, we do not favor this approach because 1)
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we aim to minimize the load on the hypervisor, especially when the protection is
not needed; and 2) bypassing the operating system is not necessary because no data
is sent to the hypervisor for activation. In addition, the user can verify the activation
by checking the returned secret message from the hypervisor.
In our design, the operation system is the medium transferring the user’s activa-
tion command to the hypervisor. Specifically, we design an application routine, e.g.
a browser extension, and install a new module to the OS, e.g. a virtual device on
Windows. The application routine listens to a prescribed key combination. When
the event is captured, it issues a system call which triggers the new module to issue
a hypercall. This process is depicted in Figure 6.2.
Hypervisor
Browser 
Kernel 
Modules
Hypercall 
Table
System call
Hypercall
Initializing
Map it into 
virtual space
1
2
Figure 6.2: The hypercall mechanism in a HVM domain.
Note that the guest OS in an HVM is not aware of the existence of the hypervisor.
The dash lines in Figure 6.2 illustrates how the hypercall mechanism is step up. The
hypervisor initializes a hypercall table and then the installed OS module maps the
table into the kernel space. The module exports an interface (i.e., a system call) to
applications. After getting input parameters from applications via system calls, the
module is invoked by the kernel automatically and forwards these parameters to the
hypervisor through hypercalls, in the same fashion as the system call mechanism.
In response to the activation hypercall, the hypervisor clears the keyboard input
buffer, starts to intercept the keyboard strokes as described in Section 6.2.2, and
authenticates itself to the user as shown in the next subsection.
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Visual Verification of Hypervisor Protection
The verification of hypervisor protection requires an output interface. To ensure
its security, the output should not be captured or manipulated by malware in the
guest OS. Otherwise, the guest can impersonate the hypervisor and give the user an
illusion that the protection is activated.
The basic idea of our visual verification is that the hypervisor securely outputs to
the monitor a secret text message chosen beforehand by the user. Note that without
involving the operating system, the monitor automatically and periodically fetches
the display data directly from a memory region called the display buffer, whose
location is determined by the hardware [42], and then it renders them on the screen.
The hypervisor shows the secret message to the user by writing it into the display
buffer. To prevent the operating system from attacking the secret, the hypervisor
clears the PAGE PRESENT attribute bit of the corresponding page table entries.
As a result, any guest access will be denied by the hardware.
The details of the visual verification are described below. Initially, the user
chooses a random text message as his/her long term secret shared with the hypervi-
sor. When the hypervisor boots up, the secret message is passed to the hypervisor
as a booting parameter, which is the reason why the secret has to be text. Once
taking control, the hypervisor stores the secret message into its own space. Since
the hypervisor boots up before the operating system, the OS is not able to access
this secret. To display it on a monitor in the graphics mode, the hypervisor derives
the graphic version of the secret message by using the corresponding font bitmap
for each character.
After receiving the activation hypercall, the hypervisor substitutes a part of the
display buffer with the secret graphic data. As a result, the user secret message is
displayed on the screen. The location of the message on the screen depends on its
offset in the display buffer. Note that it is unnecessary to choose random locations.
In addition, the hypervisor properly sets the attribute bits of the page table entries
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covering the graphic secret. Secret uploading and attribute bit setting up are an
atomic operation. In other words, the hypervisor occupies the CPU without yielding
it to the operating system until the attributes are set.
The hypervisor then sets up a timer whose duration is configured by the user
during bootup. When the timer expires, the hypervisor restores the original display
data, and finally returns the page access rights back to the guest OS.
Hypervisor Protection Deactivation
Protection deactivation requires a stronger authentication on the user than protec-
tion activation, since malware may attempt to impersonate the user to terminate the
protection. Note that once the protection is activated, the hypervisor has cleared all
previous data in the keyboard input buffer and intercepts all new keystrokes. As
a result of the interception, no software can access the keyboard input buffer, ei-
ther directly or through DMA operations, as explained in Section 6.2.2. Only the
physical keyboard strokes can place inputs to the buffer.
Therefore, the hypervisor in KGuard is pre-configured with a deactivation com-
mand. Once it intercepts the command during its protection, it switches to the
no-protection state by releasing the access control on the keyboard input buffer.
6.2.2 Keystroke Interception
After getting the activation key-combination command from the user, the hypervisor
starts keystroke interception. Since the key stroke code is directly delivered to the
guest’s memory by the hardware using DMA, keystroke interception means that the
hypervisor retrieves the keyboard scan code before the guest.
One potential approach is for the hypervisor to intercept all interrupts and inter-
venes if needed. The main drawbacks of this approach are twofold. This approach
may fail because the guest OS can keep scanning the keyboard input buffer without
waiting for the interrupt. Therefore, the guest OS may have the luck of getting the
data prior to the interrupt. Secondly, the interrupt number can be shared by several
devices. The hypervisor has to determine whether the interrupt is for the keyboard.
112
Furthermore, the interrupt by itself does not provide sufficient information for the
hypervisor to locate the data.
Since locating the keyboard input buffer is an indispensable step, we let the
hypervisor intercept the guest access on the keyboard input buffer, rather than in-
terrupt interception. This method reduces the burden of the hypervisor as the guest
OS manages all interrupts and is forced by the hardware to alert the hypervisor for
the scan code retrieval. For this purpose, the hypervisor sets up page-table based
access control on both the keyboard I/O control region storing I/O commands and
the keyboard input buffer storing the scan code. IOMMU is also configured such
that no DMA command can be issued to access these protected regions. Conse-
quently, both the guest OS’s keyboard I/O command issuance and its data retrieval
are intercepted by KGuard. For the I/O control, KGuard emulates the operations;
for the data retrieval, it replaces the user keystroke with a dummy one and saves the
original input into a buffer in the hypervisor space.
The actual access control mechanism for the keyboard input buffer depends on
the keyboard interface. A PS/2 keyboard usually uses PIO to transfer data whereas a
USB-keyboard uses DMA. It is easy to deal with port I/O keyboards. The technique
for controlling I/O port has been demonstrated in [19].
The access control for USB-keyboard is more complex due to the USB archi-
tecture.
Figure 6.3 explains the main data structures used by the so-called Universal
Host Controller hardware. Locating the keyboard input buffer starts with a 32-
bit register called FLBASEADD. Its content is the base address of a list of frame
pointers. A frame pointer points to a list of Transfer Descriptors (TDs). A TD
specifies the necessary I/O parameters for one DMA operation, including the input
buffer address. After completing one keyboard I/O, the guest OS must either update
the current TD or insert a new TD in order to read the next keyboard input. The
keystroke interception for a USB keyboard follows the steps below.
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Figure 6.3: Data structures used by the USB-keyboard. The (grey) input buffer
indicates that it is set inaccessible. Other (white) parts of the whole data structure
are set read-only.
Step 1. KGuard freezes the present frame list and all TDs by setting FLBASEADD
and all memory regions occupied by the frame list data structure as read-only
using I/O bitmap and page table respectively. Therefore, any attempts from
the guest OS to relocate the input buffer will be monitored by KGuard.
Step 2. KGuard locates the keyboard input buffer following the path used by the
host controller. The keyboard input buffer is then set as inaccessible.
Step 3. When the guest OS attempts to read the keyboard input buffer, a page-fault
is generated and passes the control to KGuard which saves the scan code
(which is one password character) in the input buffer and replaces it with a
dummy one, and sets the buffer as read-write. The guest OS can have a full
access to this buffer.
Step 4. When the guest OS prepares for the next keyboard I/O by updating the TD,
a page-fault is generated. In response, KGuard emulates the update operation.
To prevent malware from providing faked keystrokes, the hypervisor clears
the content in the keyboard input buffer, which ensures that the data fetched
in Step 3 is indeed from the keyboard.
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Note that KGuard responds differently on the keyboard input buffer and the
I/O region because one keyboard I/O only involves one TD update but may incur
multiple accesses to the buffer depending on the driver’s needs. Our approach avoids
unnecessary hypervisor involvements.
We further remark that the keyboard interception is only activated based on the
user’s command. With the cooperation from the user, the incurred cost is therefore
minimal to the platform’s overall performance and it is reasonable for KGuard to
treat all the intercepted keystrokes as the password. Even in case that the user and
KGuard are out of synchronization, no user secret is compromised and the user can
easily reset the protection.
6.2.3 Handling SSL Session
A normal web authentication may involve one SSL session comprising one or mul-
tiple SSL connections. Typically, when the user clicks a button for password sub-
mission, the browser sends out the encrypted password with other necessary infor-
mation through an SSL connection.
In our system, the browser is deprived of the privilege of handling the password,
because the encryption of the password and other authentication information must
be performed in the hypervisor space, instead of in the untrusted guest domain. For
this purpose, we design a dedicated browser extension for posting authentication
information to the server through SSL. To achieve both security and compatibility,
the extension is only responsible for non-critical operations in the SSL connection,
while all cryptographic operations, such as master key generation and data encryp-
tion, are exported to KGuard.
The extension captures the login event and initiates a new SSL connection with
the server. All keys used in this SSL connection are newly derived and only known
by KGuard and the server. Note that this new connection will be immediately closed
after the login event. Therefore, the browser does not need to maintain any extra
connection. In the new SSL connection, the extension obtains the server’s public
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key certificate. At the same time, it prepares a data blob containing all the data
needed by the web server (except the password), e.g., the user name. It then submits
to the hypervisor the data blob together with the server certificate. The hypervisor
merges the blob with the intercepted user password, and encrypts them following the
SSL specifications, on the condition that the provided public key certificate is valid.
On receiving the resulting ciphertext from the hypervisor, the extension prepares
the SSL data and sends them to the server. If the authentication succeeds, the server
usually returns a URL with some cookies, which are decrypted by the hypervisor
and forwarded to the extension. The extension then sets the cookies and redirects
the browser to the URL. Now the extension terminates its SSL connection. Since
neither the extension nor the browser possesses the keys for the SSL connection
used for password submission, this SSL connection cannot be reused by the browser.
To avoid verbosity, we do not recite how the hypervisor generates the master key
and performs the encryption, because it strictly follows the SSL/TLS specification.
Out of the same reason, we do not explain how the extension prepares the data blob
and the SSL traffic. However, it is worthwhile to elaborate how the server’s public
key certificate is validated by the hypervisor. Since we do not trust any software in
the guest domain, the certificate forward by the extension to the hypervisor can be a
malicious one. If the adversary has the corresponding private key, the hypervisor’s
password encryption will be decrypted by the adversary. We leave the details of the
browser extension in Section 6.3 because it is browser specific and more relevant to
usability than security.
Server Certificate Verification
Certificate verification has long been considered as a thorny problem due to the
trust on the public key infrastructure. The problem is even more complicated in
our case because limited information is provided to the hypervisor for the sake of
minimizing the hypervisor’s size. Note that phishing detection is not within the
scope of our study. Therefore, the criterion of a certificate’s validity is not whether
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it matches the web server the user intends to login. Instead, a certificate is deemed
as trusted as long as its root CA is trusted by the user.
In our system, the user may choose to trust all pre-loaded root CA certificates
or import CA certificates she trusts. Once the user obtains a repository of trusted
(root) certificates, the crux of our system is how the user securely passes them to the
hypervisor. The difficulty is that the hypervisor does not have a file system and the
whole guest is not trusted. The solution we propose relies on an additional trusted
platform, or alternatively, the user may consider his/her platform in the initial state
is trustworthy. On such a trusted platform, cryptographic tools such as OpenSSL,
can be used to compute a HMAC key Hk and computes HMACs for each of the
trusted certificate. Then, the user imports all trusted certificates as well as their cor-
responding HMAC tags into a file on the untrusted platform running with KGuard.
During the platform’s rebooting, the HMAC key Hk is passed to the hypervisor as
a parameter. Therefore, the hypervisor knows whether a certificate is trusted by the
user by checking its HMAC tag. Instead of using HMAC, the user may also apply
digital signatures and pass the public key to the hypervisor, though this approach
is not preferred because of its longer key and higher computation cost. Note that
these above procedure is only executed once, i.e. for the first time using KGuard.
All HMAC tags in the file are able to be reused after rebooting.
In runtime, the certificate verification proceeds as follows.
Step 1. The browser extension receives the public key certificate from the server
and composes a certificate chain such that the last certificate in the chain is a
trusted certificate imported by the user. For ease of description, we denote the
certificate chain as (Cert0, · · · , Certk) where Cert0 is the server’s certificate
and Certi is the issuer of Certi−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In most cases in practice,
k = 1 or 2. Note that only Certk is the trusted certificate while all others are
not. It is not necessary to obtain the issuer for Certk even if it is not a root,
because it is already trusted.
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Step 2. The extension transfers (Cert0, · · · , Certk, σ) to KGuard, where σ is the
HMAC tag for Certk. In addition, the extension transfers the server’s host
name to KGuard. The transferring is accomplished by a hypercall.
Step 3. In response, KGuard first checks whether σ is a valid HMAC for Certk
using the HMAC key provided by the user during bootup. If the checking
fails, KGuard rejects the certificate chain and aborts.
Step 4. KGuard then verifies the certificate chain in the same ways as the browser’s
verification, by treating Certk as a trusted CA. Namely, it checks Certi’s
signatures with the public key in Certi+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and make sure
that they are not expired, and checks whether Cert0’s subject name matches
the given server hostname (domain name). If all certificates pass the checking,
KGuard accepts Cert0 as the server’s public key and uses it to encrypt the
pre-master secret key in the current SSL connection.
The hypervisor calculates an HMAC value of each certificate in the verified
certification chain, and returns them back to the guest if the certificate chain passes
all checks. The browser inserts the certificate with its HMAC tag into the trusted
certificate repository. This is to save the hypervisor’s verification time when this
certificate is reused in the user’s future logins. Note that the new website certificates
are accepted once the root certificate is trusted by the user.
6.2.4 Security Analysis
The security of the proposed password protection mechanism relies on the security
of the hypervisor and the user cooperation. With the assumption on both condi-
tions, the user-hypervisor channel ensures that the password is typed in only when
KGuard is in position for keystroke interception, which saves the real password in
the hypervisor space. The hypervisor and the guest space isolation enabled by the
virtualization techniques prevents the guest from accessing the password. When the
browser runs an SSL connection to submit the password, all cryptographic opera-
118
tions are performed by the hypervisor. The browser and the guest OS only get the
ciphertext of the password. The hypervisor security is discussed in the Section 6.5.
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Figure 6.4: The certificate chain verification.
The hypervisor calculates an HMAC value of each certificate in the verified
certification chain, and returns them back to the guest if the certificate chain passes
all checks. The browser inserts the certificate with its HMAC tag into the trusted
certificate repository. This is to save the hypervisor’s verification time when this
certificate is reused in the user’s future login sessions.
6.3 Implementation
6.3.1 KGuard in Hypervisor
We have built a prototype of KGuard on Xen 4.1.0 on a desktop with an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7 CPU-860 @2.80GHz processor and 4GB main memory. We choose a
USB-keyboard as the experiment device. The implementation of KGuard does not
depend on the design of Xen and can be easily migrated to other hypervisors.
KGuard consists of around 1500 SLOC for its main functions except crypto-
graphic functions. We import the needed crypto functions (about 5000 SLOC) from
[76]. The main cost is due to AES and RSA algorithms which need about 3500
SLOC. Nonetheless, comparing with the Xen code base (around 225,000 SLOC),
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we only increase the code size 2.885%. In fact, most of the code in Xen are not
used by our system. Therefore, it is one of our future work to customize Xen for
KGuard.
Visual Verification
One of the implementation issues about the user’s visual verification of the hyper-
visor verification is to choose a proper secret message. It is similar to a password
in the sense that it should not be random enough to resist dictionary attacks, and it
should be easy to remember. Since the user does not type in the message at runtime,
the message can be much longer than a password. For instance, we choose the string
”ApBlE@8s BaeuT ifu10O” as the user secret in our experiment.
Another issue is the position of the text message on the screen. We do not change
the position for two reasons. Firstly, it does not enhance the security. If malware can
breach the access control, it may grab the entire display buffer data. Secondly, from
the usability perspective, it is inconvenient for users to find the message over the
whole screen. We choose the top-left corner of the screen as the location because it
is less likely to be overlapped with the web page in use.
The third concerns in visual verification is the performance overhead due to the
slow speed of the display memory. It requires twice display memory access for
the hypervisor to save the present content and to write the secret message. In our
implementation, we use the following trick to save one display memory access. We
do not save the original data. Instead, we impose the font bitmap of characters in the
message upon the existing content. By performing the XOR operation, all the bits
corresponding to the characters are flipped. As a result, the shape of the character is
displayed on the screen. Although the content is not saved, it can be recovered by
running the XOR operations again.
Note that our current implementation requires to work with the VGA compatible
graphics cards.
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6.3.2 Browser Extension and Plugin
Benefiting from the virtualization features of the Intel processor, we launch a hard-
ware virtual machine (HVM) running Windows. The HVM guest domain runs a in-
stallation of Windows 7 Professional version with default configuration. We choose
the popular firefox (version 3.6) as the test browser, and extend it with a plug-in and
an extension.
The main part of the browser plug-in is based on CyaSSL v22. It interacts with
the hypervisor using hypercalls to build a separated SSL channel with a web server.
Specifically, The plug-in interacts the hypervisor in the SSL handshake phase for
four times: to transfer the server certificate chain; to provide the key materials for
pre-master key generation; to provide the authentication data for encryption; and to
provide a finish-message to terminate the SSL handshake phase. The plugin finishes
the SSL protocol and forwards the server response data to the browser extension.
Post Data Checking 
And Adjustment
HTTP Header 
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HTTP Request Event
A Separated SSL 
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Figure 6.5: Three events generated during authentication. The third one is inter-
cepted by the extension.
The browser extension is implemented using Firefox XML User interface Lan-
guage (XUL) and JaveScript. One of the tasks of the extension is to listening to the
2CyaSSL is a C-Langue SSL library for embedded and realtime operating systems, and in regular
desktop and enterprise environments [54]
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user activation key combination and then sends a hypercall to KGuard. The other
two tasks are to integrate the password protection with the browser. The first task is
to intercept the authentication data submitted to the server. Since KGuard is trans-
parent to the browser, it proceeds as usual in password submission though with a
dummy password.
The events generated by Firefox after the login button is clicked are shown in
Figure 6.5. We choose to intercept the HTTP Request Event, the last event right
before Firefox is about to pass the data to the SSL layer. The benefit of this choice
is that this event implies that the browser has prepared all the data (including the
HTTP header) expected by the web server. Therefore, the extension does not need
to handle the nuisance of gathering all kinds of POST data required by the web
server.
The second task is to navigate the browser to the destination URL that is in the
server response packages. After receiving the response packages returned by the
plug-in from its own SSL channel, the extension extracts the cookies and the redi-
rection URL by parsing the header and body. It updates the cookies in the browser,
and requests it to refresh the current page to the redirection URL. For the following
connections, no matter whether they are HTTPS or HTTP connections, the browser
will send the request with corresponding cookies, and continue the web session as
normal. Note that the browser is not aware of the existence of the separated SSL
connection, thanks to the statelessness of HTTP and HTTPS protocols.
6.3.3 Hypercall Support In HVM
In the Windows kernel space, we build a virtual device module using the Windows
Driver Kit (WDK) [61]. The module first uses the instruction CPUID to find reg-
isters that contain the size and the location of the hypercall table. Then it maps the
hypercall table into its own memory space. Using the mapped hypercall table, the
module is able to issue hypercalls to communicate with the hypervisor.
The module also exports a DeviceIOControl interface for application usage. Ac-
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cording to the dwIoControlCode parameter in the DeviceIOControl interface, the
module can request different services by issuing different types of hypercalls to the
hypervisor.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
We have run experiments and evaluated the performance and usability with legiti-
mate web servers, including Google, Groupon, Twitter and Amazon, and Microsoft
Hotmail. We divide the total authentication session into two phases to facilitate
the evaluation. The first phase is user password input and the second is password
submission. We have measured the time overhead in each of them. Note that our
protection is the ”on-demand” mode, therefore, there are no extra cost for the system
when the protection is inactive.
6.4.1 Overhead for Password Input
Table 6.1 lists the time costs for the procedures taking place during a user’s pass-
word inputting. The password input phase begins with protection activation and
ends with protection deactivation. The main overhead is due to the hypervisor’s
responses to the activation/deactivation command and its interception of keyboard
strokes. The activation cost mainly includes a guest system call, a hypercall, a
series of access control setup, and two accesses on the display memory. The deacti-
vation cost only includes the removal of access control on the relevant regions. The
keystroke-interception cost is the CPU time spent for intercepting one keystroke.
It includes two exceptions, emulation of the refreshing of TD and processing the
keystroke.
Note that the user secret message is written to the display memory, instead of
the main memory. Its speed is much slower than the main memory chip. There-
fore, the secret message displaying dominates the overhead of protection activation.
Nonetheless, it is still negligible to the user as compared to the human keystroke
speed. The removal of the secret message is not considered as the overhead, be-
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cause with a high likelihood, it is completed between the user’s two keystrokes.
Components
Protection
Activa-
tion
Protection
Deactiva-
tion
Keystroke
Intercep-
tion
Displaying
Message
Time 1.71ms 3.5µs 0.12µs 1.67ms
Table 6.1: The performance overhead for password input protection in KGuard.
6.4.2 Overhead for Password Submission
In the password submission procedure, we evaluate the extra operations introduced
by our scheme, i.e. those not appearing in normal web authentication. The extra
operations include the extension’s HTTP Request event interception and extracting
data from the login (POST) request, which cost about 4ms in total. Note that the
extension is written in JavaScript, whose best timing granularity is in milliseconds.
The extra operations also include transferring data between the guest and the hy-
pervisor; HMAC verification for the certificate’s trustworthiness. The measurement
results are listed in Table 6.2.
Event interception
and data extraction
Data transferring
cost during in
hypercalls
HMAC computa-
tion
Time 4ms 1.38ms 0.02ms
Table 6.2: The performance overhead of each component for password submission.
We have also measured the turnaround time to evaluate the overall delay a user
may experience with KGuard. The turnaround time refers to the period from the
moment when the login button is clicked, to the moment when the browser begins
refreshing the page. We have tested KGuard with Twitter and a local web server
which resides in the same platform with the browser so that no network delay vari-
ation disturbs the results. The results are shown in Table 6.3. Note that the results
from the tests with Twitter are not sufficiently accurate due to the large variance of
network round trip time.
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Login without KGuard Login with KGuard Extra Cost
Twitter 1.10s 1.11s 10ms
Local Web Site 201ms 207ms 6ms
Table 6.3: The overall performance measurement in the login procedure.
6.5 Discussions
6.5.1 Hypervisor Security
The hypervisor security is the bedrock of the proposed password protection system.
It is known that both the code size and the interfaces affect the hypervisor security.
According to [7, 66], the size of the source code is proportional to the number of
vulnerabilities (bugs). We choose Xen for our prototype building instead of the
other mainstream hypervisor VMware ESXi, because the former has a smaller code
size according to [88] and is open source. In principle, KGuard can also be built
on those tiny hypervisors developed by researchers, such as SecVisor [78], BitVisor
[84] and Nova [88]. Unfortunately, they are not supported by the Intel processor
used in our platform.
As mentioned in [63], interfaces are the main source of critical errors. In the
current Xen hypervisor, all default hypercalls for a HVM domain are only used
during HVM loading. Therefore, we turn off all of them to enhance security to
minimize the attack surface.
In the future work, we aim to reduce the hypervisor code size by removing
unnecessary code. Besides the basic hardware virtualization functions, our initial
study shows that the functionalities required by KGuard include: 1) memory man-
agement, including data transferring and address translation between the guest and
the hypervisor; 2) access control on all I/O ports and memory regions; 3) intercep-
tions on interrupts and exceptions; 4) basic crypto algorithms, such as RSA, AES
and SHA1; 5) certain instruction emulations; and 6) asynchronization support (e.g.,
timer).
125
6.5.2 Trusted Certificate Updates
The user may need to insert or delete entries in the trusted certificate repository. It is
relatively straightforward to add a new trusted certificate. The user simply calculates
the HMAC value on a clean system and adds the certificate and its HMAC into the
repository.
However, it is costly to revoke a trusted certificate from the repository. One solu-
tion is that the user chooses a new HMAC key and re-computes the HMAC tags for
all trusted certificates excluding those revoked ones. Once the new key is updated
to the hypervisor, the revoked certificates will not pass the verification. Alterna-
tively, the user can prepare a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) whose integrity is
protected by the HMAC tag. Whenever the plugin sends the server certificate to the
hypervisor, the CRL is attached. The hypervisor then checks whether the certificate
in use is on the CRL. Both methods have pros and cons. The former requires more
user involvement while the latter increases the hypervisor’s code size and causes
more runtime overhead.
6.5.3 Sensitive Keyboard Input Protection
The KGuard system proposed in this chapter focuses on password protection. We
can easily extend it to protect other sensitive inputs from the keyboard, such as
CAPTCHA, credit card numbers or driver license numbers. KGuard is able to inter-
cept and replace the sensitive inputs whenever the user activates the protection. By
inserting them back into an SSL/TLS connection or forwarding them to a trusted
domain, all sensitive inputs are free from malware attacks.
The challenge is to maintain the user’s experience. For a normal password input,
the browser only displays a string of ’∗’. The user feels the same even if KGuard re-
places the original password with dummy ones. However, for other types of inputs,
the user may feel discomfort when seeing dummy characters instead of the expected
ones. Another issue on the user interface is how a user determines the correctness
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of the input, since a wrong key may have been pressed accidentally. One possible
solution is that KGuard echoes each input on the screen in the same ways as in the
visual verification. Alternatively, KGuard can display the entire input string and
ask for user confirmation. This method does not work well for protecting a large
amount of sensitive inputs (e.g., private document editing) due to the heavy load on
the hypervisor and the slow responses. In addition, it would add too much code into
the hypervisor and possibly weakens the security strength.
6.6 Summary
We has presented a virtualization based password input protection system, which
is composed of a novel user-hypervisor interaction channel, a keyboard stroke in-
terception mechanism, and a hypervisor-based SSL client. Our method does not
require specialized hardware and is fully transparent to the operating system and
the browser. The prototype implementation and testing have demonstrated that the
protection system incurs insignificant overhead on the platform and maintains the
user-friendliness of password authentication in web services.
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Chapter 7
Framework For Security Services
Based on the above proposed systems, and many other existing virtualization-based
security systems, such as the systems proposed in [84, 17, 16, 41, 109, 56, 89], we
summarize the common security primitives into our secure foothold (Guardian), up-
grading it to be a framework/template of secure foothold for personal systems that
could be directly used or customized by end users according to their demands to
harden their systems, without needing to build them from scratch. To demonstrate
the framework, we create four security utilities, i.e., hypervisor-based firewall, de-
vice monitoring, software runtime attestation and user present attestation for pass-
word authentication. The experiment results show that we can simply add a few
lines of code to achieve all these security services.
7.1 Architecture
An overview of the framework architecture is illustrated in Figure 7.1. At the cen-
ter of Guardian is the event dispatcher which interacts with a secure user inter-
face and four security primitives. The architecture also comprises an event log,
Guardian’s long term secrets and state information. The functioning of Guardian is
event-driven. To respond to an event from the guest or the hardware, the dispatcher
dispatches it to the proper facility for processing. Note that bridging the semantic
gap is not the purpose of Guardian.
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Figure 7.1: The architecture of Guardian.
7.1.1 Security Primitive
The crypto engine supports pseudo random number generation, SHA-1, AES and
RSA operations. The other three security primitives consist of measurement, inter-
ception, and manipulation, which are used to access and manipulate the states of the
system resources and enforce access control on them. These four primitive security
functions are the building blocks for constructing high-level security utilities shown
in Section 7.2.
Measurement Similar to the measurement in TPM based attestation [73],
Guardian’s measurement computes hash digests on memory regions or hardware re-
sources, e.g, I/O ports and MSR values. As compared to TPM based measurement,
our measurement is performed using a relatively shorter trust chain since the former
usually requires a kernel level attestation agent. Furthermore, since Guardian exe-
cutes in the host mode with the full privilege to access all resources in the platform,
the trustworthiness of the results is the same as the trustworthiness of Guardian. In
the TPM’s case, its measurement can be trusted only when the attestation agent is
trusted to run in a secure environment, which has weaker assurance than the TPM
chip itself.
Interception Interception is often used for two purposes. One is to interpose
on the guest execution so as to enforce access control policies or to monitor the
guest’s behavior. Guardian can set PTE attribute bits on the EPT and IOMMU
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tables to regulate accesses to all memory regions, and can configure VMCS for
register accesses.
The other usage of interception is for Guardian to handle external events prior
to the OS. The events typically intercepted are the interrupts by peripheral devices
and those by software, e.g., a system call. Most interceptions rely on the supported
from the hardware virtualization technology, for instance, the events listed in [46].
Note that rather than intercepting all events, Guardian only performs interception
based on its configuration and user commands.
Manipulation The manipulation function is for Guardian to modify the plat-
form status or set up the guest context. For instance, by manipulating the VMCS,
Guardian can change the CPU mode of the guest or change the access permission
on a particular I/O port. Manipulation also includes emulation. Guardian supports
two types of emulation: instruction emulation and event injection.
In short, measurement, interception and manipulation are the three basic security
tools Guardian can use. As explained above, their functioning solely relies on the
hypervisor and the hardware feature. The guest OS does not have the privilege to
tamper with the operations.
7.1.2 Event Log
The event log is for the end-user’s postmortem on attacks or incidents. In our design,
Guardian records those security sensitive events. For instance, the build-in camera
is turned on only for a fraction of a second, or the network card is turned to the
promiscuous mode.
Note that Guardian does not support any file systems. Therefore, the logs are
stored in the hypervisor partition in the hard disk. Guardian protects them from
being read, modified or deleted by the guest. When booting up, it moves the logs
from the disk into a protected memory region in the hypervisor space. To add a new
log entry during runtime, it encrypts the log and writes to the memory region. Upon
power off, it writes all encrypted logs back to the hypervisor-partition. Note that the
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logs do not belong to the TCB, although they are protected in a similar way.
7.2 Security Utilities
When designing security utilities based on Guardian, we endeavor to deal with
threats plaguing normal end-users and system administrators. To this end, we pro-
pose the following utilities. More specifically, we provide two local services, i.e.,
device monitor and software runtime attestation, two network utilities, i.e., user p-
resence attestation and hyper-firewall. We also evaluate their performance. The
experiment results show that the modifications on Guardian is small and they all
introduce insignificant performance overhead.
7.2.1 Device Monitoring
A rootkit can misuse a peripheral device without the user’s consent. For instance, it
can quickly turn on the camera of a laptop to take a picture of the user and then turn
it off. In a stealthy manner, it can also turn a network adaptor into the promiscuous
mode so as to sniff the entire LAN traffic. We develop a Guardian utility to monitor
the states of the camera and the network interface. In case of risky device usage, the
end-user is alerted via the hypervisor-user interface or a beep sound. Note that the
beep cannot be stopped by the adversary, because Guardian is able to intercept all
accesses to that device.
Camera Control. Our design considers an external camera attached to the plat-
form through a USB interface. (It can also be extended for a built-in camera.) The
USB port is controlled by an EHCI [44] or UHCI [43] controller. In either case, a
frame list, with its base address specified by the PERIODICLISTBASE register, is
used to queue I/O commands. To enable the camera, the driver must insert a transfer
descriptor or TD to the frame list. The host controller automatically fetches it from
the queue and responds properly.
Upon the user’s activation command, the camera control utility makes use of
the interception primitive to set read-only on the region for the base register, the
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frame list and the TD queue. If it detects a new TD with the open command
UVC SET CUR for the camera, it alerts the user through a beep sound.
NIC Promiscuous Mode Control. The control on the network interface is sim-
pler than EHCI. The Unicast Promiscuous Enabled (UPE) bit and the Multicas-
t Promiscuous Enabled (MPE) in the Receive ConTroL Register (RCTL) are the
flags that turns on the NIC’s promiscuous mode. The monitoring utility intercepts
the accesses to RCTL. Once the UPE bit or the MPE bit is set, an alert is raised to
the user.
Note that Guardian and its utilities are not burdened with the complicated task
of device management, for instance, to block illegal operations. This is to keep the
hypervisor size small and more reliable.
Device Monitoring Evaluation
The device management component consists of 1.2K SLOC. Currently Guardian
supports to monitor camera and network card working modes. It can be extended to
support other similar devices, such as a microphone.
We experiment with a USB Logitech web camera attached on an EHCI host
controller. Note that the monitoring has no effect on the camera’s performance as
the scheme does not intercept runtime commands and data transferring.
The network card mode monitor is built upon the Intel 82579LM Gigabit Net-
work Card, whose registers are accessed using MMIO. The experiment results pro-
duced by network benchmark tool netperf [70] prove that the monitor service al-
most does not affect the network I/O throughout. Note that the device management
service does not require any modifications in the guest kernel or device drivers.
7.2.2 Hyper-firewall
Recent attacks have shown that both application-level and OS-level firewalls can
be disabled by rootkits. One solution proposed recently is the VMwall [87], which
isolates the firewall in a separated domain (i.e., the Dom0 in the Xen setting). How-
ever, this approach dramatically increases the TCB size and requires the user to run
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two domains concurrently.
We propose in this section a more elegant and stronger solution called hyper-
firewall as the firewall functions in the hypervisor space. The basic idea is that a
Guardian utility interposes on network I/O. It drops illegal packets if their TCP/IP
headers are not compliant to the firewall policies set by the end-user through the
secure UI. Since Guardian does not comprise any NIC driver, this utility does not
significantly increase Guardian’s code size. The main challenge is how to intercept
network packets in an efficient way. Before presenting the details, we briefly explain
the network I/O mechanism.
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Figure 7.2: The transmit descriptor circular queue used by the NIC.
The packet transmission mechanism is illustrated in Figure 7.2. The NIC makes
use of a ring buffer (essentially a circular queue) to store transmit descriptors which
point to the packets to transmit. The ring buffer has its base address saved in the
TDBAL and TDBAH registers, has its size saved in the TDLENL and TDLENH
registers, and has a head register and a tail register pointing to the queue head and
tail respectively. The NIC always dequeues the descriptor pointed by the head regis-
ter, and then fetches the corresponding packet. After retrieval, it advances the head
pointer. The tail pointer is maintained by the device driver. To send a new packet,
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the driver enqueues one or multiple descriptors. Then, the tail pointer is also ad-
vanced. The NIC only uses the descriptors between the head and the tail. It stops
transmission when the two pointers collide.
The packet receiving mechanism is analogous to the transmission mechanism.
It also has a ring buffer storing receive descriptors, and has its own base address
registers, length registers, and the head and tail registers. Initially, the driver allo-
cates a set of fixed length DMA buffers, and enqueues the corresponding descriptors
into the ring queue. When receiving packets, the NIC stores them into those pre-
allocated DMA buffers, updates the corresponding descriptors, and advances the
head pointer accordingly. Finally, it throws out an interrupt to notify the driver to
fetch the packets according to the descriptors. Since the packet sending and receiv-
ing mechanisms are different, we design two interposition schemes, respectively.
Note that the registers used by NICs may be different. To support all NICs, we can
provide a profile which can provide necessary information for Guardian to under-
stand register meanings.
Outbound Packet Filter Guardian uses the EPT to intercept all write accesses the
TDBAL, TDBAH, TDLENL and TDLENH registers so that Guardian can always
locate the legitimate ring buffer. Similarly, it sets up the EPT and IOMMU tables,
such that the head register can only be updated by the NIC1, and all accesses to
the tail register are intercepted by Guardian. Lastly, it sets the entire ring buffer as
read-only.
When a write access to the ring buffer is intercepted by Guardian, it checks
whether the write overwrites an existing descriptor which has not been fetched by
the NIC. If so, the access is blocked; otherwise, Guardian emulates the write. When
a write access to the tail register is intercepted, Guardian performs the following. (1)
It checks whether the packets pointed by the descriptors between the present tail and
the new tail are compliant with the firewall policies; (2) It copies all legal packets
1In the current hardware specification, the driver is not able to instruct the NIC to update the
header register
134
to the hypervisor space and updates those descriptors accordingly so that the NIC
can fetch them from their new locations; for illegal packets, it sets the packet-length
field in their descriptors as zero; (3) It emulates the tail update.
Once the packets are moved to the hypervisor space, their descriptors are not
allowed to be changed. Note that packets are much smaller than a memory page.
Therefore, relocating them into the hypervisor space avoids undesirable page faults
as compared to protecting them in the guest space.
Inbound Packet Filter The inbound packet filter mechanism is similar to its out-
bound counterpart. By enforcing access control on those control registers and the
ring buffer for the receiving descriptor, Guardian locates the DMA buffers allocat-
ed by the driver. To retrieve a packet, the driver first fetches the receive descriptor
which triggers a page fault. Guardian then performs the packet inspection according
to the firewall policies, and drops illegal ones.
Hyper-firewall Evaluation
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Figure 7.3: The benchmark results with and without hyper-firewall.
The packet filter service is built on the Intel Corporation 82579LM Gigabit Net-
work Card, and does not add any code into the guest OS. Current hyper-firewall
supports adding policies on inbound and outbound packets. For the outbound pack-
ets, hyper-firewall restricts the region of the target destination (e.g., external IP ad-
dresses), and for the inbound packets, hyper-firewall restricts the connection ports
135
(e.g., SSH port 22). All hyper-firewall policies can be enabled and disabled through
the RTSUI. All experiments show the hyper-firewall works well. We tested the net-
work I/O performance with benchmark tool netperf [70]. When we only enable
outbound policy, the performance results show that our hyper-firewall only intro-
duces (0.096% - 0.064%) performance overhead; when we enable inbound and out-
bound policies, the hyper-firewall introduces (18.29% - 0.26%) performance over-
head. Note that the short packet setting generates more interceptions. Thus its
performance is relatively low. Note that the monitoring of NIC does not affect the
I/O speed of other derives. The packet filter service only adds 0.9K SLOC into
Guardian.
7.2.3 Software Runtime Attestation
A rootkit may tamper with the execution of a process. For instance, the rootkit
starves the antivirus process or manipulates its execution flow by inserting mali-
cious code or running ROP (Return Oriented Programming) attack. We develop a
Guardian-based attestation mechanism for a challenger (in a trusted environment)
to check the runtime states of a process over a period of time.
Our goal is not to protect a process from being manipulated, but to monitor
the runtime states. In our design, Guardian plays the role of a trusted observer
securely reporting the runtime measurements to the challenger. It is the latter’s task
to determine whether the process runs properly and to take actions if necessary.
Described below are the details of the attestation scheme taking place between
an attester platform equipped with Guardian and a remote challenger, e.g., a VPN
gateway. To check the runtime context of a target software P on the attester, the
challenger sends the program’s identity to an untrusted agent in the attester’s kernel
level. The agent then obtains the CR3 register value for the corresponding process
and passes it to Guardian.
Guardian measure P ’s execution within a time window consisting of multiple
CPU occupations. Out of the performance consideration, Guardian does not per-
136
form measurements for all occupations. Instead, for each occupation, it tosses an
independent random coin (with a pre-configured probability ρ) to decide whether
to measure the context. Since the coin is kept secret by Guardian, the guest has no
advantage in predicting which occupation is measured.
A runtime context measurement encloses (1) all CPU registers; (2) the user s-
tack; (3) the code page for the current execution with N (e.g., 2) randomly chosen
code pages from nearby regions. For every occupation, Guardian also measures the
consumed CPU cycles. When the time window expires, Guardian computes c as the
sum of consumed CPU cycles, and compiles all measurements of sampled CPU oc-
cupation into one data blob D. It computes a signature σ upon (c,D, T imestamp)
using its RSA private key. It also prepares a message file M which consists of
c, T imestamp, the snapshots of CPU registers, the stacks and the addresses of all
measured code pages. In the end, (σ,M) are passed to the attestation agent and
forwarded to the challenger. Since the challenger has P ’s binary code (with the
dependent libraries), she recovers D fromM by using the sampled code page ad-
dresses. By enclosing the addresses instead of the actual pages, the size of M is
greatly reduced.
It is not straightforward to measure process P ’ context as it appears. With an
illustration in Figure 7.4, we explain our design details below. Guardian intercepts
every CR3 update so that it can detect when P is about to occupy the CPU by check-
ing the new CR3 value and when it is about to leave the CPU. At both moments,
Guardian gets the clock reading and obtains the occupation duration. However, CR3
switches are not the right moments for measurement. When CR3 is about to load
P ’s page tables, P ’s context is actually not loaded yet. Therefore, a malicious k-
ernel may cheat after CR3 loading. When CR3 is about to offload P ’s page table,
the present code is the kernel’s scheduling routine. The malicious kernel can cheat
as well. We remark that the kernel can not manipulate the timer interrupts which
is a hardware interrupt. Therefore, when the coin toss indicates a measurement,
Guardian intercepts the timer interrupts, one of which will trigger the measurement.
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A typical CPU time slice for a process is in the range 10ms−200ms [95], while the
timer interval is 1ms or smaller. Since one occupation comprises of multiple timer
interrupts, Guardian chooses a random one for measurement, so that the malicious
kernel can not predict the timing.
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Figure 7.4: An illustration of probabilistic measurement in software runtime attes-
tation.
In summary, the attestation is essentially to randomly sample the runtime con-
text. The whole execution is divided into multiple occupations and one occupation
comprises multiple timer interrupts. Guardian uses a probability token to determine
which occupation to measure, and then use another probability token to determine
interrupt to use. These random tokens can be pre-computed in order to save runtime
cost.
Verification of Runtime Attestation
The challenger may perform the basic hash-comparison verification as in the TPM-
based attestation scheme, from which the challenger knows which code pages are
executed. To have stronger security assurance, the challenger can make uses the
call graph (or control flow graph) to do further verification. With the pre-computed
call graphs for the target process and its dependent libraries, the challenger locates
the corresponding functions for sampled IP values in the temporal order returned by
Guardian, and validates whether there exists a valid execution path crossing those
functions.
For platforms enabling the Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
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mechanism2, the challenger needs the runtime memory layout (e.g., the layout infor-
mation in the /proc/[pid]/maps), which can be collected and reported by a loadable-
module in the guest.
Comparing with TPM-based attestation, which usually focuses on the load-time
integrity and/or static properties, the hypervisor-based software runtime attestation
provides richer semantics with runtime information, from which the challenger
could make right and timely response for the identified misbehaviors. As men-
tioned earlier, our attestation requires a much shorter trust chain than TPM-based
attestation.
We acknowledge that runtime attestation may not capture all execution misbe-
haviors due to the performance considerations and the time gap between two snap-
shots. Therefore, some tricky attacks may be missed if they can clean the traces
before the next measurement. To increase the accuracy, the end-user can increase
the frequency of the sampling. In the extreme case, the end-user can configure
Guardian to measure each single step of the process. We leave it as our future work
to devise more efficient attestation scheme with stronger security assurance.
Software Runtime Attestation Evaluation
In our experiment, the system gets the HPET-supported timer interrupt every 1/4ms,
and the target process ”firefox” is roughly scheduled per 2 − 3ms. An untrusted
loadable kernel module forwards request and response messages between Guardian
and the challenger. Each time the target process occupies the CPU, it has 1/ρ chance
to be measured. The parameter ρ is configurable and currently chosen as 0x0100.
Each runtime states measurement produces 4280 bytes log data. In our experiment,
the monitor time on the target process is about 524.21s, and the CPU-occupation
time is about 98.54s. Figure 7.5 illustrates the distribution of the measured code
pages and the really-used code pages. During the monitor period, the target process
uses 1647 code pages, where 419 pages are measured by Guardian. As illustrated
2Note that the current commodity operating system (e.g., Windows and Linux) only randomize
dynamic-link libraries.
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in Figure 7.5, some pages are not measured in the selected time period. Therefore,
some attacks may be successful in our measurement setting. It is an interesting
topic to improve the scheme to make sure that it precisely measures the execution
of a process with low performance overhead.
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Figure 7.5: The benchmark results with and without hyper-firewall.
Note that the hash function used in the attestation is SHA1, and the the length
of the private key in the sign operation is 1024 bits. The timestamp is directly
read from Real-Time Clock (RTC) in the COMS. The software runtime attestation
services only adds 0.5K SLOC into Guardian. Table 7.1 shows the performance
results on the following operations: 1) time measurement when the target process
on CPU and off CPU, 2) runtime states measurement, and 3) the sign operation.
Operations Runtime Cost
On-CPU Time Measurement 0.03µs
Off-CPU Time Measurement 0.03µs
Runtime States Measurement 0.17ms
Sign 2.64ms
Table 7.1: The runtime cost of each operation in the software runtime attestation
service.
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7.2.4 User Presence Attestation For Password Authentication
Password authentication is another area which can benefit from using a hypervisor.
One example is KGuard [18] which protects the password secrecy against rootkits.
Another possible application is that the hypervisor generates the second factor by
storing a secret or computing a one-time PIN.
Instead of protecting password secrecy, our interest is to design an authentica-
tion system resilient to password theft. The idea of our system is that Guardian
attests to the authentication server that the user is present at a particular momen-
t. This can be applied for accessing an organization’s critical servers, as it greatly
mitigates the damage of password theft either by malware or through social engi-
neering. An outside adversary knowing the password can not login using his own
computer due to the absence of Guardian with the certified RSA private key. Nei-
ther can the malware residing in the legitimate user’s computer, because Guardian
does not vouch for it.
The design is as follows. The end-user logins to the server in the normal way,
except that she activates the user-presence attestation before entering the password,
and deactivates it afterwards, both of which are through the secure hypervisor-user
interface in Section 3.2.2. To attest to user-presence, Guardian locks the keyboard
and intercepts the keyboard I/O as in running the RTSUI. Namely, it sets the EPT
and IOMMU page tables so as to intercept all direct accesses from the guest and to
block all DMA accesses (except from the keyboard). This access control is not for
protection keystroke secrecy. Instead, it ensures that the only allowed write access
to the I/O buffer is the keyboard’s DMA operation. When Guardian intercepts the
guest interrupt handler’s read access to the I/O buffer, it checks whether the present
key-code is different from the prior one. (Note that typing a key generates two
interrupts with two different key-codes for key-down and key-up, respectively.) If
so, Guardian generates an RSA signature on the current time; otherwise, Guardian
does not produce any signature. The current time is directly collected from hardware
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(i.e., COMS), whose interfaces (i.e., I/O ports) are enforced access control using
VMCS by Guardian, so that the guest can only read the time information but can not
manipulate it. Guardian’s signature is then exported to the guest though a hypercall
and forwarded to the server. The server verifies the signature and checks whether
the gap between the signed time and the time of authentication is acceptable.
It is well-known that the drawback of using a clock in attestation is that it leaves
a short time window for attacks. One remedy is to use a challenge-response scheme,
which however incurs one additional round of network flow.
Our scheme can be integrated with authentication schemes without a graphic
interface, e.g., a secure terminal. It is compatible with automatic login, since the
user can still activate attestation and type the keyboard.
Note that both the runtime attestation and the user presence attestation require
that Guardian’s RSA public key can be correctly verified by the challenger. For
cooperate users, the public keys in use can be certified through a common PKI. We
also remark that the proposed user presence authentication is not compatible with
automatic password submission.
User Presence Attestation Evaluation
The user presence attestation service is built using a Dell USB-keyboard attached on
the EHCI host controller. A loadable module listens to the activation command (e.g.,
CTRL+ALT+PAGEUP). The sign algorithm is the same as the one in the software
runtime attestation. We built a client and a server to simulate the login procedure.
Before typing into the user name and password, the user pressed the activation key
combination to enable the user-presence-attestation service. Guardian signed the
timestamp of the first keystroke. Later the server checked the username, password
and the login-timestamp to verify if the user is able to login. The experiments
show that the user presence attestation service can be easily integrated with current
communication protocol (e.g., SSL/TLS) to enhance the login security. Note that
the user presence attestation service adds 0.2K SLOC into Guardian.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we proposed several systems to harden a system. Specifically,
we designed and implemented a lightweight and reliable hypervisor Guardian as
the system secure foothold, which is the first bare-metal hypervisor with integri-
ty and availability guarantees. Guardian leveraged virtualization technology and a
secure boot and shutdown mechanism to protect itself in the whole life cycle. More-
over, we extended Guardian to be a framework of secure foothold, which consisted
of summarized common security primitives for facilitating our proposed systems
and other security services in the future. Built upon Guardian, AppShield created
isolated execution environments for protecting critical applications. In an IEE, the
secrecy and integrity of code and data together with the execution integrity are guar-
anteed. In addition, the application can use the memory and issue system calls in
the same fashion as in a normal setting.
As the inputs and outputs of the protected applications are not protected by
Appshield, we proposed DriverGuard to protect them by building trusted paths be-
tween the protected application and hardware input/output devices. DriverGuard is
a generic I/O protection system protecting all kinds of I/O flows with combination of
cryptographic and virtualization techniques. We also proposed a dedicated system
KGuard to protect passwords in the increasingly popular online services. KGuard
efficiently and securely built a trusted path from the keyboard to the remote web
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server, against all system key-loggers, as well as all kinds of network eavesdropper-
s. Note that the trusted paths built by DriverGuard and KGuard did not leverage any
special hardware.
We implemented the prototypes of all the above systems, and evaluated their
performance overheads. The experiment results showed that the performance costs
on CPU computation and device I/O are insignificant.
8.1 Look into the Future
One of the main reasons why malware is rampant in today’s computers is the failure
of the operating system’s security protection, which in turn is caused by its enor-
mous code size and complexity. A strategic architecture change by taking security
into consideration may combat malware more efficiently and effectively. It is not
impossible that the future platform architecture encloses the hypervisor as the se-
cure foothold functioning as a trustworthy security delegate between the operating
system and hardware. The OS and the hypervisor jointly form a holistic security
framework against malicious software. We do not expect the hypervisor to protect
the OS from being subverted (which is intractable in our view). Instead, the OS and
the hypervisor can jointly provide reliable access control and monitoring services
for applications and the enduser. The operating system can define security policies
based on the user demands, while the hypervisor enforces them by relying on the
hardware. Since policies are essentially data, it is easier to check their integrity. In
addition, the hypervisor can also provide a series of security services to the OS and
applications in an on-demand fashion, such as a strong isolation, whereby the user
has the flexibility to choose between security and performance.
The systems and techniques proposed in this dissertation has laid a solid foun-
dation towards trustworthy systems. In the following, we attempt to propose new
security services based on them or extend them to harden new platforms.
• Whole Platform ROP Defence. Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a
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sophisticated exploitation technique that is able to drive target application-
s/OSes to perform arbitrary unintended operations by constructing a gadget
chain reusing existing small code sequences (gadgets). To detect and prevent
ROP attacks, many solutions are proposed. However, none of them is the w-
hole system protection scheme, where the proposed scheme protects all user
applications and the OS simultaneously. The hypervisor beneath OS is able
to protect itself from all guest ROP attacks, and at the same time, it is able to
efficiently access both kernel and user spaces in real time. All these make it
possible to propose a hypervisor-based scheme to support the whole system
against ROP attacks. In the future work, we aim to design and implement a
whole platform protection system to efficiently defend against ROP attacks.
• Application Protection with Availability Guarantee. All existing in-VM
solutions that are able to protect applications through isolated execution en-
vironments cannot ensure the availability of the protected applications. It
means that the compromised OS is able to shutdown or halt the protected ap-
plications, preventing them from occupying the CPU to run their services. If
we put the scheduler which can explicitly put the protected applications on
the CPU into the hypervisor space, the size and the complexity of the hyper-
visor will increase. Moreover, the frequent hypervisor-guest context switches
will dramatically reduce the performance of the whole platform, especially
for the protected applications. In the future work, we aim to seek a solution to
achieve the availability with low performance overhead and minimum TCB
expansion.
• File Access Control On Untrusted OS. Traditional file access control is an
OS-based mechanism to prevent illicit access from applications. The security
of the access control completely relies on the trustworthiness of the OS. Once
the OS is compromised, kernel rootkits will freely access/modify/delete any
files. To enforce file access control upon an untrusted OS, a hypervisor-based
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file access control is needed. To build such mechanism, the main challenges
are from the semantic gap and the performance consideration. Specifically,
a hypervisor is usually not equipped with disk drivers and file systems due
to security considerations (i.e., keeping hypervisor small and simple), which
cause that the hypervisor misses the file-level information even if it is able
to intercept disk I/O. In addition, the frequent context switches due to the
interception on the disk I/O will dramatically reduce the speed of disk I/O
and the CPU utilization. In the future work, we aim to seek a solution to
efficiently and reliably enforce file access control.
• Secure Foothold for Mobile. Mobile phones are integral to our daily lives.
A mobile phone usually contains a lot of sensitive personal information and
many third-party applications, which attracts the adversary’s attention. At
the same time, the new mobile phones are designed to efficiently support
virtualization and TrustZone technologies simultaneously. All these make it
possible to deploy new virtualization-based and/or TrustZone-based secure
foothold to harden mobile systems. Based on the new secure foothold, many
security services could be built. In the future work, we aim to seek a way to
build a new reliable and lightweight mobile secure foothold to facilitate the
design and the implementation of mobile security services.
• Secure Foothold for Cloud Instance (VM). Our current technology is able to
create a reliable secure foothold for personal computers, but it will fail in the
cloud computing setting. Specifically, in a cloud platform, a hypervisor has
been executed before the guest instance (VM) starts to run. In this way, the
secure foothold of the guest instance is not able to get the highest privilege of
the whole system that has been occupied by the platform hypervisor. Facing
such situations, in the future work, we aim to seek a new technology to create
a reliable secure foothold for the guest instance, and make it coexist with the
hypervisor of the platform.
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